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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research has generally shown a very small although statistically 
significant economic benefit from attending high-quality colleges. This small effect was 
at odds with what students’ college choices and various social theories would seem to 
suggest. This study sought to reconcile the empirical evidence and theories. The effort 
was in two directions. First, the economic effect of college quality was reexamined—not 
only for an “average” student, but also for different students. Second, the effect of college 
quality was expanded from examining only the economic benefit to considering other 
student outcomes, including job satisfaction and graduate degree accomplishment. A new 
perspective regarding the social role of college quality was offered in conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
American higher education has experienced massive expansion in the 20th 
century, especially over the last 40 years. In 2000 there were approximately 4,200 
institutions of higher education in the United States and its territories, enrolling about 
15.3 million students (National Center for Education Statistics, 2003).1 The diversity of 
this large enterprise was extraordinary, ranging from two-year colleges providing mainly 
vocational training and preparing students for further education to large research 
universities offering a variety of education and research. As the majority of high school 
graduates in the United States attended colleges, the differentiation of educational 
attainment increasingly went beyond the dichotomy of college graduates versus non-
college graduates.2 This reality encouraged differentiation among college graduates, with 
one dimension being college quality.3
                                                          
1 These institutions included 2,450 four-year colleges (enrolling approximately 9.4 million students) and 
1,732 two-year colleges (with about 5.9 million students).  
2 According to National Center for Education Statistics (2003), 61.7% of the nation’s high school graduates 
attended colleges in 2001.  
3 Phrases such as college quality and high-quality colleges may sound ambiguous to some researchers. 
Some may suggest that other words such as selectivity be used. Admittedly, selectivity is more concrete and 
easier to measure, yet college quality is certainly more than selectivity. In this dissertation, I chose the word 
quality but used it as a relative measure. In many cases, high-quality colleges may be interpreted as 
colleges with relatively high quality. The major measure of college quality in this study is Barron’s index (a 
composite selectivity index constructed on the basis of entering students’ class rank, high school grade 
point average, average SAT scores, and the percentage of applicants admitted). See Chapter 3 for a detailed 
discussion. Also, I used other measures of quality, such as mean SAT scores of the entering class, tuition 
and fees, and Carnegie Classifications to capture different aspects of college quality. In cases where the 
term most prestigious or elite institutions is used, it refers to a smaller subset of high-quality colleges. 
Finally, college quality may be interpreted as characteristics of institutions or as characteristics of students. 
To some extent, these two interpretations are the same. 
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Whereas college quality appeared to have profound effects on some student 
outcomes, graduates’ earnings have long been the particular interest of the research 
community in the finance of higher education and in labor economics. Many researchers, 
in one way or another, have made the case that college quality was an element in the 
formation of human capital and thus had an important effect on earnings. Weisbrod and 
Karpoff (1968), Reed and Miller (1970), Solmon (1973, 1975), and Wise (1975) were 
among the first to explore the effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings. Behrman 
and Birdsall (1983) showed that quantity alone was not sufficient to capture the return of 
education and that quality should be incorporated into the standard Mincerian (1962, 
1974) framework.4 Recently, studies by Brewer and his colleagues (Brewer & Ehrenberg, 
1996; Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg, 1999; Eide, Brewer, & Ehrenberg, 1998) and Thomas 
(2000a, 2003) have significantly improved our understanding of the economic effect of 
college quality.  
Implicitly or explicitly recognized in these studies was that the quality of college 
education, in addition to college education itself, might have significant effects on 
graduates’ earnings. Most studies along this line, however, found that college quality 
generally had a very small though statistically significant effect on earnings (Mueller, 
1988; Solmon & Wachtel, 1975; Thomas, 2000a). A similar conclusion was drawn by 
                                                          
4 In the simplest Mincerian frame, the return of education is estimated by εβββ +++= EDUCXW 210ln , 
where  is the logarithm of earnings or hourly wage rate, Wln X  is a set of individual characteristics 
typically including race, gender, and family background variables, and  is the quantity of education, 
usually measured in years of schooling. In this framework, 
EDUC
2β  is the return of one additional year of 
education. More recent research has suggested that quantity alone is not sufficient to capture the return of 
education (e.g., Behrman & Birdsall, 1983); other dimensions of education such as quality of education 
have been incorporated into the equation. 
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Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) in their review of the literature on the effect of college 
quality on earnings. 
These empirical results appeared to be at great odds with decisions made by many 
students and their families: If college quality had such a small effect on earnings, why 
were so many more than willing to pay the increasingly large tuition charges at high-
quality colleges? Why did so many work so hard to gain admission to high-quality 
colleges? For example, for the top 15 liberal arts colleges nationally, the “sticker price” 
or stated tuition level was $18,057 in 1994-1995, with other institutions (including 2,739 
four-year institutions) charging about $5,919 (Ehrenberg, 2000). In 2000-2001 the 
average tuition rate of Ivy League institutions was about $25,350, while other institutions 
charged about $8,000, on average. Despite their extraordinarily high tuition rates, the 
acceptance rates at these elite institutions were surprisingly low. According to US News 
and World Report, in 2000-2001 the average acceptance rate at the top 15 liberal arts 
colleges was 35%, and the figure was 18% at Ivy League institutions. The high demand 
for these high-priced seats at prestigious institutions suggested a larger effect of college 
quality than has been shown by the bulk of previous research.5
Further, the empirical results from previous studies were inconsistent with the 
disproportionate representation of graduates from high-quality colleges (especially 
private, elite institutions) among those generally considered to be “most successful” in 
the United States. National leaders almost without exception held degrees from highly 
selective private institutions—the Adamses, Roosevelts, Tafts, Kennedys, and Bushes in 
                                                          
5 Here a high-quality college eduation is regarded as an investment instead of a consumption good. 
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politics and the Mellons, Rockefellers, and Fords in economic affairs. This evidence was 
not just anecdotal. In a study investigating the predictors of executive career success, 
Judge, Cable, Boudreau, and Bretz (1995) found that nearly 1 in every 10 executives was 
from an Ivy League university, not to mention those from other high-quality institutions. 
This evidence suggested an enormous impact of high-quality colleges, especially the 
most prestigious institutions, on social status and power, if not income.6
Finally, the results were in conflict with what social theories would suggest. Many 
social theories would suggest great benefits associated with attending high-quality 
colleges. From the economic perspective, the decision to choose high-quality colleges, 
which often meant paying high tuition and fees, was based on a comparison of the 
financial benefits and costs of such an investment. Considering the substantial tuition 
difference between high-quality colleges (especially high-quality private colleges) and 
low-quality ones (especially low-quality public colleges), one would expect significant 
earnings differences between graduates of these two types of institutions. Human capital 
theory, a major theory in explaining success in labor markets, also argued for large 
economic benefits associated with a high-quality college education. The theory posits that 
the labor market rewards investments individuals make in themselves (e.g., their 
education or training) and that these investments lead to higher salaries (Becker, 1964, 
1992; Schultz, 1960, 1961). High-quality colleges, which usually possess quality 
                                                          
6 An alternative explanation is that these “successful” individuals would have been successful anyway, 
regardless of the quality of colleges they attended. Statistically speaking, being “successful” could be due 
to individual heterogeneity, but not state dependence. The individual heterogeneity can be controlled if it is 
observable (by the analyst); otherwise, it becomes the well-known problem of selection bias. Both views 
are entertained in subsequent chapters. 
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academic faculty, capable and motivated students, large libraries, well-equipped 
laboratories, and so on, appear to provide their students with better resources for human 
capital improvement than low-quality colleges.  
It seems, then, that empirical evidence is not fully consistent with everyday 
observations and social theories. Can these observations and theories be reconciled with 
the empirical evidence? What is the role of college quality in society? Answering these 
questions is the goal of this study. 
To achieve this goal, I broaden the research on the effects of college quality on 
earnings by examining the variability in the effect of college quality along an array of 
factors. Whereas previous research has evaluated the effects of college quality at the 
mean of the earnings distribution, I consider the effects more broadly. Implications and 
applications of mean results or “average” effects are based implicitly on the assumption 
that the monetary effect of college quality is homogenous across different students. This 
assumption is convenient but potentially problematic. Intuitively, it is probable that 
college quality may matter to some students but not to others. For example, it may be that 
it is more productive (greater “value added”) for a more capable student to study at an 
elite institution than for one who is intellectually less capable. Therefore, empirical 
results stated at the average may mislead many students and their families. If it can be 
shown that substantial differences in earnings exist among particular groups of students 
enrolled in colleges of varying quality, then the results of prior studies, although 
presumably valid on average, may lead to invalid generalizations with regard to specific 
individuals and specific colleges.  
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Also, I extend the study of the effects of college quality beyond the area of 
earnings differences. Most previous studies on the effect of college quality have ignored 
the effect of college quality on non-monetary outcomes. Bowen (1977) suggests that a 
college education might have effects on a variety of non-monetary outcomes. So too 
might college quality have effects on various non-monetary aspects of students’ lives. 
Due to lack of data and other limitations, an inventory of such non-monetary outcomes is 
apparently impossible. In this dissertation, I consider the effects of college quality on two 
non-monetary outcomes: graduate education and job satisfaction. (Graduate education is 
a particularly interesting outcome in that it may in turn have positive effects on earnings.) 
If it can be shown that college quality has a positive effect on non-monetary outcomes, 
such as graduate education and job satisfaction, then focusing on economic benefits alone 
could understate the real effects of college quality. Significant and positive effects of 
college quality on non-monetary outcomes may add considerably to the relatively small, 
average, monetary effects of college quality and in the process bridge the gap between 
social theories and prior empirical results. By expanding the previous research on the 
effects of college quality in these two directions, my ultimate goal is to explore a new 
perspective on the impact of college quality, especially to certain groups of students.  
The organization of this dissertation is as follows.7 In Chapter 2, I review the 
literature on the effect of college quality on earnings and argue that the average effect of 
                                                          
7 The organization of this dissertation deviates from the conventional five-chapter format, namely, 
introduction, literature review, data and methods, results, and discussion. Because this dissertation 
investigates a variety of research questions, I divide them into smaller chapters (Chapters 3 to 7 investigate 
five research questions, although these research questions are inherently related). Moreover, because a 
variety of methods are used to fit the analysis in each chapter, I do not tend to write an overall methods 
chapter; instead, methods are discussed with the actual analysis of each research question. 
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college quality as examined in previous studies disguises much of the variation in the 
effect of college quality across individuals and overlook the non-monetary outcomes. I 
then provide the theories that guide the inquiry into the variability in the effects of 
college quality. Specifically, I discuss two representative theories: human capital theory, 
which, from a rational perspective, accentuates the positive role of education on 
individual economic outcomes, and social reproduction theory, which, from a critical 
perspective, highlights the interaction between socioeconomic status and educational 
attainment. The discussion of social reproduction theory leads to three research questions 
and corresponding hypotheses, which are analyzed and tested in three subsequent 
chapters. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on degree attainment by examining the variability in the 
probability of earning degrees at high-quality institutions. The probability may vary 
across individuals due to various academic and non-academic factors. Further, these 
academic and non-academic factors may be related to each other in certain ways. 
Analysis in this chapter situates the discussion of the variability in the effects of college 
quality across individuals in a proper context. These are two different equity issues, but 
both should be considered in understanding the role of college quality in particular and 
education in general in society. Focusing on the varying effects of college quality among 
individuals without examining the varying probability of earning degrees at high-quality 
colleges does not capture the complete relationship among socioeconomic factors, 
educational attainment, and graduates’ earnings. 
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A series of questions is posed in this chapter. For example, how is the probability 
of earning a degree at high-quality institutions related to students’ demographic 
characteristics? What is the effect of family background? Does student ability play any 
role? If so, how is student ability related to demographic and family background 
characteristics? These research questions point to larger issues of post-secondary access 
and baccalaureate attainment; more importantly, they provide a proper context for 
thinking about different effects of college quality for different individuals. 
In Chapter 4, I explore the variability in the effects of college quality among 
different individuals by gender, race/ethnicity, family income, parental education, 
intellectual ability, and major fields of study. Essentially, the question here is whether 
different students are able to realize the same amount of economic benefit from earning 
degrees at high-quality institutions. Examining the difference in the effect of college 
quality among different individuals helps explain the social role of college quality. 
In this chapter, I first establish an empirical model to estimate the average effect 
of college quality on graduates’ earnings. The estimated effect is on average in the sense 
that there might be variations among different groups of students and across different 
points of the earnings distribution. This model has been discussed and tested by other 
researchers and myself in previous studies of the effect of college quality (Thomas, 2003; 
Thomas & Zhang, 2002). Then I investigate some technical issues related to the model 
before it is applied to specific groups of students. These issues include correction for 
selection bias, Hierarchical Linear Modeling, measures of college quality, and earnings 
growth over time. Finally, I explore the variability in the effects of college quality among 
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different individuals by gender, race/ethnicity, family income, parental education, 
intellectual ability, and major fields of study. Varying effects of college quality across 
different individuals are crucial in understanding the social role of college quality. 
In Chapter 5, I consider the other dimension of the variations in the effect of 
college quality, that is, variation across the earnings distribution. For example, do high-
quality colleges affect students who end up at the bottom of the earnings distribution 
more than those who end up at the top of the earnings distribution? In other words, does 
college quality compress or stretch the earnings distribution? These questions point to the 
different predictive power of college quality for individuals at different positions in the 
earnings distribution. Put simply, college quality may matter more for students who end 
up at the top of the earnings distribution than those at the bottom. In an era when college 
education becomes quite universal and, more importantly, as previous research has 
shown that college education tends to compress the earnings distribution (Eide & 
Showalter, 1999), the role of college quality as a differentiating apparatus needs to be 
examined properly. 
The analysis of the effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings would not be 
complete without examining the effect of college quality on graduate study. The benefit 
of attending colleges of higher quality is more than earnings premium; it may involve the 
opportunity to obtain further education, which in turn yields a positive economic effect. 
This idea is framed as the option value by Weisbrod (1962). If it can be shown that 
college quality has a positive effect on graduate education and moreover that graduate 
education has a positive effect on earnings, then estimates of the effects of undergraduate 
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college quality based on earning differences among terminal baccalaureate recipients is 
most likely underestimated. In Chapter 6, I study the effect of college quality on graduate 
school enrollment and graduate degree attainment. For example, how does the quality of 
college attended affect a student’s decision to enter and complete a graduate degree 
program? For those who have actually enrolled in graduate programs, how does college 
quality affect the program type, specifically a master’s versus doctoral program? And 
what is the effect of college quality on the selection of graduate institutions, that is, 
comprehensive, doctoral, or research institutions? 
In Chapter 7, I investigate the effect of college quality on another non-monetary 
aspect of student outcomes, job satisfaction. The effect of college quality on job 
satisfaction is not clear-cut. On one hand, College quality may have a positive effect on 
job satisfaction by raising graduates’ earnings. On the other hand, college quality may be 
related to how well one’s occupational expectations are met, possibly resulting in a 
negative job satisfaction effect. Whereas the small number of studies that have addressed 
this question suggest that college quality has little direct effect on an individual’s job 
satisfaction (Bisconti & Solmon, 1977; Ochsner & Solmon, 1979; Solmon, Bisconti, & 
Ochsner, 1977), these studies have tended to suffer from several weaknesses, including 
inadequate job satisfaction measures, inappropriate treatment of the categorical 
dependent variable, and neglect of the endogeneity of earnings. My analysis seeks to 
overcome these shortcomings. 
From Chapter 3 to Chapter 7, I provide an examination of the entire process of 
post-secondary attainment––from baccalaureate attainment to graduate education and to 
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outcomes in labor market at the early stage of graduates’ careers. Throughout this 
process, college quality is the element of particular interest. The effect of college quality 
and the role of high-quality institutions may be better understood in the larger frame of 
post-secondary attainment. 
In the concluding chapter, I sum up all the findings of this study and turn back to 
my starting point: What have we learned about the effect of college quality from this 
study? In summarizing my major findings, I discuss various variations in the effect of 
college quality, suggesting that the average economic effect of college quality as 
estimated in previous studies disguises many variations of the effect across an array of 
factors. Moreover, I examine the social role of college quality by integrating various 
components of the analysis in this study, arguing that college quality plays an important 
role in preserving and perpetuating socioeconomic structure in American society. Finally, 
I explore the policy implications of this dissertation for educational practitioners and 
policy makers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Generally speaking, the modern literature on the economic effect of college 
quality began with studies by Weisbrod and Karpoff (1968), Wales (1973), Solmon and 
Wachtel (1975), and Wise (1975) and recently has undergone a renaissance with works 
by Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996), Brewer and Ehrenberg (1996), Brewer 
et al. (1999), and Dale and Krueger (1999). Pascarella and Terenzini completed a 
summary and criticism in 1991. Not only were the results of studies of these issues 
important for academic and theoretical purposes, they were also important to prospective 
students and their parents who paid more of the increasing costs of higher education, 
especially at prestigious institutions (Ehrenberg, 2000). 
Table 2.1 summarized 24 previous studies of the effect of college quality on 
earnings. Although the list was by no means exhaustive, it included most of the 
published, methodologically rigorous studies. Twelve of these studies have been 
summarized in Brewer et al. (1999). Almost without exception, studies in Table 2.1 used 
more or less the same methods: Individual i’s log earnings or hourly wage rate ( ) 
was a function of the quality of institution j he or she actually attended ( ), 
demographic characteristics ( ), family background ( ), academic background ( ), 
job market conditions ( ), and an individual disturbance term (
)ln( iY
ijQ
iD iF iA
iJ iµ ). In mathematical 
notation, 
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Table 2.1 
Summary of Previous Studies of the Effect of College Quality on Earnings 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
*Weisbrod 
& Karpoff 
(1968) 
7,000 male 
college graduates 
at AT&T in 1956 
4-fold rating of college 
by personnel office 
Academic performance, 
years of experience 
Annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
Larger return to 
more selective 
college if similar 
class rank achieved. 
 
      
       
      
 
*Reed & 
Miller 
(1970) 
2,559 male 
college graduates 
from CPS 
supplement in 
1967 
7-fold ranking based 
on freshmen aptitude 
index 
Age, major, race, 
father’s occupation, 
father’s education, 
region, urban HS 
Average 
weekly 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
Higher earnings 
associated with 
higher rank. 
 
*Wales 
(1973) 
3,700 white males 
with at least some 
college. NBER-
Thorndike Air 
Force pilot 
trainees in 1943, 
earnings data in 
1969 
5-fold classification 
based on Gourman 
rating, graduate school 
rankings 
IQ estimate, schooling 
dummies, religion, age, 
father’s education, 
marital status, 
biographical variable 
(family income, 
education, and hobbies), 
occupational dummies 
 
Monthly 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
Top fifth college 
increases earnings 
substantially. 
Quality effect varies 
by education level, 
but not by ability 
level. 
 
*Solmon 
(1973, 
1975) 
1,511 white males 
from NBER-
Thorndike data 
with 1969 
earnings, and 
1,199 from 1955 
earnings 
Gourman overall and 
academic rating, 
average faculty salary, 
SAT score, 
instructional 
expenditures per FTE 
students, university 
income and 
expenditure, single 
overall measure in 
some models 
IQ estimate, years of 
education, experience 
and experience squared, 
occupational dummies 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
All quality measures 
have positive effect 
on earnings when 
entered separately. 
Average SATs and 
faculty salary are 
isolated as 
independent factors. 
Effect does not vary 
with years of college 
or with ability. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
*Solmon & 
Wachtel 
(1975) 
3,489 white male 
college attendees 
in NBER-
Thorndike sample 
as Wales (1973) 
8-fold classification 
based on Carnegie 
Commission ratings 
IQ estimate, years of 
schooling, years of 
experience and 
experience squared, 
occupational dummies 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
Quality has 
significant effect on 
earnings. Rate of 
return also varies 
with quality. Quality 
effect does not vary 
by ability for those 
who did not attend 
graduate school. 
Quality added 
separately and 
interactively with 
years of schooling. 
      
       
 
*Wise 
(1975) 
976 white male 
college graduates 
in a single 
manufacturing 
firm in 1968 
6-fold classification 
based on Astin’s 
college selectivity 
index 
GPA, rank in class, 
major, years of 
experience before firm, 
average rate of salary 
increase, SES, indices of 
job security, leadership, 
initiative, and supervisor 
rating 
Log monthly 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
Rate of salary 
increase rises with 
college selectivity, 
and selectivity effect 
similar across GPA. 
College selectivity 
permitted only to 
affect rate of salary 
increase. 
*Wachtel 
(1976) 
1,633 males from 
NBER-Thorndike 
sample in 1969, 
including those 
with only high 
school 
Expenditures per FTE 
student at 
undergraduate and 
graduate levels 
MAT scores, father’s 
education, years of 
experience and 
experience squared, 
years of schooling, 
college/graduate school 
dummies, school 
expenditures per pupil in 
high school district 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
College 
expenditures per 
student have 
significant effects 
for non-graduate 
college attendees, 
but small effects on 
graduate college 
attendees. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
*Griffin & 
Alexander 
(1978) 
525 male college 
attendees from 
ETS 1955 sample, 
1970 follow up 
Astin’s selectivity 
index 
SAT score, high school 
class rank, GPA, honors, 
mother’s education, 
father’s education and 
occupation, parental 
income, household 
possessions, religion, 
educational experiences, 
counseling and 
orientation, occupational 
aspirations, academic 
self image. HS 
curriculum and 
math/science course, 
major region, urban high 
school 
Annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
College selectivity 
positively related to 
earnings, but effect 
small. 
 
       
*Morgan & 
Duncan 
(1979) 
881 males and 
517 females from 
1974 PSID 
sample of college 
attendees 
Average ACT/SAT 
scores of entering 
freshmen, college 
expenditure per FTE, 
Coleman prestige 
ranking 
Scores on sentence 
completion test, years of 
experience, job tenure, 
city size, father’s 
occupation and 
education, amount of 
college completed, 
annual hours worked, 
occupation 
Log hourly 
wages 
estimated by 
OLS 
Quality measures 
insignificant for 
females. For males, 
only freshman ACT 
significant. Effect 
varies by years of 
college. 
Separately by males 
and females. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
Trusheim 
& Crouse 
(1981) 
4,836 males from 
Panel Study of 
Income 
Dynamics, with 
some four-year 
college education 
Average SAT/ACT 
scores of the entering 
freshmen 
Test scores, father’s 
occupation, father and 
mother’s education, 
number of siblings, 
dummies for non-south, 
non-farm, non-foreign 
upbringing, achievement 
motivation, education 
and occupation, weeks 
worked 
Earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
College selectivity 
has a significant 
impact on middle-
aged men’s income 
in a single year, but 
not affect further 
growth in income. 
 
      
      
 
Mueller 
(1988) 
3,094 male and 
3,833 female 
students from 
1971 ACE/UCLA 
Freshman Survey, 
with earnings 
from 1979-80 
HERI follow-up 
survey 
Average SAT scores 
of the entering 
freshmen 
Mother’s education, 
father’s education, 
parental income, HS 
rank, financial 
aspiration, concern for 
financing college, 
academic ability, 
academic motivation, 
confidence, degree 
aspiration, college 
control, highest degree, 
occupational prestige 
 
Recursive 
structural 
equation 
models 
Quality could 
explain only a 
minute percentage 
of variance in 
income above and 
beyond the controls, 
but it had a 
significant indirect 
impact on earnings. 
This study examined 
the direct, indirect, 
and non-causal 
effects of selectivity 
on earnings for both 
sexes. 
*Kingston 
& Smart 
(1990) 
1971 sample in 
1980 cooperative 
Institutional 
Research 
Program, 2,213 
college attendees 
with BAs or less 
Public/private and 
selectivity categories 
based on SAT scores 
of freshmen 
HS grades and class 
ranking, race, sex, 
parental income, 
mother’s and father’s 
education, GPA, HS 
type, occupational 
aspiration, leadership 
index, college GPA, 
science major dummies 
Approximate 
annual 
income 
estimated by 
OLS 
Significantly higher 
income from higher 
selectivity college, 
non-linear effects. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
Karabel & 
McClelland 
(1987) 
3,144 college 
attendees from 
1973 
Occupational 
Changes in a 
Generation 
Survey 
7-fold classification 
based on Astin’s 
selectivity index 
Father’s education, 
mother’s education, 
father’s occupation, 
mother’s occupation, 
education level, Duncan 
SEI of respondent’s 
occupation 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
College quality 
affects earnings of 
advantaged students 
more than to 
disadvantaged 
students. Aggregate 
models of the 
impact of 
institutional rank are 
problematic.  
 
      
      
 
Smart 
(1988) 
3,357 students 
from 1970 and 
1980 Cooperative 
Institutional 
Research Program 
(CIRP) survey 
3-fold classification 
based on SAT/ACT 
scores, expenditures 
per student, and tuition 
College grades, sex, 
SES, HS academic 
record, race, college size, 
major, highest degree 
earned, job complexity, 
organizational size and 
nature 
Income level 
(a nine-point 
scale based 
on actual 
earnings) 
estimated by 
structural 
equations 
College quality has 
a significant indirect 
effect only for those 
in public 
organizations, but 
not for those in 
private 
organizations. 
Earnings are a 
functions of a 
complex series of 
events, including 
students attributes, 
college types, 
performance in 
college, nature of 
employers, and 
characteristics of 
their jobs. 
 
*Fox 
(1993) 
853 college 
graduates in 1986, 
HS&B seniors 
Dummy for most 
competitive colleges 
based on Barron’s 
rating 
HS&B verbal and math 
scores, male and 
race/ethnicity dummies, 
family income, HS 
grades, college major, 
and private college 
dummies 
Log hourly 
wage 
estimated by 
OLS, 
simulates net 
earnings 
profiles 
Premium from 
attending elite 
institution higher if 
private. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
*James et 
al. (1989) 
 
 
1,241 (1989) and 
1,107 (1993) male 
college graduates 
in 1986 from 
NLS-72 
Log 
instructional/general 
expenditures per 
student, average SATs 
of entering freshmen 
SAT, HS rank, HS GPA, 
college GPA, 
Public/private dummies, 
research/Ph.D. dummies, 
% students part time, % 
graduate students, % 
liberal arts majors, own 
SAT minus average SAT 
squared, major, race, 
religion, number of 
siblings, father’s 
education and 
occupation, Catholic HS, 
HS size, months 
experience, job tenure, 
weeks worked, marital 
status, 
occupation/industry 
dummies 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
WLS. Fixed 
effect model 
with college 
dummies 
only 
Average SAT has 
positive effects on 
earnings, except in 
models with 
occupation/industry 
dummies, 
expenditure 
variables 
insignificant. 
Some specifications 
with an IV for 
selectivity and 
expenditures per 
students. 
       
*Loury & 
Garman 
(1995) 
2,013 male 
college attendees 
from NLS-72 in 
1979 or 1986 
Median SAT score of 
college 
SAT, GPA, race, weeks 
worked, rural dummy, 
parental income, years of 
college, major dummies 
Log weekly 
earnings by 
WLS 
College quality 
positively affects 
earnings for Blacks 
but nor for Whites 
in full model’ for 
college completers 
with same ability 
selectivity had very 
small effect. 
Model allows effect 
of major, GPA, 
college SAT and 
years of college to 
vary by race. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
Rumberger 
& Thomas 
(1993) 
8,021 BA 
completers from 
Recent College 
Graduates (RCG) 
1987 Survey 
Astin’s selectivity 
score 
Sex, race/ethnicity, 
father’s education, 
mother’s education, 
father’s occupation, 
mother’s occupation, 
college major, GPA, 
private/public dummy, 
labor market conditions 
(including working 
experience, hours per 
week, public sector, self-
employed, degree 
requirement, job not 
related to major) 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS and 
HLM 
College quality 
affects initial 
earnings of college 
graduates, but the 
effect is small and 
not consistent for 
student of different 
majors. 
 
      
      
 
Behrman et 
al.  
(1996) 
8,400 female 
twins born in 
Minnesota in 
1936-1955 
Private, Ph.D. 
granting, college size, 
average full professor 
salary, expenditures 
per student, total 
students per faculty 
School years, working 
experience 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS 
Higher faculty 
salary, granting of 
Ph.D., smaller 
college size, and 
private controls 
have significant 
positive effects on 
earnings. 
 
This study used data 
on female twins to 
difference out 
common unobserved 
effects. 
Brewer & 
Ehrenberg 
(1996) 
2,549 college 
attendees from 
HS&B 1980 
Senior cohort, 
with 1986 
earnings 
6-fold classification 
based on Barron’s 
rating 
Female, race, family 
size, father’s education, 
mother’s education, test 
scores, part-time job, 
undergraduate/graduate 
dummies 
Log hourly 
wage 
estimated in 
the context of 
a structural 
model, 
correction for 
selection bias 
Attending an elite 
private college does 
not necessarily pay 
off in terms of early 
earnings, but it 
increases the 
probability of 
graduate school 
enrollment. 
The structural model 
allows for the 
correction of self-
selection bias. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
Brewer et 
al. (1999) 
3,062 college 
attendees from 
NLS-72 and 2,165 
from HS&B 
Sophomore cohort  
6-fold classification 
based on Barron’s 
rating 
Female, race, family 
size, father’s education, 
mother’s education, test 
scores, part-time job, 
undergraduate/graduate 
dummies 
Log hourly 
wage 
estimated in 
the context of 
a structural 
model, 
correction for 
selection bias 
Larger premium to 
attending an elite 
private institution, 
smaller premium to 
attending a middle-
rated private 
institution. Return to 
elite private college 
increases for 1980 
cohort as compared 
to 1972 cohort. 
It uses longitudinal 
data to examine the 
changes of labor 
market returns 
across time for a 
given cohort. The 
structural model 
allows for the 
correction of self-
selection bias. 
      
      
 
Dale & 
Krueger 
(1999) 
College and 
Beyond (C&B) 
1976 cohort, with 
1995 earnings 
Average SAT scores 
divided by 100 
Race/ethnicity, 
SAT/100, HS top 10%, 
college athlete, 
additional applications, 
undergraduate percentile 
in class, advanced 
degree, public/private 
dummies, liberal arts, 
average tuition charged 
 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
OLS, 
correction for 
selection bias 
Quality does not 
affect earnings, but 
tuition is 
significantly related 
to earnings. 
Correction for 
selection bias by 
matching sets of 
students who were 
accepted and 
rejected by the same 
groups of colleges. 
Thomas 
(2000a) 
3,832 BA 
completers from 
B&B first follow-
up in 1994 
Average SAT scores 
of the entering 
freshmen 
Sex, race/ethnicity, first 
generation BA, parental 
occupation, GPA, 
number of other colleges 
attended, attended 
community college, 
college major, labor 
market characteristics, 
private institution, 
college size, urban 
college 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
HLM 
College quality 
affects initial 
earnings but the 
effect is very small. 
Effect of private 
college is also small. 
The coefficient of 
quality college 
variable is 0.0001. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Study      Data source College quality
measure 
Controls Model Findings Notes
Thomas 
(2003) 
4,604 BA 
completers from 
B&B second 
follow-up in 1997 
Six-fold classification 
based on Astin’s 
selectivity index and 
institutional control 
Similar as in Thomas 
(2000a) 
Log annual 
earnings 
estimated by 
HLM 
Quality confers 
larger earning 
advantages 
compared with 
Thomas (2000a), 
both for public and 
private institutions. 
Academic 
performance and 
major also affect 
earnings 
significantly. 
 
* Studies with * are summarized in Brewer et al. (1999) 
  
 
 
35
iiiiiiji JAFDQY µαααααα ++++++= 543210)ln(                        (2.1) 
Popular measures of college quality included average SAT/ACT scores of entering 
freshmen (Dale & Krueger, 1999; Griffin & Alexander, 1978; Morgan & Duncan, 1979; 
Mueller, 1988; Solmon, 1973, 1975; Thomas; 2000a, 2003; Wise, 1975), Gourman rating 
(Solmon, 1973, 1975; Wales, 1973), Carnegie Classification (Solmon & Wachtel, 1975), 
tuition (Smart, 1988), expenditure per FTE student (Morgan & Duncan, 1979; Wachtel, 
1976), and Barron’s ratings (Brewer & Ehrenberg, 1996; Brewer et al., 1999). 
Early research usually used the conventional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
technique (e.g., Wales, 1973; Weisbrod & Karpoff, 1968). Structural equation models 
were sometimes employed to examine the direct and indirect effect of college quality on 
earnings (e.g., Mueller, 1988). Recent studies paid more attention to the econometric 
problems in the earnings equations such as equation 2.1. For example, Behrman et al. 
(1996) used data on female twins to control for common unobserved effects, and Brewer 
and Ehrenberg (1996) and Brewer et al. (1999) used structural models to allow for 
correction for selection bias. Thomas (2000a, 2003) employed a Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling (HLM) technique to entertain the multi-level structure of the survey data. 
Findings of these studies were not totally unequivocal.8 Some studies, for 
example, demonstrated significant and handsome economic benefits from attending high-
quality colleges. A recent exemplary study was Brewer et al. (1999). After controlling for 
gender, race/ethnicity, family size, parental education, test scores, and part-time job, they 
                                                          
8 This might be partially due to the different measures of college quality and estimating frameworks used in 
these studies. I examined these issues in more detail in Chapter 4 where technical issues of the model are 
discussed. 
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found that students who attended private elite institutions enjoyed a large salary 
premium. This finding was echoed by Thomas (2003) who also found substantial 
economic benefits from attending high-quality colleges five years after college 
graduation. In contrast, other studies have indicated either statistically non-significant or 
even negative effects of college quality on earnings. For example, Dale and Krueger 
(1999) found that college quality had either non-significant or negative effects on 
earnings after controlling for some salient, confounding variables. 
Putting aside those studies with “extreme” results (both strong positive effects and 
negative effects), most studies suggested that college quality had a statistically significant 
though generally very small effect on earnings (Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991). For 
example, a study by Solman and Wachtel (1975) analyzed a sample of white male college 
attendees in the 1943 NBER-Thorndike survey, which reported 1969 earnings and found 
that after controlling for IQ estimates, years of schooling, years of experience and 
experience squared, and occupations, college quality, assessed at the mean, had a 
statistically significant but economically very small effect on earnings: only about an 
additional 1% of the variance in 1969 earnings above and beyond control variables. A 
similar conclusion was reached by Mueller (1988), who confirmed that college quality 
could explain only a minute percentage of variance in earnings above and beyond the 
controls. In a more recent study, using a nationally representative sample of 4,061 college 
graduates in 1992, Thomas (2000a) found that college quality had a small ( 0001.0=β ) 
but statistically significant ( 10.0=α ) effect on earnings one year after college 
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graduation.9 Findings of most studies in Table 2.1 belonged to this category: College 
quality had a small although statistically significant effect on college graduates’ earnings. 
These empirical results appeared to be at great odds with the increasing cost gap 
among colleges of varying quality; neither were they consistent with the disproportionate 
representation of graduates from high-quality colleges (especially private, elite 
institutions) among those who were generally considered to be “most successful” in the 
United States. Apparently, a re-interpretation of the economic data and re-examination of 
the effect of college quality was warranted. In the remaining chapters of this dissertation, 
I broadened the research on the effects of college quality on earnings by examining the 
variability in the effect of college quality along an array of factors. I also extended the 
study of the effects of college quality beyond the area of earnings differences. 
What theories might guide the inquiry into these issues? If it was generally 
recognized in previous studies that a college education in general and college quality in 
particular have impacted graduates’ economic status, how would we interpret this effect? 
What theory (or theories) would help us understand the mechanism through which 
college quality takes effect? Further, in re-interpreting and re-examining the effect of 
college quality in this dissertation, how should we proceed with such an analysis? What 
theory (or theories) would guide us through the analysis and helps us understand the role 
of college quality in society? 
                                                          
9 In a later study, he found that college quality had a substantial effect on graduates’ earnings four to five 
years after graduation. Further, in comparing the effect of college quality at two points in time, Thomas and 
Zhang (2001) found that graduates from high-quality colleges increased their earnings substantially relative 
to those from low-quality colleges during the period. 
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Previous studies relied heavily on human capital theory in interpreting the effect 
of college quality on earnings. Human capital theory advocated investment in human 
capital as analogous to investment in physical capital and claimed a positive role for 
education in enhancing one’s labor productivity (hence income). Intensive economic 
analysis of human capital began with the work of Theodore Schultz (1960, 1961), Jacob 
Mincer (1962), and Gary Becker (1964). (More recently human capital theory has been 
widely used in explaining economic growth among nations and income distribution 
among individuals.) In most early work, education was presented merely by years of 
schooling. Later, thanks to studies examining the effect of educational quality (including 
those studies listed in Table 2.1), the quality of education has become a standard element 
in what has come to be called the Mincerian (1974) framework. 
According to human capital theory, the labor market rewards investments 
individuals make in themselves (e.g., their education or training) and these investments 
lead to higher salaries (Becker, 1964). High-quality colleges, which usually possess 
quality academic faculty, capable and motivated students, large libraries, well-equipped 
laboratories, and so on, would appear to provide their students with better resources for 
human capital improvement than low-quality colleges. Thus, most previous studies 
proceeded with the proposition that college quality may have significant effects on 
graduates’ earnings although the bulk of these studies have only shown a relatively small 
effect on those earnings.10
                                                          
10 Human capital theory provides a perspective to interpret the effect of college quality but does not suggest 
the magnitude of such an effect. However, considering the increasing gap between the costs of a college 
education among colleges of varying quality, we expect that college quality has a significant effect on 
graduates’ earnings if larger investments in human capital lead to higher income. 
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Whereas human capital theory acknowledges the positive role of education (in 
this particular case, college quality) in raising one’s income, it ignores many related 
issues. For example, previous studies have shown that college quality has a positive 
effect on graduates’ earnings, but does everyone have the same chance of earning degrees 
at high-quality colleges? Moreover, is the effect of college quality invariant across 
individuals with different backgrounds? Because human capital usually assumes that 
markets are free, rational, and impartial, and individuals are evaluated solely on their 
educational credentials, regardless of their gender, race/ethnicity, or social origins, it 
attributes labor market outcomes to individual choices. Therefore, human capital theory 
helps little in understanding the relationship among family backgrounds, educational 
attainment, and graduates’ earnings. As Bowles and Gintis (1975) critiqued, 
The theory of human capital . . . ultimately locates the sources of human 
happiness and misery in an interaction of human nature (preferences and 
“ability”) with nature itself (technologies and resources). This framework 
provides an elegant apology for almost any pattern of oppression or inequality…. 
It provides, in short, a good ideology for the defense of the status quo. But it is a 
poor science for understanding either the workings of the capitalist economy or 
the way towards an economic order more conducive to human happiness. (p. 82) 
To understand how class-related variables influence one’s educational attainment and 
how the effect of college quality varies across individuals, other theories that underscore 
the relationship between class and education are called for. 
A major theory that highlights the interaction between class and education is 
social reproduction theory.11 Social reproduction theorists, from a critical perspective, 
                                                          
11 Other useful frameworks are the signaling (Spence, 1973, 1974) and screening (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 
1976) hypotheses. Whereas in principle these two hypotheses involve two types of games and equilibria in 
the context of asymmetric information, in higher education research they are conveniently referred to as 
sorting hypotheses: students are sorted according to their educational credentials. For this type of sorting 
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recognize the positive role of education on labor market outcomes, but they proceed with 
the assumption that pedagogical practices are related to social practices and highlight the 
impact of class, race, and gender in determining the distribution of educational 
credentials among individuals (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Duncan, Featherman, & Duncan, 
1972; Sewell & Hauser, 1975). Social reproduction theory (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; 
Cookson & Persell, 1985; McLeod, 1987; Willis, 1981), suggests that the distribution of 
educational credentials is largely determined by one’s social class, and institutions such 
as high-quality colleges help preserve and reproduce the existing social structure. 
Perhaps the earliest work on the issue of social reproduction through education 
came from two French scholars, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1977). 
Drawing partially on Marxist tradition, they claimed that education produced certain 
understandings and perceptions that allowed the dominant class to maintain its status. 
Social reproduction theory shed light on the intergenerational transmission of social 
inequality and attempted to show how and why the United States could be depicted more 
accurately as the place where “the rich get richer and the poor stay poor” than as “the 
land of opportunity” (McLeod, 1987, p. 7). McLeod and Cookson and Persell (1985) 
explored how class was socially reproduced through education in American society. 
McLeod studied educational programs (such as the Occupational Education Program, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
mechanism to work in the particular case of college quality, there must be some costs associated with 
attending high-quality colleges. Moreover, these costs are higher for some individuals than for others, and 
those with lower costs have certain traits favored by the labor market. For example, if certain traits of the 
upper-class are favored in market, college quality may serve as a sorting device because the cost of 
attending high-quality colleges (tuition and fees, living expense, and otherwise) is relatively lower for 
students from upper-class families than for others. Interpreted in this way, the signaling and screening 
hypotheses are in fact consistent with social reproduction theory. 
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Enterprise Co-op Program, and the Building and Trades Services Programs) offered to 
working-class students in high school and illustrated that the system of education in the 
United States teaches working-class students to be working-class adults. The theme of 
social reproduction was also animated in a drastically different educational environment 
by Cookson and Persell, who documented how the philosophies, programs, and lifestyles 
of boarding schools helped transmit power and privilege of the elite class. 
If, according to social reproduction theory, education is the tunnel through which 
social value is reproduced and perpetuated, then how are students from different social 
classes sorted into different paths? In the minds of most, education seems to be the great 
equalizer; it provides a playing field where the rich and the poor are seen to compete on 
an equal basis—on the principle of meritocracy. Quite the contrary, according to social 
reproduction theory; education actually reinforces social inequality. For example, recent 
economic studies on the relationship between family income and college enrollment 
suggest that family income affects college enrollment in at least two ways: short-term 
credit constraints and long-term factors crystallized in ability (e.g., Carneiro & Heckman, 
2002; Kane, 1994). Short-term credit constraints make students from poor families more 
sensitive to the price of a college education (Kane, 1994). Family income also exerts 
long-term influence on educational credentials through its effect on individuals’ cognitive 
and non-cognitive abilities (Carneiro & Heckman, 2002). The debate on which effect, 
short-term or long-term, dominates in the family income-educational credentials 
relationship is not particularly relevant to the current study; both suggest that family 
income gives upper-class students enormous leverage to obtain more prestigious 
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educational credentials, which subsequently help preserve and perpetuate their 
advantageous social positions. 
In cases where students from lower classes enter elite institutions, they might 
have to downplay their social class background to be successful. In studying working-
class students attending Harvard Law School, Granfield (1988) poignantly observed that 
working-class students were taught that unless they downplayed their social class 
background, the most lucrative opportunities would be denied them. Willis (1981) 
depicted how working-class students resisted in school, but only in a self-defeating way. 
These observations suggest that graduating from elite colleges might benefit upper-class 
students more than working-class students. This conclusion urges us to examine the 
effect of college quality across students from different social classes. This can be 
accomplished by segmenting students according to class-related variables and then 
examining the effects of college quality for different groups of students. 
Social reproduction theory suggests that we may examine how educational 
credentials are distributed among individuals and how the effects of these credentials 
differ across different groups of individuals. Consequently, three research questions are 
proposed; hypotheses for these research questions as implied by social reproduction 
theory are presented in Table 2.2. Because the theory is not relevant to some research 
questions, in cases where no hypothesis is generated from the theory, the null hypothesis 
is tested instead. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Do different students have the same probability of 
earning degrees at high-quality colleges? 
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Table 2.2 
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Questions Hypotheses 
(RQ1) Do different students have 
the same probability of earning 
degrees at high-quality colleges? 
Both social class variables and individual ability 
variables will be strong predictors of graduating 
from high-quality colleges; social class variables 
also influence ability variable. 
By family 
wealth 
College quality benefits students from wealthy 
families more than those from poor families. 
By parental 
education 
College quality benefits students from well-educated 
families more than those from low-educated 
families. 
By race College quality benefits White students more than 
non-White students. 
By intellectual 
ability 
College quality benefits high-ability students more 
than others. 
By gender N/A 
(RQ2) Does 
the effect of 
college quality 
differ across 
different 
groups of 
students? 
By field of 
study 
N/A 
(RQ3) What is the effect of 
college quality at different points 
of earnings distribution? 
College quality would be an especially strong 
predictor of earnings for those individuals ending up 
at the top of earnings distribution. 
 
Social reproduction theory entails the relationship between class and educational 
credentials. Although my focus is on examining the effect of college quality across 
individuals, the question of who graduates from high-quality colleges is essential to 
understanding the social role of high-quality colleges. For example, empirical work has 
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consistently found that Blacks earn less than Whites, yet this earnings penalty may result 
from lower educational credentials of Blacks or from labor market discrimination. If it 
can be shown that the effects of college quality are the same for Blacks and Whites but 
only the probabilities of graduating from high-quality colleges differ, then it is reasonable 
to draw the conclusion that high-quality colleges preserve the economic statuses of 
Blacks and Whites. In contrast, if it can be shown that probabilities of graduating from 
high-quality colleges are the same for Blacks and Whites but the effects of college quality 
differ, then we may conclude that it is not educational institutions but other forces (such 
as taste discrimination and statistical discrimination) that create the income gap between 
Blacks and Whites.12 The same logic also applies to the income difference between males 
and females and between lower and higher income students. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Social class variables such as family income and parental 
education have a strong effect on graduating from high-quality colleges; they also exert 
indirect influence through individual ability.  
Arguably, from children’s early days of life, the quality of educational institutions 
selected by upper-class families, especially those with the highest income, probably is 
superior to the quality of institutions selected by lower-class families, especially those 
with the lowest income. Upper-class families, through choosing high-quality education 
for their children, are able to transmit their socioeconomic status to the next generation. 
                                                          
12 Taste discrimination and statistical discriminations are ways to explain the earnings gap between groups, 
especially racial groups. To explain the Black-White earnings gap, taste discrimination assumes that 
employers, fellow workers, or customers have a desire to avoid Black workers (Becker, 1957). Statistical 
discrimination explains the earnings gap by assuming that the observed signal of productivity such as 
educational attainment is less reliable for Black workers than for White workers, leading to lower wages for 
Black workers if employers are risk averse (Aigner & Cain, 1977).    
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Social reproduction theory highlights such a family-education relationship and suggests 
that social class variables (such as family wealth and parental education) are strong 
predictors of graduating from high-quality colleges. The theory also suggests that 
individual abilities (usually measured by test scores) play an important positive role 
because part of family factors has been crystallized in individual abilities through the 
quality of education in students’ early days of life. As a result, high correlations exist 
among college quality, individual ability, and family wealth.  
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does graduating from a high-quality college yield 
the same level of earnings advantage across different groups of students by gender, race, 
family wealth, parental education, intellectual ability, and major field of study? 
This second research question examines the effects of college quality across 
different individuals, i.e., the interactions among college quality and individual 
characteristics. As discussed above, social reproduction theory sheds light on such 
interactions. My analysis examines the effect of college quality across different groups of 
students by various criteria, such as family wealth, parental education, intellectual ability, 
race, gender, and major field of study. The effect of college quality across these groups is 
examined separately. For example, do high-quality colleges affect wealthy students more 
than poor students? Do high-quality colleges yield more earnings advantages to students 
from highly educated families than to others? 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Graduating from a high-quality college benefits students from 
wealthy families more than students from poor families, students from well-educated 
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families more than those from poorly educated families, students of high ability more 
than students of low ability, and perhaps White students more than non-White students. 
Social reproduction theory suggests that students from lower-class families have 
less chance to earn degrees at high-quality colleges; it also suggests that even when 
students from lower-class families successfully graduate from high-quality colleges, they 
have extra obstacles to overcome in converting their educational credentials into 
economic benefits. Thus, graduating from high-quality colleges would benefit students 
from the upper class more than students from the lower class. Among the above six 
factors, family income, parental education, ability, and race are unambiguously class 
related. 
Research Question 3(RQ3): What is the effect of college quality at different points 
of the earnings distribution? 
The third research question examines the variations in the effect of college quality 
in another dimension. Not only can the effects of college quality be evaluated for 
different groups of individuals as in RQ2, the effects of college quality can also be 
evaluated at different points in the earnings distribution. In other words, given graduates’ 
realized earnings—especially for those at the very top of the earnings distribution—how 
has college quality helped them reach that position?  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The effects of college quality evaluated at the top of the 
earnings distribution (e.g., 75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles) are larger than the effect 
evaluated at lower points of the earnings distribution (e.g., 10th, 25th, and 50th 
percentiles). 
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Consistent with H2, the effect of college quality is mediated by class variables. 
Other factors should be supportive for college quality to exert large effects on graduate 
earnings. Following this logic, the effect of college quality is larger at the top of the 
earnings distribution than at the lower part of the distribution. In other words, college 
quality may in fact stretch the earnings distribution. This hypothesis is consistent with the 
reality that as the majority of high school graduates attend colleges, college quality 
increasingly serves as a differentiating apparatus among college graduates.13
The above three research questions not only point to the equity issue regarding the 
educational attainment among different students, but also the equity issue with respect to 
the benefit of such educational attainment among different students. Answers to these 
questions will provide more complete understanding of the interactions among 
socioeconomic factors, educational attainment, and graduates’ earnings. These three 
research questions are analyzed in Chapters 3 to 5. 
Although the above three research questions examine the economic effect of 
college quality in great detail, they ignore the option value of college quality and the non-
monetary effect of college quality. The option value of college quality is very important 
in this analysis because graduate education is an important period of human capital 
                                                          
13 It should be cautioned here that treatment effects on distributions and distributions of treatment effects 
are two different concepts. In this study, graduating from high-quality colleges is the treatment. Because 
only the earnings distribution after treatment is observable (but not the distribution before treatment), we 
can only estimate treatment effects on distributions (but not distributions of treatment effects). In other 
words, we can only examine whether college quality matters more to those ending up at the top of the 
earnings distribution than others but may not know whether college quality matters more to those who 
would have been at the top of the earnings distribution than others if there had been no such treatment 
(because the distribution before treatment is unobserved). To apply social reproduction theory, the 
assumption of rank preservation, also known as perfect positive dependence (which is weaker than the 
assumption of constant treatment effects) is needed. For detailed discussion, see Abadie, Angrist, and 
Imbens (2002), Imbens and Rubin (1997), and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997).  
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improvement (thus graduate education could also be seen as an economic outcome). 
Social reproduction theory would suggest that social class variables such as family 
income and parental education have a strong effect on graduate education, and because 
part of the social class factors have crystallized into college quality and ability, these 
variables also have strong effects on graduate education. Moreover, human capital theory 
would suggest that graduate education has a strong effect on earnings because graduates’ 
human capital is further improved and enhanced in graduate school. These hypotheses are 
tested in Chapter 6. 
Job satisfaction is another important non-monetary outcome to be considered. 
Unfortunately, neither human capital theory nor social reproduction theory tells us how 
college quality would impact job satisfaction. Thus I proceed with the null hypothesis. 
Presumably, graduates’ earnings have some influences on job satisfaction; it is instructive 
to examine the interaction between college quality, graduates’ earnings, and job 
satisfaction. These issues are examined in Chapter 7. 
To sum up, in reviewing the literature on the effect of college quality on 
graduates’ earnings, I found that the average effect of college quality on earnings greatly 
simplifies the analysis and disguises much of the variation across individuals. Further, 
previous analyses relied heavily on human capital theory, thus separating the analysis of 
the effect of college quality from the analysis of college destination. I attempted to tie 
these analyses together from another theoretical framework: social reproduction theory. 
In doing so, I emphasized the centrality of social class in the analysis of the effect of 
college quality. Finally, I argued that previous analyses may overlook some non-
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monetary effects of college quality. I remedied this weakness by incorporating the 
analysis of graduate education and job satisfaction into the analysis of the effect of 
college quality. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHO COMPLETES AT HIGH-QUALITY COLLEGES? 
 
3.1 Perspective 
In this chapter, I focus on the first research question; that is, I examine the 
variability in the probability of earning degrees at high-quality institutions among 
different students. For example, how is the probability of earning degrees at high-quality 
institutions related to students’ demographic characteristics? What is the effect of family 
background characteristics? Does the student’s ability play any role? If so, how is the 
student’s ability related to demographic and family background characteristics? At first 
sight, these questions might not seem to be germane to the study of the effect of college 
quality. They are in fact highly relevant in a couple of ways. 
First, the answer to who graduates from high-quality colleges situates the effect of 
high-quality colleges in a proper context. To understand the effect of educational 
attainment in terms of college quality across individuals is to first understand the 
distribution of such educational attainment across individuals. For example, if it can be 
shown that the effects of college quality are the same (or even larger) for lower-class 
students and for upper-class students but only the probabilities of earning degrees from 
high-quality colleges differ, then it is reasonable to conclude that high-quality colleges 
preserve and perpetuate the economic status of different social classes. In contrast, if it 
can be shown that probabilities of earning a degree at high-quality colleges are the same 
for lower-class students and upper-class students but the effects of college quality differ, 
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then we may conclude that it is not educational institutions but other forces (such as 
discrimination in the labor market) that create the income gap. Thus, both the variability 
in the probability of earnings degree at high-quality colleges and the variability in the 
effect of college quality across individuals are necessary in order to understand the 
stratification among individuals more completely. 
Second, from a statistical point of view, estimating who completes at colleges of 
varying quality is important in obtaining consistent estimates of the effect of college 
quality on students. Econometricians call it the selection bias problem (Heckman, 1979). 
In simple language, students are not randomly selected into different types of colleges; 
they self-select by optimizing certain individual utility functions. Due to the endogeneity 
of college quality, the effect of college quality estimated by the conventional OLS 
technique includes both the true effect of college quality and the return to optimizing 
behavior in choosing a particular type of institution. To estimate the true effect of college 
quality consistently, the usual technique involves a selectivity term by estimating a 
selection equation (Heckman, 1979; Lee, 1983).14 The selection equation, which 
estimates the probability of earning degrees at different types of colleges, provides the 
first step in the well-known two-step or structural approach of estimating the effect of 
college quality. 
Educational researchers have a vested interest in exploring how various social and 
individual factors determine one’s educational attainment. Roughly speaking, this line of 
literature can be divided into two branches: those focusing on college choice/access and 
                                                 
14 Detailed discussion of the selection bias problem is provided in Chapter 4, where the effect of college 
quality is estimated. 
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those on retention/graduation. The choice/access literature explores various tasks students 
must accomplish to realize college enrollment. Among those tasks are academic 
qualification, graduation from high school, and applying to college (Adelman, 1999; 
Berkner & Chavez, 1997; Hossler, Braxton, & Coopersmith, 1989). A recent study by 
Cabrera and La Nasa (2001) finds that upper-class students are favored at each of the 
three tasks on the path to college. For example, the lowest SES students are about 51% 
less likely than the highest SES students to secure academic qualification; controlling for 
school-level and family background variables still leaves 15% net difference unaccounted 
for. Further, the lowest SES students are about 25% less likely than the highest-SES 
students to graduate from high school, even after controlling for other salient variables. 
Finally, ceteris paribus, there is a considerable gap (25%) in the college application rate 
between the lowest SES students and the highest SES students. All of these gaps put 
those socioeconomically disadvantaged high school students in a hazardous position in 
accessing a college education. 
The branch of research examining college retention and graduation is dominated 
by Astin’s (1975, 1984) theory of involvement and Tinto’s (1975, 1993) concept of 
integration. These theories have been reconceptualized and elaborated by educational 
researchers (Braxton, Sullivan, & Johnson, 1997; Cabrera et al., 1992; Milem & Berger, 
1997; Thomas, 2000b). The most stripped-down finding is that being female, white, high 
ability, and from high-SES families is associated with higher probability of retention 
(Berger & Milem, 1999; Elkins, Braxton, & James, 2000). Research focusing on the 
“Baccalaureate Gap” and students’ transferring from two-year colleges to four-year 
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institutions also finds similar disadvantages for low-ability and low-SES students 
(Dougherty, 1992; Lee & Frank, 1990). 
In short, great stratification exists in postsecondary access and attainment among 
students. This stratification, however, should move beyond college graduates versus non-
college graduates in an era when the majority of high school graduates go to college and 
the majority of them obtain college degrees. In this respect, the question of who 
completes at high-quality colleges extends and complements the above literature.  
 
3.2 Analysis 
My analysis draws data from two levels: the individual level and the institutional 
level.15 The individual-level data come from the 1994 first follow-up of the Baccalaureate 
and Beyond (B&B) study. The B&B is a national longitudinal study designed to provide 
information concerning education and work experiences after completion of the 
bachelor’s degree. It provides cross-sectional information one year after bachelor’s 
degree completion and longitudinal data concerning entry into and progress through 
graduate level education and the work force16. The restricted BB: 93/97 data set is used to 
enable the connection of students and institutions.17 The first follow-up survey includes 
more than 10,000 baccalaureate recipients who completed their degrees between July 
                                                 
15 Due to the variety of research questions asked in this dissertation, data used in different chapters are 
slightly different in samples and variables, although the same data sources are used throughout the study. 
Variables are discussed in detail when first introduced, and they are mentioned briefly when used in later 
analyses. 
16 For more information about the B&B study, see http://www.nces.ed.gov. 
17 The restricted B&B: 93/97 data is obtained through the restricted data license at the University of 
Arizona authorized by National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 
 
 
 
54
1992 and June 1993. All analyses reported in this paper have been weighted 
appropriately, normalized on the final sample, if not specified otherwise.18
School-level data come from two sources including the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System 1992-93 (IPEDS) and various editions of Barron’s Profiles of 
American Colleges. I extract the variable of types of institutional control (i.e., publics 
versus private) from IPEDS. College selectivity data are from Barron’s Profiles of 
American Colleges.19 Barron’s rating categorizes institutions into six selectivity groups 
on the basis of entering students’ class rank, high school grade point average, average 
SAT scores, and the percentage of applicants admitted (see Fox, 1993). In this analysis, I 
follow the conventional approach by collapsing six selectivity categories into three based 
on a rating of most competitive or highly competitive (with Barron’s rating of 5 or 4), 
very competitive or competitive (with Barron’s rating of 3 or 2), and less competitive or 
non-competitive (with Barron’s rating of 1 or 0). Because public perceptions of public 
and private institutions are quite different, I further distinguish between privately and 
publicly controlled institutions in each group, yielding six college types: high-quality 
privates, high-quality publics, middle-quality privates, middle-quality publics, low-
quality privates, and low-quality publics. 
                                                 
18 Because a multistage cluster sample is used in B&B: 93/97, there may exist homogeneity within clusters 
(colleges in this case) that leads to under-estimation of the standard errors if this multistage clustering is 
ignored. Thomas and Heck (2001) suggested using the design effect to adjust the estimated standard errors 
or multilevel modeling to capture the multistage clustering. The multilevel modeling is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4, and the results are very similar to OLS estimates. 
19 In this chapter, only Barron’s rating is used. In Chapter 4, different measures of college quality (such as 
average SAT score of entering class, Carnegie Classification, and tuition and fees charged by the 
institution) are experimented in estimating the effect of college quality on earnings. 
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The initial sample includes 10,080 baccalaureate recipients who completed their 
degrees between July 1992 and June 1993. Because I am interested in estimating the 
variability of earning degrees at colleges of varying quality, only those students with 
institutional information are included. This criterion limits the sample to 8,642 students 
(about 15% of the initial sample is left out) and 516 institutions. Table 3.1 provides the 
distribution of these 8,642 students across different types of institutions.20 In the final 
sample, about 15% of students graduate from high-quality institutions, which have a 
Barron’s rating of 4 or 5. About 6% are from public institutions and another 9% from 
private institutions. The majority (67%) are from middle-quality institutions (Barron’s 
rating of 2 or 3), with public 47% and private 20%. The remaining 18% are from low-
quality institutions, with public 13% and private 5%. 
Table 3.1 
Distribution of Students across Colleges of Varying Quality 
 Public institutions Private institutions Total
High-quality institutions 538 (6.2%) 747 (8.6%) 1,285 (14.9%)
Middle-quality institutions 4,072 (47.1%) 1,724 (19.9%) 5,796 (67.1%)
Low-quality institutions 1,137 (13.2%) 424 (4.9%) 1,561 (18.1%)
Total 5,747 (66.5%) 2,895 (33.5%) 8,642 (100%)
Note: The percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
The outcome of interest in this analysis is the quality of institutions from which 
students graduate (0, 1, and 2 for low-, middle-, and high-quality institutions, 
respectively). Endogenous variables include various demographic, family backgrounds, 
                                                 
20 Weighted by B&B first follow-up weight, normalized on the final sample of 8,642. 
 
 
 
56
intellectual ability, and educational aspiration variables. Demographic variables capture 
aspects of gender (a categorical dummy indicating whether the student is female), 
race/ethnicity (categorical dummies indicating Native American, Asian, Black, and 
Hispanic with the omitted group being White), and age (in years). Individual ability is 
captured by the merged SAT and ACT quartile (with 1 indicating the lowest and 4 the 
highest quartile).21 Educational aspiration is measured by the highest degree expected 
(categorical dummies indicating whether the highest expected degree is a Master or 
Doctor with the omitted group being a Bachelor). Family background characteristics 
include mother’s education (categorical dummies indicating whether the mother has high 
school education, some college education, college degree, or advanced degrees with the 
omitted group being less than high school education) and family income (in ten thousand 
dollars). A detailed definition and description of these variables is provided in Table 3.2. 
The results of analysis are arranged as follows. First, the differences in student 
profile by gender, race/ethnicity, family background, intellectual ability, and educational 
aspirations are examined descriptively. I then use regression analysis to examine the 
impact of various individual and family characteristics on students’ college destination. 
Results from OLS, multinomial logit, and ordered logit regressions are presented. The 
final part of the analysis explores the relationship among independent variables. 
 
  
 
                                                 
21 Due to data limitations, I was unable to obtain other popular measures of individual ability such as 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores. 
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables, by College Quality 
All 
Low 
quality
Middle 
quality 
High 
quality
Mean S.D. Mean Mean Mean
Female 0.5441 0.4981 0.5890 0.5414 0.5016
Native American 0.0059 0.0764 0.0065 0.0060 0.0043
Asian 0.0418 0.2000 0.0229 0.0371 0.0859
Black 0.0628 0.2426 0.1037 0.0587 0.0313
Hispanic 0.0423 0.2013 0.0522 0.0405 0.0387
Age 26.9755 6.6227 28.8741 27.0106 24.5103
Expect MA 0.5795 0.4937 0.6137 0.5790 0.5399
Expect PhD 0.1911 0.3932 0.1695 0.1836 0.2511
Mother high school graduate 0.3152 0.4646 0.3622 0.3285 0.1980
Mother some college 0.1600 0.3666 0.1734 0.1604 0.1421
Mother college graduate 0.1804 0.3846 0.1388 0.1718 0.2699
Mother advanced degree 0.1084 0.3109 0.0649 0.1038 0.1822
SAT/ACT quartile 1.9985 1.3845 1.4959 1.9250 2.9407
Family income ($10,000) 4.8335 5.4866 3.7233 4.7147 6.7188
N 8642  1561 5796 1285
 
Notes: 
Female: 1 = female; 0 = male. 
Native American: 1 = Native American; 0 = otherwise. 
Asian: 1 = Asian American; 0 = otherwise. 
Black: 1 = Black; 0 = otherwise. 
Hispanic: 1 = Hispanic; 0 = otherwise. 
White (omitted category): 1 = white; 0 = otherwise. 
Age: Age as of 12/31/1994. 
Expect MA: 1 if the highest expected degree is Master; 0=otherwise. 
Expect PhD: 1 if the highest expected degree is Doctor; 0=otherwise. 
Expect BA (omitted category): 1 if the highest expected degree is Bachelor or less; 0=otherwise. 
Mother high school graduate: 1 if mother is a high school graduate; 0=otherwise. 
Mother some college: 1 if mother has some college education; 0=otherwise. 
Mother college graduate: 1 if mother is a college graduate; 0=otherwise. 
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Table 3.2 – Continued 
 Public Private 
 Low 
quality
Middle 
quality
High 
quality
Low 
quality 
Middle 
quality
High 
quality 
Female 0.5808 0.5296 0.4880 0.6108 0.5693 0.5114
Native American 0.0056 0.0071 0.0026 0.0090 0.0035 0.0055
Asian 0.0216 0.0441 0.1139 0.0262 0.0204 0.0657
Black 0.0674 0.0552 0.0308 0.2009 0.0671 0.0316
Hispanic 0.0514 0.0449 0.0341 0.0543 0.0300 0.0421
Age 28.2487 26.5848 24.8565 30.5517 28.0160 24.2608
Expect MA 0.6145 0.5760 0.5862 0.6116 0.5862 0.5066
Expect PhD 0.1616 0.1783 0.2298 0.1907 0.1962 0.2664
Mother high school graduate 0.3600 0.3310 0.2282 0.3682 0.3228 0.1762
Mother some college 0.1765 0.1601 0.1627 0.1650 0.1611 0.1273
Mother college graduate 0.1443 0.1668 0.2473 0.1242 0.1835 0.2862
Mother advanced degree 0.0660 0.1029 0.1420 0.0620 0.1058 0.2111
SAT/ACT quartile 1.6484 1.9561 2.7125 1.0867 1.8517 3.1051
Family income ($10,000) 3.8195 4.4397 5.8132 3.4651 5.3641 7.3715
N 1137 4072 538 424 1724 747
 
Mother advanced degree: 1 if mother has a graduate degree; 0=otherwise. 
Mother less than high school graduate (omitted category): 1 if mother has less than high school education; 
    0=otherwise. 
SAT/ACT quartile: Merged SAT or ACT quartile. 1=the lowest quartile; 2=the second lowest quartile;  
    3=the second highest quartile; 4=the highest quartile. 
Family income: Family income in $10,000 increments. 
 
Student Profiles at Colleges of Varying Quality 
The most intuitive way to understand how student characteristics differ at colleges 
of varying quality is to look at descriptive statistics. Table 3.2 presents the mean statistics 
 
 
 
59
of students’ characteristics by college quality and types of institutional control. The first 
column (All) of Table 3.2 provides the means and standard deviations of the demographic 
and family background variables for the whole sample of 8,642 students, and the 
remaining three columns in the upper panel of Table 3.2 give the means of students’ 
characteristics at low-, middle-, and high-quality colleges.  
Differences in student profiles at colleges of varying quality emerge by 
comparing the means across these three columns. For example, Native Americans 
represent a very small proportion of the student body at each category (e.g., 0.59% for the 
“All” category in the first column); they represent an especially small proportion among 
those who graduate from high-quality colleges (0.43%). This observation is also 
generally true for Hispanic students. It should be cautioned, however, because the 
numbers of Native Americans or Hispanic students in the sample are very small, it is 
difficult to draw any conclusions from this simple comparison. The differences in the 
proportion of Black students (non-Native Americans, non-Hispanics) at different types of 
colleges are quite dramatic. Although Black students only represent about 3-5% of the 
entire student body at middle- and high-quality colleges (5.9% at middle-quality colleges 
and 3.1% at high-quality colleges), they constitute more than 10% of the student 
population at low-quality colleges. This could be explained by the large enrollment of 
Black students at Historically Black Colleges and Universities that are often classified as 
low-quality institutions. For example, among the 516 institutions in the sample, 24 are 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, with 12 classified as low-quality 
institutions and the other 12 as middle-quality institutions. In contrast, Asian students are 
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more represented at high-quality institutions (8.6%) than at low- and middle-quality 
institutions (2.3% and 3.7%, respectively). 
There are also differences in gender and age composition among colleges of 
varying quality. For example, the proportion of female students exceeds one half at all 
three types of colleges, but their representation is greatest at low-quality colleges 
(58.9%). The proportion of female students at high-quality colleges is only slightly above 
one-half (50.2%). In terms of age, students who graduated from high-quality colleges are 
younger than those from low-quality colleges.22
Students from high-quality colleges seem to be intellectually more capable than 
those from low-quality colleges. The average merged SAT and ACT quartile of students 
(Row 13, Table 3.2) from high-quality colleges is roughly 1.5 quartiles higher than that 
of students from low-quality colleges (2.94 versus 1.50) and also one quartile higher than 
that of students from middle-quality colleges (2.94 versus 1.93). Students from high-
quality colleges also seem to have higher educational aspirations (Row 8). For example, 
about a quarter of students (25.1%) from high-quality colleges expect to obtain doctoral 
degrees, while only 17.0% of the students from low-quality colleges and 18.4% of the 
students from middle-quality colleges expect to obtain doctoral degrees. 
Family backgrounds in terms of family income and mother’s education also differ 
among students graduating from different types of colleges. For example, the average 
family income (the last row) for the whole sample is $48,335, but this figure is $37,233 
for students graduating from low-quality colleges and $67,188 for those graduating from 
                                                 
22 Note that students graduated between July 1992 and June 1993, and the age is reported as of 12/31/1994, 
so they graduated roughly one year younger than the age reported in Table 3.2.  
 
 
 
61
high-quality colleges. Mother’s education is also higher for students graduating from 
high-quality colleges. In the pooled sample, about 32% of students have mothers with 
only a high school education, 16% have some college, 18% hold college degrees, and 
11% have post-graduate education. These figures are more or less the same for those 
students graduating from middle-quality colleges (33%, 16%, 17%, and 10%, 
respectively). 23 Obviously, students graduating from high-quality colleges are more 
likely than those graduating from low- and middle-quality colleges to have mothers with 
college degrees (including college degrees and advanced degrees). Roughly 45% (27% 
plus 18%) of students from high-quality colleges have their mothers with a college 
degree; this figure is about 27% (17% plus 10%) for students from middle-quality 
colleges and 20% (14% plus 6%) for students from low-quality colleges. 
The lower panel of Table 3.2 distinguishes public institutions from private ones 
and reports the mean statistics for each quality category by types of control. The 
qualitative observations are almost identical to those in the last three columns at the upper 
panel of the table; there are, however, some minor quantitative differences between 
students graduating from public and private institutions at the same college quality level. 
For example, students from high-quality private colleges appear to have wealthier and 
better-educated families than students from high-quality public institutions. 
 
                                                 
23 Due to missing values in the reported mothers’ education, the sum of these percentages does not add to 
100%. Assuming that students with low-educated mothers were less likely to report this variable (about 
74% of students attending low-quality colleges reported their mothers’ education, 76% for those attending 
middle-quality colleges, and more than 79% for those attending high-quality colleges), the actual difference 
in mothers’ education among students attending different types of colleges could be larger than the 
difference reported in Table 3.2. 
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Regression Estimate for Graduating from Colleges of Varying Quality 
Descriptive statistics as presented in Table 3.2 are not on a ceteris paribus basis. 
For example, descriptive statistics suggest that female students are less well represented 
at high-quality colleges; however it could have been the case that female students had 
lower test scores and that being female per se did not reduce the probability of earning a 
degree at high-quality colleges. To evaluate the impact of various individual and family 
characteristics on the probability of earning a degree at high-quality colleges, I turn to 
regression analysis.24 Because the dependent variable is a discrete variable, the 
multinomial logit technique is employed. Further, because college quality could be 
inherently ordered, an ordered logit technique is also used.25 Table 3.3 presents 
multinomial estimates for the impact of various individual and family characteristics on 
college quality, and Table 3.4 presents the estimates from the ordered logit regression. In 
both tables, the estimated marginal effects represent the impact of one unit increase in the 
corresponding independent variable on the probability that a student earns a 
baccalaureate degree from a certain type of college relative to other types. For example,  
 
                                                 
24 In the regression analysis, pubic and private institutions at each quality level were pooled together. At the 
descriptive level, students’ characteristics at public and private institutions for a given quality level were 
quite similar. For this reason, when public and private institutions were separated in the choice model, the 
prediction was very poor. 
25 A natural question is raised by estimating both the multinomial logit and ordered logit models: Which 
one is better (or right), the multinomial logit or the ordered logit model? It depends on whether one is 
willing to impose the assumption of the ordered characteristic of college quality. That is, when one fails to 
be admitted into high-quality colleges, is his/her next choice middle-quality colleges? Statistically, there is 
a criterion to determine which model is “better.” Vuong (1989) showed a way to test non-nested MLEs. He 
proposed a test statistic based on the difference of two log-likelihood functions (multiplied by –2 to 
produce a chi-square distributed random variable). In this case, the chi-square statistics was 151 with 19 
degrees of freedom. So, the multinomial logit model won the race. It is safe, however, to report results from 
both models, because many possibilities (e.g., model misspecification and measurement error) may lead to 
the rejection of the ordered logit even if the dependent variable is indeed inherently ordered. 
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Table 3.3 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for College Quality
 Marginal Effects 
 Low quality Middle quality  High quality 
Female 0.0116 (1.41)  -0.0145 (1.54)  0.0029 (0.47)
Native American -0.0197 (0.43)  0.0315 (0.55)  -0.0119 (0.29)
Asian -0.0790 (4.90)  -0.0551 (2.14)  0.1340 (5.71)
Black 0.0558 (3.13)  -0.0546 (2.55)  -0.0012 (0.07)
Hispanic 0.0001 (0.01)  -0.0467 (1.84)  0.0466 (2.17)
Age 0.0045 (6.67)  0.0039 (3.80)  -0.0084 (8.71)
Expect MA 0.0076 (0.64)  -0.0304 (2.14)  0.0229 (2.23)
Expect PhD -0.0138 (0.98)  -0.0385 (2.14)  0.0523 (3.55)
Mother high school graduate -0.0338 (2.16)  0.0220 (0.95)  0.0118 (0.57)
Mother some college -0.0260 (1.56)  -0.0019 (0.07)  0.0278 (1.18)
Mother college graduate -0.0526 (3.33)  -0.0143 (0.52)  0.0669 (2.48)
Mother advanced degree -0.0824 (5.59)  -0.0121 (0.38)  0.0945 (2.93)
SAT/ACT quartile -0.0453 (9.87)  -0.0250 (4.78)  0.0703 (20.3)
Family income ($10,000) -0.0074 (5.94)  0.0043 (3.61)  0.0031 (6.28)
N 8642    
2χ  1438    
Notes:  
1. Also included in the model are a constant term and dummies indicating missing values of independent  
    variables. 
2. Graduating from low-quality colleges is the comparison group in estimating the index function. 
3. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variables for continuous variables; marginal effects for 
    dummy variables are for discrete change from 0 to 1. 
4. Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. 
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Table 3.4 
Ordered Logit Estimates for College Quality 
 Marginal Effects 
 Low quality Middle quality  High quality 
Female 0.0018 (0.30) -0.0003 (0.31)  -0.0015 (0.30)
Native American -0.0111 (0.31) 0.0011 (0.76)  0.0100 (0.29)
Asian -0.0865 (11.12) -0.0469 (3.32)  0.1334 (6.24)
Black 0.0306 (2.21) -0.0082 (1.60)  -0.0223 (2.55)
Hispanic -0.0177 (1.31) 0.0012 (1.86)  0.0165 (1.19)
Age 0.0046 (8.53) -0.0007 (4.42)  -0.0039 (8.45)
Expect MA -0.0059 (0.67) 0.0009 (0.64)  0.0049 (0.67)
Expect PhD -0.0307 (3.28) 0.0017 (1.43)  0.0290 (2.92)
Mother high school graduate -0.0212 (1.64) 0.0025 (2.11)  0.0187 (1.57)
Mother some college -0.0213 (1.59) 0.0017 (2.49)  0.0196 (1.46)
Mother college graduate -0.0576 (4.96) -0.0039 (0.87)  0.0616 (3.93)
Mother advanced degree -0.0765 (7.43) -0.0216 (2.16)  0.0981 (4.95)
SAT/ACT quartile -0.0706 (21.61) 0.0111 (4.97)  0.0596 (21.16)
Family income ($10,000) -0.0052 (8.44) 0.0008 (4.37)  0.0043 (8.41)
N 8642       
2χ  1287       
Notes:  
1. Also included in the model are a constant term and dummies indicating missing values of independent  
    variables. 
2. For the ordered logit estimation, 0 = low-quality colleges, 1 = middle-quality colleges, 2 = high-quality 
    colleges. 
3. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variables for continuous variables; marginal effects for  
    dummy variables are for discrete change from 0 to 1. 
4. Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. 
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the first coefficient 0.0116 in Table 3.3 suggests that on average female students are 
1.16% more likely to graduate from low-quality colleges than their male counterparts. 
Results from both tables suggest that intellectual ability and educational 
aspirations impact the probability of earning a degree at high-quality colleges in 
significant and powerful ways. These results also suggest that individuals’ ascribed and 
socioeconomic background characteristics play a very significant role. Other things being 
equal, Black students, older students, students who have lower educational aspirations, 
students who have lower test scores, students whose mothers have lower educational 
attainment, and students whose family has a lower income are all somewhat less likely to 
earn degrees at high-quality colleges. 
Not surprisingly, the multinomial logit and ordered logit models yield quite 
similar results, although slight differences exist in some non-significant coefficients. In 
both tables, mothers’ educational attainment emerges as one of the most powerful and 
significant predictors for earning degrees at high-quality colleges. For example, both 
models estimate that having mothers with post-graduate degrees increases the probability 
of earning a degree at high-quality colleges by almost 10% (9.45% in last column of 
Table 3.3 and 9.81% in last column of Table 3.4) compared with students whose mothers 
have less than high school education, and having mothers with a college education also 
increases the probability by 6-7% (6.69% Table 3.3 and 6.16% in Table 3.4) compared 
with having mothers with less than high school education.  
Naturally, having mothers with high educational attainment reduces the 
probability of earning degrees at low-quality colleges significantly. For example, having 
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mothers with post-graduate degrees reduces the probability of earning a degree at low-
quality colleges by about 8% (8.24% in first column of Table 3.3 and 7.65% in first 
column of Table 3.4) compared with students whose mothers have less than high school 
education. Another indicator of socioeconomic status, family income, has a smaller 
impact on the probability of earning a degree at high-quality colleges than one would 
expect, although the effect is statistically significant (see the last row in both tables). This 
may be because family income varies over time and thus is not a good measure of family 
wealth.26
Individual ability as measured by SAT/ACT quartile is another influential factor 
in determining college quality.27 For example, the multinomial logit model predicts a 7% 
marginal impact for one quartile advance in SAT/ACT scores (e.g., from the second-
highest quartile to the highest quartile) on the probability of graduating from high-quality 
colleges, and the ordered logit suggests a 6% margin. Educational aspirations also matter, 
although the impact is smaller than for intellectual ability. Having educational aspirations 
for a doctoral degree increases the probability of earning baccalaureate degrees at high-
quality colleges by 5% compared with having educational aspiration for a master’s 
degree. 
In the context of various controls, female students do not seem to have any 
advantage or disadvantage in earning degrees at high-quality institutions. The observation 
of fewer female students at high-quality colleges in Table 3.2 is indeed due to individual 
                                                 
26 Perhaps due to the same reason, in the model estimating the effect of college quality on graduates’ 
earning, the effect of family income was very small.  
27 The variable of SAT/ACT quartile has much missing data. In the actual analysis, these missing values 
were all coded into 0 with a dummy variable to indicate the missing value.  
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heterogeneity. After other variables are controlled for, the gender gap disappears. For 
example, both the logit and ordered logit models do not reveal any significant effect of 
gender on the probability of graduating from high-quality colleges (the first rows in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4).  
Similarly, being Native American or Hispanic per se does not reduce the 
probability of graduating from high-quality colleges. However, even after other variables 
are controlled for, Black students are still more likely to earn degrees at low-quality 
colleges and less likely at high-quality colleges. For example, the logit model suggests 
that Black students are 5.58% (Row 4, Table 3.3) more likely than their White 
counterpart to earn a degree from low-quality colleges. This result is likely influenced by 
the large enrollment of Black students in Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
that are disproportionately lower in quality. In contrast, both the multinomial logit and 
ordered logit models show that Asian students are about 13% more likely to earn degrees 
at high-quality colleges than are White students. In terms of age, younger students are 
more likely to graduate from high-quality colleges than older students. It seems, then, that 
individual ascribed characteristics including gender, race/ethnicity, and age do affect the 
probability of earning degrees at high-quality colleges. 
Financial factors have an obvious impact on access and have been the focus of a 
large number of studies. For example, Hearn (1984) uses tuition as a proxy for college 
quality. To examine this, an OLS model is also estimated with dependent variable being 
tuition and fees. The results are reported in Table 3.5, which presents the effect of one 
unit increase in the corresponding independent variable on the college quality measured  
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Table 3.5 
OLS Estimates for Tuition and Fees 
  Coefficient t
Constant 1.7547 9.48
Private institution 7.1429 146.09
Female 0.0600 1.30
Native American -0.0162 0.05
Asian 0.2327 2.03
Black -0.8058 8.35
Hispanic -0.0333 0.29
Age -0.0392 9.10
Expect MA 0.1232 1.79
Expect PhD 0.2913 3.56
Mother high school graduate 0.0074 0.07
Mother some college -0.0371 0.32
Mother college graduate 0.1308 1.13
Mother advanced degree 0.2866 2.30
SAT/ACT quartile 0.3164 13.03
Family income ($10,000) 0.0316 7.27
N 8642  
2R  0.7302  
Notes:  
1. The dependent variable is tuition and fees in thousand dollars. 
2. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
3. Absolute value t statistics are included. 
by tuition and fees in thousand dollars. For example, the coefficient (0.3164) for the 
SAT/ACT quantile can be interpreted that other things being equal, if a student increases 
his/her SAT/ACT scores by one quartile, then he/she is able to earn a degree from an 
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institution charging about $316 more tuition and fees. The major qualitative results from 
Table 3.3 and 3.4 hold. For example, intellectual ability and educational aspirations exert 
large and significant influences on college quality as measured by the level of tuition and 
fees. Socioeconomic factors such as family income and mothers’ education also 
significantly affect the quality of college attended.  
The above analyses suggest that certain individual characteristics including 
gender, race/ethnicity, age, family income, and intellectual ability affect the probability 
of earning degrees at high-quality colleges. Although this might be one’s intuitive 
interpretation of the analyses, an alternative interpretation, which treats college quality as 
the characteristics of the individuals attending the college, could also be illuminating. As 
a matter of fact, these two interpretations are one and the same: If students and colleges 
are viewed as participating in a matching game, then the equilibrium can be described by 
the characteristics of either side. More importantly, both interpretations reassure the 
social reproduction theory that posits a tight connection between socioeconomic factors 
and educational credentials. 
 
Impact of Socioeconomic Factors on Intellectual Ability 
The above analysis suggests that both academic (such as measured intellectual 
ability) and non-academic factors (such as demographic and socioeconomic variables) 
influence where to earn one’s baccalaureate degree. The analysis in this section takes one 
step further to examine the relationships among these academic and non-academic 
factors. In particular, I am interested in understanding how intellectual ability measured 
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by test score and educational aspiration are affected by socioeconomic background and 
ascribed characteristics. Specifically, in Table 3.6, the SAT/ACT quartiles are regressed 
on socioeconomic background and ascribed characteristics. And in Table 3.7, educational 
aspirations are regressed on the same set of variables as in Table 3.6.28
Table 3.6 shows that intellectual ability as measured by test scores is significantly 
affected by socioeconomic background and ascribed characteristics. For example, relative 
to having a mother with less than high school education (the left-out category in the 
regression), having a mother with college degree or advanced degree increases test scores 
by about one-half quartile (0.49 quartile for having a mother with college degree and 0.50 
quartile for having a mother with advanced degree). Family income also affects test 
scores, although the magnitude is not as large as mothers’ educational attainment. On 
average a $10,000 increase in family income only moves SAT/ACT scores up by 0.0159 
quartile. Being female, Black, or Hispanic is negatively related to test scores. On average 
the SAT/ACT scores of Black students are almost one quartile (0.8114) lower that those 
of White students. Female students’ relatively lower test scores explain some of the 
discrepancies among Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. Female students are less represented at 
high-quality colleges in Table 3.2 without controlling for other covariates, but being 
female does not seem to lower the probability of earning degrees at high-quality colleges  
                                                 
28 This analysis, however, begs several questions. For example, is there a possibility of multicollinearity in 
the analysis of college quality determination if there are correlations among independent variables? The 
small R-squared in Table 3.6 does not seem to cause multicollinearity in the previous analysis. However, 
the relatively low R-squared is not contradictory to the relatively large marginal impact of socioeconomic 
factors on intellectual ability and academic aspiration. The second concern is that if certain independent 
variables are functions of other independent variables, is it necessary to use a structural approach? Perhaps 
a better way to view the effect of socioeconomic factors on college quality in Table 3.3 is as direct effect, 
while their effect through intellectual ability and educational aspirations are viewed as indirect effect. 
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Table 3.6 
OLS Estimates for Merged SAT and ACT Quartile
 Coefficient t
Constant 2.5354 22.00
Female -0.2899 11.73
Native American 0.3727 2.07
Asian 0.1168 1.83
Black -0.8114 15.42
Hispanic -0.3613 5.60
Age -0.0091 2.73
Mother high school graduate 0.1123 1.65
Mother some college 0.2856 4.01
Mother college graduate 0.4901 6.90
Mother advanced degree 0.5023 6.77
Family income ($10,000) 0.0159 7.08
N 7118  
2R  0.1025  
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is merged SAT/ACT quartile; observations with missing values for the  
    dependent variable are excluded. 
2. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
3. Absolute value t statistics are included. 
when other variables such as test scores are controlled for in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Exactly, 
Table 3.6 shows that being female has a negative indirect effect on college quality 
through academic factors. Table 3.7 suggests that educational aspiration is also affected 
by socioeconomic background and ascribed characteristics. Socioeconomic factors such 
as family income and mothers’ education is positively related with the educational 
aspiration of doctoral degree.  
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Table 3.7 
Logit Estimates for Educational Aspiration 
  Marginal Effects 
 Coefficient t
Female  -0.1230 3.66
Native American  -0.0060 0.65
Asian  0.1400 2.81
Black  0.0070 0.31
Hispanic  0.0841 4.88
Age  0.0745 3.61
Mother high school Graduate  -0.0041 5.00
Mother some college  -0.0051 0.23
Mother college graduate  0.0179 0.77
Mother advanced degree  0.0295 1.26
Family income ($10,000)  0.0547 2.22
N  7787  
2χ   100  
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is Expect PhD; observations with missing values for the dependent variable are  
    excluded.  
2. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
3. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variables for continuous variables; marginal effects for  
    dummy variables are for discrete change from 0 to 1. 
4. Absolute value t statistics are included. 
 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
The analysis of the variability in the probability of earning degrees at high-quality 
colleges goes beyond earlier studies of college destination and college retention and 
examines finer differentials among college graduates in terms of college quality. Yet, the 
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major themes from previous studies are supported in the current analyses: The 
academically and socioeconomically “rich” become richer while the academically and 
socioeconomically “poor” become poorer (Hearn, 1984). It seems that not only does the 
rich-poor gap increase in terms of the quantity of education, as previous studies have 
shown (Adelman, 1999; Berkner & Chavez, 1997; Cabrera & La Nasa, 2001; Hossler et 
al., 1989), but also in terms of the quality of education. Academically and 
socioeconomically advantaged students are more likely to attend and obtain degrees at 
colleges that possess more intellectual and material resources. 
Socioeconomic factors such as family income and mothers’ education take effect 
in two ways: a direct impact on students’ educational attainment and an indirect influence 
through academic factors. The analysis of the determination of individuals’ intellectual 
ability confirms that some of the socioeconomic factors have been crystallized in one’s 
intellectual ability. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario when more socioeconomic 
variables are included in this type of analysis; academic factors can be largely determined 
and thus become equivalent to socioeconomic factors. Indeed, Rothstein (2002), in 
studying the determination of undergraduate academic performance, finds that after 
controlling for various socioeconomic factors and high school characteristics, test scores 
have virtually no predictive power in determining academic performance in college.29 In 
studying the family income-schooling relationship, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) 
distinguish short-run liquidity constraints from the long-term factors that promote ability 
                                                 
29 Considering its potential impact on the admission criteria, this reality may be disturbing to many. 
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and find that long-run factors crystallized in ability are the major determinants of the 
family income-schooling relationship. 
Clearly, the above results support the social reproduction hypothesis associated 
with the first research question. Socioeconomic factors exert great influence on college 
quality both directly and indirectly through academic factors. Many researchers have 
suggested that the expansion of post-secondary educational opportunity might be a false 
promise, with massive expansion of American higher education system resulting in 
increasing differentiation within the system (Bourdieu, 1977; Hoxby, 1997; Karabel, 
1972; Karabel & Astin, 1975). In the minds of many, education promises to be the great 
equalizer; it provides a playing field where the rich and the poor are seen to compete on 
an equal basis—on the principle of meritocracy, as human capital theory would suggest. 
However, it is in many ways a false promise, as the current analysis shows, not only in 
that non-meritocratic tendencies still prevail, but more importantly in that meritocratic 
factors are largely determined by non-meritocratic forces. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VARIABILITY IN THE EFFECT OF COLLEG E QUALITY 
 
In Chapter 3, I examined the variability in the probability of earning degrees at 
high-quality institutions among different students. There the outcomes of higher 
education were considered equitable if students had the same probability of earning 
degrees at high-quality institutions, regardless of their demographic characteristics and 
socioeconomic status. Analysis in Chapter 3 indicated considerable variations among 
individuals in the probability of earning degrees at high-quality institutions. 
In this chapter, I explore another equity issue related to college quality. This 
equity issue relates to the variability in the effect of college quality across individuals. 
Here the outcomes of higher education are considered equitable if students with the same 
educational attainment are able to enjoy similar advantages, regardless of their 
demographic characteristics and socioeconomic status. That is, I explore the effects of 
college quality for college graduates—not only the average effect, but the effect across 
different individuals, i.e., interactions among college quality and individual 
characteristics, such as family wealth, parental education, intellectual ability, race, 
gender, and major fields of study.  
A series of research questions are posed. For example, do high-quality colleges 
affect the earnings of wealthy students more than poor students? Do high-quality colleges 
provide more of an earnings advantage to students from highly educated families than to 
others? Do high-quality colleges raise earnings more for intellectually less capable 
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students than for the more capable? Do high-quality colleges matter more to White 
students than non-White students? Do high-quality colleges benefit female students more 
than male students? Do high-quality colleges provide more competitive edge to certain 
major fields of study than to others? 
As spelled out in Chapter 2, social reproduction theory sheds light on such 
interactions. Hypothesis 2 (H2) suggests that graduating from high-quality colleges 
would benefit socioeconomically advantaged students more than disadvantaged students. 
This hypothesis is tested in the remaining part of this chapter. The organization of this 
chapter as follows: First, a baseline model that pools all students together estimates the 
average effect of college quality. Then, several technical issues (including correction for 
selection bias, Hierarchical Linear Modeling, measures of college quality, etc.) are 
investigated before the baseline model is applied to different groups of individuals. 
Finally, the different effects of college quality across students are examined sequentially. 
 
4.1 The Baseline Model 
Previous studies exploring the effect of college quality on individual earnings (or 
hourly wage rate) use more or less the same method: Individual i’s log earnings ( ) 
is a function of quality of institution j he or she actually attended ( ), demographic 
characteristics ( ), family background ( ), academic background ( ), job market 
conditions ( ), and an individual disturbance term (
)ln( iY
ijQ
iD iF iA
iJ iµ ). In mathematical notation,  
iiiiiiji JAFDQY µαααααα ++++++= 543210)ln(                        (4.1) 
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This model has been tested in several recent studies by Thomas (2000a, 2003) and 
Thomas and Zhang (2001, 2002). The same model is used in this study as the baseline 
model for several reasons. First, it is desirable to maintain consistency with previous 
research (provided it is good) so that results can be compared without confusion due to 
the method. Second, although it is interesting to employ statistically more advanced 
methods such as correction for selection and HLM, it is my intention to keep the 
technical aspect of this study as parsimonious as possible. Finally, I experiment with 
other methods, and results do not differ substantially from the baseline model. 
The data used in this chapter are from the same source as in the last chapter. 
Indeed, all the variables of college quality, demographic characteristics, and family 
background are defined in exactly the same fashion.30 The outcome of interest in this 
chapter is earnings, measured as the annualized self-reported earnings in the graduates’ 
primary job in April of 1997. Additional individual level independent variables, besides 
various demographic and family background variables as in the last chapter, include 
undergraduate major and labor market variables. Undergraduate major variables 
(categorical dummies) indicate business, education, engineering, health, public affairs, 
biology science, social science, math/science, history, humanity, psychology, and other 
majors. In all subsequent analyses, education majors are treated as the reference group. 
Labor market variables include tenure at present job (in years), its square term, and 
                                                 
30 To keep the model comparable to the model in Thomas (2000a, 2003) and Thomas and Zhang (2001, 
2002), a dummy variable that indicates whether the student is a first-generation college graduate is used 
instead of several dummy variables indicating mothers’ education as in Chapter 3. 
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number of hours worked per week. The rationale for including these variables is 
discussed in Thomas (2000a, 2003) and Thomas and Zhang (2001, 2002). 
The sample of 8,642 students in last chapter serves as the initial sample in this 
chapter. To examine the relationship between college quality and earnings, the sample of 
student is further limited to students who are working full-time as of April 1997, earning 
between $1,000 and $500,000 per year, and not enrolled in school full-time. These 
criteria limit the final sample to 3,965 students across 500 institutions. A detailed 
description of the variables is presented in Table 4.1. The variables are broken out into 
several conceptual categories that include institutional characteristics, demographic 
characteristics, family background, educational background, and labor market variables.  
 Table 4.2 presents OLS estimates of the effects the various demographic, family 
background, education, labor market, and college characteristics on graduates’ log 
earnings.31 Demographic variables have a significant impact on earnings. Net of all other 
factors in the full model, female graduates on average earn about 10% (0.0936 in log 
points) less than male graduates.32 The earnings penalty, in fact, is larger in partial  
                                                 
31 For the purpose of simplicity, only the results from the full model are presented here; stepwise results are 
not reported. The results of this baseline model are discussed briefly in this section; however, because the 
focus of this study is on the effect of college quality on students’ outcomes, the effects of other variables 
are presented but not discussed in later analyses. 
32 In the log-linear model such as the baseline model in this study, the estimated effects are in log points. To 
convert the log points to percentage points, we need to assess the log points at certain point in the 
distribution of the dependent variable, usually the mean. When the log points are small, they are very 
similar to the percentage points. For example, an increase of 0.05 in the log income represents a 5.13% 
increase in income when evaluated at the mean of the income distribution. When the log points are 
relatively large, the percentage points can be substantially larger than the log points. For example, an 
increase of 0.18 (the estimated effect of high-quality public colleges) in the log points represents a 19.72% 
increase evaluated at the mean; an increase of 0.3 in the log points is approximately a 35% increase in 
income. An alternative way is to convert the log points into dollar amount directly. For example, an 
increase of 0.05 in the log income represents about $1,575 when evaluated at the mean of the distribution. 
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Earnings Equation 
Variable Mean SD 
  Log earnings 10.3328 0.4841 
Institutional Characteristics  
  Low-quality, public institution 0.1511 0.3582 
  Low-quality, private institution 0.0526 0.2233 
  Middle-quality, public institution 0.4749 0.4994 
  Middle-quality, private institution 0.2078 0.4058 
  High-quality, public institution 0.0487 0.2153 
  High-quality, private institution 0.0648 0.2462 
  Historically Black colleges and institutions 0.0258 0.1585 
  Private institution 0.3252 0.4685 
Demographic Characteristics  
  Female 0.5188 0.4997 
  White 0.8453 0.3616 
  Native American 0.0049 0.0701 
  Asian 0.0340 0.1811 
  Black 0.0694 0.2541 
  Hispanic 0.0413 0.1991 
Family Background  
  Family income (in $10,000) 4.6576 4.7764 
  First generation college graduate 0.5100 0.5000 
Academic Background  
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 1.9381 1.3389 
  Business major 0.2885 0.4531 
  Engineering major 0.0643 0.2452 
  Health major 0.0607 0.2388 
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Table 4.1 – Continued 
Variable Mean SD  Acronym 
  Public affairs major 0.0367 0.1880  PUBAFFR 
  Biological science major 0.0275 0.1634  BIOSCI 
  Math science major 0.0560 0.2300  MATHSCI 
  Social science major 0.0910 0.2876  SOCSCI 
  History major 0.0170 0.1291  HISTORY 
  Humanity major 0.0720 0.2586  HUMAN 
  Psychology major 0.0292 0.1683  PSYCH 
  Other major 0.1423 0.3494  OTHER 
Labor Market     
  Age 29.9966 6.4937  AGE97 
  Age squared / 100 9.4195 5.0196  AGE972 
  Tenure 2.8057 3.2974  TEN97 
  Tenure squared / 100 0.1874 0.6677  TEN972 
  Number of hours per week 45.3744 9.1568  NUMHRS97 
N 3965    
 
models where other factors such as undergraduate majors are not controlled for.33 This 
gender gap in pay is consistently documented in labor economics. After controlling for 
other variables, minority graduates (except for Asians) have earnings comparable to those 
of their White counterparts. This finding is consistent with a large body of earlier work 
(e.g., Berger, 1988; Thomas, 2003). 
 
                                                 
33 This is so because female students are generally more likely to major in low-paying majors such as 
education, history, and humanities. 
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Table 4.2 
OLS Estimates for the Earnings Equation 
Variable Coefficient t 
  Constant 8.7298 51.72 
Institutional Characteristics   
  Low-quality, private institution 0.0530 1.42 
  Middle-quality, public institution 0.0920 4.41 
  Middle-quality, private institution 0.1066 4.61 
  High-quality, public institution 0.1800 5.46 
  High-quality, private institution 0.1754 4.47 
  Historically black colleges and institutions -0.1167 2.31 
Demographic Characteristics   
  Female -0.0936 6.04 
  Native American 0.1040 1.47 
  Asian 0.1268 3.46 
  Black -0.0109 0.35 
  Hispanic 0.0438 1.07 
Family Background   
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0055 3.55 
  First generation college graduate -0.0233 1.61 
Academic Background   
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0081 1.06 
  Business major 0.2752 11.08 
  Engineering major 0.4321 14.15 
  Health major 0.4429 14.28 
  Public affairs major 0.1473 3.67 
  Biological science major 0.1493 3.15 
  Math science major 0.3818 10.39 
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Table 4.2 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t 
  Social science major 0.1944 5.88 
  History major -0.1340 1.38 
  Humanity major 0.1231 3.80 
  Psychology major 0.1290 3.31 
  Other major 0.1471 5.09 
Labor Market    
  Age 0.0362 4.15 
  Age squared / 100 -0.0433 3.90 
  Tenure 0.0160 3.37 
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0058 0.28 
  Number of hours per week 0.0130 10.95 
2R  0.2247  
Note: Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
Family background variables do not seem to have a large and significant effect on 
graduates’ earnings. For example, an increase in family income by $10,000 only 
increases graduates’ earnings by 0.55% (Table 4.2), which is about $170 evaluated at the 
sample mean salary. Being a first-generation college graduate (i.e., neither parent is a 
college graduate) is associated with a small and statistically non-significant earnings 
penalty. Block-wise regressions show that effects of those family background variables 
diminish as other blocks of variables are added. This observation is consistent with the 
bulk of research examining the relationship between earnings and family characteristics: 
Family background tends to have indirect effects on earnings through its impact on 
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individuals’ propensity to invest in education rather than to have direct effects on 
earnings (Hearn, 1984, 1991; Karabel & Astin, 1975; Rumberger, 1983). 
 The results show that, net of all other variables in the model, the intellectual 
ability variable measured by SAT/ACT quartiles does not appear to affect graduates’ 
earnings significantly, although there is a small, positive effect. Previous studies (Jones & 
Jackson, 1990; Rumberger & Thomas, 1993; Thomas, 2000; Wise, 1975) find that 
academic performance measured by GPA has a positive and significant effect on 
earnings. This is probably due to the relative independence between GPA and college 
quality variables. 
 The earnings differentials among graduates from different academic majors are 
substantial, even after controlling for all other variables in the model. For example, 
relative to education majors, engineering and health majors enjoy an earnings advantage 
of over 40%. Math science and business majors also have substantial earnings advantages 
over education majors. Graduates from other majors including public affairs, biological 
science, social science, humanity, and psychology also have some earnings advantages 
over education majors, with the lowest paid major being history. Very similar earnings 
patterns among college graduates of different majors have been observed in a number of 
other studies (Berger, 1988; Rumberger, 1984; Rumberger & Thomas, 1993). Earlier 
studies (e.g., Thomas, 2000a) also find that when detailed labor market variables (such as 
employment sector, whether job has career potential, whether college degree is required, 
and number of job offers) are introduced into the model, the direct effect of college major 
diminishes, suggesting that college majors are correlated with different labor market 
  
 
 
84
conditions. Because many labor market variables are partially determined by educational 
background, they are left out in the current study to avoid the problem of endogeneity. 
 Graduates’ earnings are also found to be a concave function of both age and 
tenure at the current job, which is generally explained by the accumulation and 
depreciation of general and specific human capital in labor economics. Due to the 
inability to obtain hourly wage rate data required for the standard Mincerian framework, 
the number of hours worked per week is controlled in the model as a partial adjustment. 
On average, a one standard deviation (9.2 hours, Table 4.1, last row) increase in hours 
worked yield a 12% earnings advantage. 
Finally, graduates’ earnings are significantly impacted by institutional 
characteristics. Holding all student characteristics constant, graduates from high-quality 
institutions—both public and private—enjoy a nearly 20% earnings premium over those 
from low-quality public colleges. Even graduating from middle-quality institutions yields 
about a 10% earnings advantage over graduating from low-quality colleges. There does 
not seem to exist an earnings advantage for students graduating from private colleges 
over for those graduating from public colleges in the same quality category.34
An immediate question from analyzing the effect of college quality on graduates’ 
earnings is whether the benefits are worth the associated costs. Researchers have been 
very cautious about conducting such cost-benefit analyses, partly because the real costs 
of a college education are too complex, if not impossible, to measure. It is widely held 
                                                 
34 These estimates are obvious larger than what most previous research has found. This may be due to 
various reasons including different measures of college quality and different stages of graduates’ career. 
See the next section for details. 
  
 
 
85
that the costs of college education should include not only the direct costs (such as tuition 
and fees, and living expenses) but also the indirect costs (such as forgone income). 
Fortunately, because the present question is whether the benefits are worth the costs in 
attending a high-quality college relative to attending a low-quality college, many 
components of the cost-benefit analysis are differenced out, making it feasible to carry 
out a cost-benefit analysis for those attending different types of colleges. To illustrate, 
suppose a high school graduate faces the following three choices: to join the labor 
market, to attend a low-quality college, or to attend a high-quality college, and further 
assume that tuition and fees, living expenses, and forgone income are the only three 
components of costs of attending college, the following calculation illustrates the cost-
benefit analysis:35
 Costs Benefits
1. Joining the labor market L B
2. Attending a low-quality college lll FLT ++ lB
3. Attending a high-quality college hhh FLT ++ hB
 
T refers to tuition and fees, L refers to living expenses, F refers to forgone income, and B 
refers to benefits. Subscript l refers to attending low-quality colleges, and h  refers to 
high-quality colleges. Due to the inability to estimate Ls, Fs, and Bs, it is difficult to 
make a decision between Options 1 and 2 and between Options 1 and 3; however, it is 
possible, with an additional assumption that is not very strong, to make a comparison 
                                                 
35 Adding more cost components to the table does not change the results as long as they are incurred when 
attending both types of colleges. More complicated analysis of net present value (that may require specific 
utility function and discounting factors) for each choice does not change the main point either.  
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between Options 2 and 3. The additional assumption is that living expenses and forgone 
income are the same whether attending a low-quality college or a high-quality college for 
the same individual. Intuitively, individuals would incur the same amount of foregone 
earnings and living expenses as long as they choose to attend college regardless of 
college quality.36 That is, hl LL =  and hl FF = . Then, Option 3 is preferred if and only 
if )()( llllhhhh FLTBFLTB ++−>++− , which is equivalent to  under 
the above assumption. In other words, the decision of which type of college to attend 
hinges on the relative magnitude of the benefit difference and the cost difference that 
boils down to the difference in tuition and fees. The benefit difference, , is readily 
available from the analysis of the effect of college quality and the cost difference can be 
estimated from the average tuition and fees for each type of institutions. 
lhlh TTBB −>−
lh BB −
Table 4.3 shows the average tuition and fees for each type of institution. The 
tuition and fees are much lower and less dispersed in public institutions than in private 
institutions. From Table 4.3, the difference in tuition and fees among different types of  
colleges can be calculated. For example, the average difference in tuition and fees 
between low-quality public institutions and high-quality private institutions is $10,633 
(that is, $12,201 minus $1,568) per year. The benefit difference can be calculated by 
taking the coefficient in Table 4.2 and evaluating it at the mean of the earnings 
distribution. For example, the benefit difference between low-quality public institutions  
                                                 
36 The signaling model assumes that individuals incur different costs (both financial and psychological) in 
attending different types of college. Clearly in the model proposed here, tuition and fees are the only 
element considered to differ in choosing different types of colleges, and psychological costs are not 
considered here. 
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Table 4.3 
Average Tuition by College Quality and Types of Control 
Institutional Type N Tuition 
Low-quality, public institution 78 $1,568 
Low-quality, private institution 46 $6,020 
Middle-quality, public institution 155 $1,824 
Middle-quality, private institution 159 $8,531 
High-quality, public institution 15 $2,171 
High-quality, private institution 47 $12,201 
Total 500  
Note: Average tuition is not weighted.  
 
and high-quality private institutions evaluated at the mean of the earnings distribution is 
$5,890 per year.37 With reasonable estimates for the length of a college education and the 
length of a career, the comparison is quite clear: The benefit difference over one’s career 
well exceeds the cost difference.38 The cost-benefit analyses can be carried out similarly 
among other categories of colleges. The results seem clear: It pays to attend a high-
quality college versus a low-quality college. Admittedly, the above analysis resolves the 
choice between Options 2 and 3; other analyses would be required to resolve the choices 
among all the options. In other words, if an individual has decided to attend college at all, 
it is worthwhile to pay high tuition and attend a high-quality college; however, we need 
to rely on other research to decide whether to attend college at all. 
                                                 
37 The estimated effect of high-quality private colleges relative to low-quality public colleges is 0.1754 log 
points, which can be converted into dollar amount by assessing the log points at the mean of the 
distribution.  
38 A question raised by this comparison is whether the benefit, i.e., the effect of college quality, is stable 
over an individuals’ career time. I explore this point in the following section. 
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Admittedly, the above calculation is on a ceteris paribus basis in that the 
comparison is based on the coefficients from a multiple regression. College choice may 
affect other variables in the equation that in return would change the comparison. For 
example, time to degree, attendance pattern, academic performance, and undergraduate 
majors can be all affected by college choice. It may take less time to complete a degree at 
high-quality colleges than at low-quality ones; it also could be the case that students have 
higher academic performance (higher GPA for instance) at low-quality colleges than at 
high-quality institutions. Similarly, lucrative majors could be more competitive at high-
quality colleges than at low-quality colleges. Finally, the amount of financial aid could be 
very different at different colleges. Nevertheless, given the substantial earnings advantage 
provided by high-quality college, it is still safe to conclude that it pays to attend a high-
quality college versus a low-quality college. 
 
4.2 Some Issues in the Baseline Model 
In the above section, a baseline model was established for the estimation of the 
effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings. I also constructed a cost-benefit analysis 
based on differences in benefits and costs. The analysis was meaningful because many 
immeasurable elements in the cost structure of a college education were differenced out 
in the comparison between attending a high-quality college and a low-quality college. 
The baseline model developed above is used to examine the different effect of college 
quality among different students in the remainder of this chapter. 
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Several technical issues, however, have been raised in the baseline model. To 
keep our focus on the analysis instead of technical issues, the detailed discussion of these 
issues is carried out in appendices. Appendix A discusses the problem of self-selection 
bias in the baseline model; Appendix B examines the hierarchical dimension of the data; 
Appendix C investigates other commonly used quality measures and estimates the effect 
of college quality by different measures; and Appendix D explores the effect of college 
quality on wage growth in the early stage of graduates’ careers. A summary of these 
appendices follows. 
The leading econometric problem in studies on the effect of college quality is the 
potential for self-selection bias. In simple language, students self select different types of 
colleges partially based on the expected labor market payoff and many other factors. 
Thus, the estimated effect of college quality includes not only the true effect of college 
quality, but also the payoff from the self-selection process. In this sense, selection bias is 
a model specification error (Heckman, 1979). By definition, individual heterogeneity in 
observed characteristics is not the source of selection bias. For example, students with 
higher measured abilities stand a better chance of graduating from high-quality colleges, 
and those with lower measured ability are more likely to graduate from low-quality 
colleges. Controlling for observed characteristics effectively eliminates the bias caused 
by individual heterogeneity, but not by self selection. 
Correction for selection bias usually involves a system of two equations: a 
selection equation and a usual outcome equation with a Heckman-type selection term as 
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one independent variable.39 Appendix A follows the standard Heckman-type (1979) 
approach to re-estimate the baseline model with selection bias corrected. First, a selection 
model identical to that in Chapter 3 is estimated using the sample in the baseline model 
(i.e., 3,965 graduates). Then, Lee’s (1983) generalized method is employed to calculate 
the selection term for each individual in each group (low-quality, middle-quality, and 
high-quality colleges). After that, the baseline model is re-estimated for each type of 
college quality with the selection term as one independent variable. Because types of 
control (i.e., public versus private) do not seem to matter in the baseline model, public 
and private colleges of the same quality are pooled together in re-estimating the baseline 
model for each college quality type. A total of three OLS regressions are estimated. 
Finally, the unconditional earnings differentials (i.e., the effect of college quality after 
removing the selection bias) are calculated. As expected, the estimated effects after 
removing selection bias are smaller than the estimated effects in the baseline model. 
Although correction for selection bias is important in principle and appealing in 
theory, the method is not adopted as the major estimating framework in this study for the 
following reasons. First, in studies of this type, it is very difficult to develop a system of 
two equations with different sets of independent variables in each. Because most 
variables are correlated with each other, those in the selection equation tend to enter the 
usual outcome equation. As a result, the non-linear functional form of the selection term 
is usually used as the last resort to identify the system, which causes other problems such 
                                                 
39 Strictly speaking, the Heckman (1979) selection term is constructed from a probit model. Other types of 
discrete choice models, such as logit and linear probability models, are also able to generate the selection 
term. Robinson’s (1988) propensity score is an alternative approach to solving the selection bias problem 
without an explicit assumption of the error structure in the selection equation. 
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as multicollinearity. Second, the estimation of the effect of college quality with selection 
bias corrected is very sensitive to the specification of the selection equation. Changes in 
the variables included in the selection equation sometimes alter the results completely. 
Third, in previous studies on the effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings, 
researchers have found little evidence that correction for selection bias significantly 
changes the results (Brewer & Ehrenberg, 1996; Brewer et al, 1999). In the current 
analysis, the selection term is only marginally significant for the sample of students from 
low-quality colleges, and it is not significant for the remaining two groups of graduates. 
For the above reasons, the usual OLS approach is adopted in the remaining part of the 
dissertation. 
A second econometric problem of this type of study is usually phrased as the 
inconsistency between the data structure and the OLS method. Due to the multilevel 
nature (i.e., institutional and individual) of the factors shown to have effects on the 
outcome of interest (i.e., earnings) in the current analysis, econometric techniques that 
characterize this nature, such as the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) technique are 
often recommended (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Heck & Thomas, 2000). The rationale 
of the HLM model is to allow individual characteristics to explain the variation among 
individuals within each unit and institutional characteristics to explain the variation in the 
effects of individual variables on outcome variables among institutions. In other words, in 
the framework of multilevel modeling, the estimated effects (intercept or coefficients) are 
allowed to vary across groups, and the variations are explained by institutional 
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characteristics. In this sense, the regular OLS model is a special case of the HLM model 
in that the OLS model keeps the effects (intercept or coefficients) constant across groups. 
The application of the HLM model in educational research has become popular 
recently, based on the belief that the HLM is the appropriate way to capture the 
multilevel nature of most data in educational research.40 The application of the HLM 
model, however, does not seem to produce results much different from the OLS model.41 
Appendix B discusses the theory and estimation of the HLM for the same data used in 
estimating the baseline model. Not surprisingly, the estimated effects of college quality 
on graduates’ earnings are very similar to the OLS estimates as in the baseline model. In 
light of the ongoing debate between these two methods and of the similar results 
produced by both methods for this particular study, the OLS model is employed 
throughout the remaining part of this dissertation. 
The third controversial issue in studies on the effect of college quality is how the 
college quality should be measured if it is measurable at all. In the baseline model above, 
the quality measures are constructed from the Barron’s ratings. Previous studies on 
similar topics have used other measures, such as the mean SAT score of the entering 
freshmen, Carnegie Classification, and tuition and fees (see Table 1.1 for details). These 
                                                 
40 Other researchers believe that the data arrangement in the OLS model has already captured the multilevel 
structure of the data. Thus, OLS can also entertain the multilevel nature of the data, only in a different way 
as does HLM (de Leeuw & Kreft, 1995). 
41 Admittedly, the HLM model is much more flexible in modeling the effect of explanatory variables from 
different levels on the outcome variable. For example, the HLM framework helps us understand how the 
effect of an individual-level variable varies by institutional-level variables. Because we are interested in 
estimating the effect of institutional characteristics on outcomes, the HLM model is simplified to 
intercepts-as-outcomes model (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992, p. 21), which usually produces very similar 
results to the OLS model. 
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measures are examined individually, and the results are discussed in detail in Appendix 
C. 
My primary interest, however, is not to judge which is the best measure of college 
quality, but to understand how different measures of college quality may lead to different 
estimated effects of college quality on earnings. If it is the case that the estimated effect 
of college quality is sensitive to the measures of quality used, then those different 
measures may provide partial explanation for the different estimated effects of college 
quality in previous studies. It is also important to see whether conclusions from the 
baseline model are robust to different measures of college quality. For example, the 
results from the baseline model suggest that the earnings difference between attending 
high-quality colleges and low-quality colleges is worth the higher costs for attending 
high-quality colleges. Yet we do not know whether this result holds only for the quality 
measure used in the baseline model or is robust to different measures of college quality. 
In Appendix C, I re-estimate the earnings equation using three different measures 
of college quality, namely, average SAT score of the entering class, Carnegie 
Classification, and tuition and fees.42 Several observations can be drawn from the 
analyses in Appendix C. First, no matter what measures of college quality are used, the 
effect of college quality on earnings is generally positive and significant. For example, 
when the college quality measure constructed from mean SAT scores of entering class is 
used, the effect of high-quality private institutions is about 10%, and graduating from 
                                                 
42 The Carnegie Classifications were not devised as a quality measure and recently have changed the 
classification itself. However, the hierarchy in Carnegie Classifications is correlated with other measures of 
quality and historically it was used as a measure of college quality (see Table 2.1). In this analysis, the 
1994 Carnegie Classification is used. 
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other categories of institutions (high-quality publics, middle-quality privates, and middle-
quality publics) is also associated with 4-8% earnings advantages relative to low-quality 
public institutions. When the Carnegie Classification is used as a college quality measure, 
research institutions and doctoral institutions are associated with higher earnings relative 
to Liberal Arts II institutions, with the only exception being that graduating from Liberal 
Arts I institutions does not seem to provide significant earnings advantages relative to 
Liberal Arts II institutions. Finally, when the college quality is approximated by tuition 
and fees, it is highly associated with graduates’ earnings, especially at private institutions. 
Second, it appears that the estimated effect of college quality is sensitive to the 
measure of college quality. For example, the estimated effects of college quality 
constructed from Barron’s ratings and mean SAT scores of entering class are quite 
different. Table 4.4 compares the estimated effect of college quality for these two 
different measures. At each quality level (especially for high-quality colleges), the 
estimated effect of college quality is much higher with Barron’s ratings than mean SAT 
scores. This observation helps reconcile some of the discrepancies in previous studies. 
For example, using the same college quality measure constructed from Barron’s ratings, 
Brewer et al. (1999) find that the effect of private elite colleges is in the order of 20-40% 
relative to low-quality public institutions. Thomas (2003), however, using the college 
quality measure constructed from the mean SAT scores of entering class, finds that the 
effect of private elite colleges is in the order of 10% relative to low-quality institutions. 
Third, no matter what measures of college quality are used, the earnings 
differentials among colleges of varying qualities are sufficiently large to compensate for  
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Table 4.4 
The Effect of College Quality Measured by Barron’s Ratings and SAT Scores
 Barron’s ratings SAT scores 
Low-quality, private institution 0.0530 (1.42) -0.0018 (0.06) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0920 (4.41) 0.0457 (2.31) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1066 (4.61) 0.0793 (3.16) 
High-quality, public institution 0.1800 (5.46) 0.0608 (2.67) 
High-quality, private institution 0.1754 (4.47) 0.1005 (4.13) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics in parentheses. The full model for the effect of college quality measured by 
Barron’s ratings is presented in Table 4.2, and the full model for the effect of college quality measured by 
SAT scores is presented in Appendix C, Table C.3. 
 
the difference in tuition and fees among institutions. The most direct comparison is 
provided by the regression with tuition and fees as the college quality measure. A $1,000 
increase in tuition and fees at private institutions is associated with a $733 earnings 
increase annually, and at public institutions a $1,000 increase in tuition and fees is 
associated with a $570 earnings increase annually. Similar cost-benefit analyses are 
carried out for different measures of college quality, and the conclusion of the baseline 
model (i.e., it pays to attend a high-quality college versus a low-quality college) is quite 
robust (see Appendix C for details). 
It seems that different measures of college quality yield different estimated effects 
of college quality. The analysis here helps us understand the discrepancies in the findings 
among previous studies where different measures of college quality are used.43 The 
qualitative findings from the baseline, however, seem consistent across different 
                                                 
43 See Table 2.1 for a detailed description of the different measures of college quality used in previous 
studies. 
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measures of college quality. For the purpose of simplicity and convenience, I only use the 
college quality measure constructed from the Barron’s ratings in the remaining part of 
this chapter. 
The final issue relates to the effect of college quality on individuals’ lifetime 
income. Most work on economic returns has focused on the modest returns to college 
quality at discrete points in time (usually one to five years after graduation), and very 
little is known about how college quality influences individuals’ lifetime income. 
Although the data availability prevent a mapping of the trajectory of the economic effect 
of college quality over one’s lifetime, comparing the estimated effect of college quality at 
two different points in time is sufficient to test the hypothesis of whether the effect of 
college quality changes over time. In Appendix D, I compare the effect of college quality 
on graduates’ earnings one to two years and four to five years after graduation. 
The analysis in Appendix D suggests that significant wage growth attributable to 
college quality occur among graduates from high-quality public and private institutions. 
For example, the estimated effect of high-quality private institutions is 7.5% (0.0723 log 
points) in 1994 and 22.7% (0.2043 log points) in 1997, representing a 15 percentage 
points increase in the estimated effect in 1997 (Table D.2). Put in another way, the wage 
gap between graduates from high-quality private college and those from low-quality 
public institutions triples between 1994 and 1997 (a 22.7% gap versus a 7.5% gap). A 
significance test suggests that this increase in the wage gap between these two points in 
time is statistically significant with a t value of 3.19. Similarly, the wage gap between 
graduates from high-quality public and low-quality public institutions increases from 
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about 9.5% to 21.8%, suggesting that the wage gap has more than doubled between 1994 
and 1997. The estimated effects of middle-quality institutions have also increased more 
than five percentage points in 1997 compared with 1994. Thomas (2003) shows that, on 
average, although earnings of graduates from all types of colleges grow significantly 
between these two time periods, those graduates from high-quality private institutions 
increased their earnings the most.  
Because college quality has different effects on earnings at different points of 
individuals’ careers, the relatively small effect of college quality usually estimated at the 
early stage of graduates’ careers may be valid on its own, but problematic if it is 
generalized to lifetime income. In particular, my analysis suggests that the effect of 
college quality at one’s early stage of career may significantly understate the effect of 
college quality on one’s lifetime earnings.  
 
4.3 Variability in the Economic Effect of College Quality 
The above section explored some important issues in estimating the effects of 
college quality on graduates’ earnings. The qualitative results found in the baseline model 
(multivariate OLS model) have been shown to be robust not only to different estimating 
techniques (e.g., correction for selection bias and HLM), but also to different measures of 
college quality. In the spirit of simplicity and consistency, only the baseline model is used 
in examining variations of the effects of college quality across different individuals. 
In this section, I start by examining the variation in the effect of college quality by 
two demographic factors, gender and race/ethnicity. Then, I study how socioeconomic 
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factors such as family income and parental education impact the effect of college quality 
on earnings. Finally, two academic factors, ability and major field of study, are 
considered for their influence on the effect of college quality. Because race/ethnicity and 
ability are unambiguously linked to socioeconomic status, I also use these analyses in 
mapping out the interaction between socioeconomic factors and the effect of college 
quality, which is the main task of this chapter. 
 
Variations by Gender 
The examination of the variability in the effects of college quality on graduates’ 
earnings by gender falls in the broader discussion of earnings inequality by gender, that 
is, what accounts for the earnings difference between men and women? Decomposition 
methods in labor economics suggest that aside from gender discrimination, the earnings 
gap could be explained by at least two observable and estimable factors.44 The first is the 
observed heterogeneity between women and men. For example, the earnings difference 
between women and men may partially be explained by the relatively lower educational 
attainment of women. The other factor is the variation in the returns to various work-
related resources by gender. For example, educational attainment may have different 
effects on earnings for women and men due for example to different career choices. The 
inequality in the education attainment in terms of college quality has been explored in 
                                                 
44 For a detailed discussion on decomposition methods, see Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973), Neumark 
(1988), and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991). 
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Chapter 3. Here I consider differences in the effect of college quality on earnings 
between male and female graduates. 
Previous studies on different effects of educational attainment by gender have not 
yielded unequivocal results. Bibb and Form (1977) show that blue-collar women receive 
lower earnings in relation to their educational attainment, even after controlling for other 
salient variables. Treiman and Terrell (1975), McClendon (1976), and Rosenfeld (1980) 
do not find significant differences in the returns to educational attainment (in terms of the 
highest grade) between women and men. Other studies focusing on the effect of college 
quality on earnings find that college quality has somewhat greater effects for women. For 
example, Mueller (1988) finds that college selectivity has significant direct and indirect 
effects for both men and women. The direct effects are similar for both genders, while the 
indirect effect is almost twice as large for women as for men. Solmon (1985) finds 
stronger evidence that college quality matters less for white men than for White women, 
even after controlling for undergraduate major, GPA, tenure, and sector. In reviewing the 
evidence on different returns to educational attainment by gender, Anderson and Hearn 
(1992) conclude that both the quantity and the quality of education have a greater impact 
on women than on men and that the marginal payoff to further education is greater for 
women than for men. 
Conclusions such as those drawn by Anderson and Hearn (1992) create problems 
in relating the return of college quality to individuals’ college choices. If the return to 
college quality were higher for female students than for male students, then the former 
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should have greater incentive to attend high-quality colleges.45 Quite the contrary, the 
analysis in the previous chapter (Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6) has shown that female students 
are somehow less likely to earn degrees from high-quality colleges, although the 
difference is not statistically significant after controlling for other covariates. From this 
evidence, we would expect that college quality should have more or less the same if not a 
smaller impact for female than for male students. 
To examine whether the return to college quality differs by gender, one can either 
add interaction terms of college quality and gender variables in the baseline model or 
estimate separate equations for each gender group. Adding interaction terms, however, 
restricts the estimated effect of other variables to be the same for male and female 
students. Further, because many interaction terms need to be created (6 categories of 
college quality and 2 categories of gender yield a total of 12 interaction terms), the results 
of such a model with many interaction terms are not easily interpretable. Thus, in the 
following analyses, I estimate the baseline model separately for male and female 
students.46 Differences between the estimated effects of college quality for males and 
females can then be computed from the results of these separate regressions.47 Results 
                                                 
45 Alternatively, conclusions drawn by Anderson and Hear (1992) could be explained by the different 
discount rate between male and female students. Because women might have higher discount rate than 
men, the former would not push their investment as far. 
46 This strategy is used in the remaining part of this chapter in estimating different effects of college quality 
across different groups of students. 
47 Let fβ  and )var( fβ  denote the estimated effect of college quality for female students and its variance 
and mβ  )var( mβ  for male students. The difference between the effect of college quality for female and 
male is then mf ββ − . Assuming fβ  and mβ  are not correlated (that is, the residual terms from separate 
regressions are not correlated), then the variance for the difference term mf ββ −  is )var()var( mf ββ + . 
Statistical testing follows as usual. 
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from separate regressions also provide insight into different effects of other variables on 
the earnings of male and female graduates.48
Table 4.5 presents the results of separate regressions for male and female 
students. For the convenience of discussion, only the estimated effects of college quality 
are included in the table. The first column in Table 4.5 presents the estimated effect of 
college quality for the pooled (male and female students) sample, the second column 
provides the estimates for the sample of female graduate, and the last column shows the 
sample of male students. 
Table 4.5 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equations, by Gender 
College quality Pooled Female Male 
Low-quality, private institution 0.0530 (1.42) 0.0363 (0.89) 0.0715 (1.07) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0920 (4.41) 0.0519 (2.28) 0.1317 (3.67) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1066 (4.61) 0.0734 (2.92) 0.1510 (3.70) 
High-quality, public institution 0.1800 (5.46) 0.1678 (4.65) 0.1779 (3.19) 
High-quality, private institution 0.1754 (4.47) 0.1612 (3.65) 0.2039 (3.15) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. The estimates for the full model are provided 
in Appendix E, Table E.1.  
A couple of observations may be made from Table 4.5. First, both female and 
male students enjoy significant benefits (statistically and economically) from earning 
degrees at institutions of higher quality. For both public and private institutions, the 
                                                 
48 For example, Solmon (1985) find that academic variables such as GPA and fields of study may have 
different effects on earnings for male and female students. Although this analysis only discusses different 
effects of college quality on earnings for male and female students, readers who are interested in the effects 
of other variables may refer to Appendix E for the estimates of the full baseline model. 
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higher the measured quality of an institution, the higher the benefits it provides. Second, 
the estimated effects of college quality for female students are uniformly lower than that 
in the pooled regression, and most of the estimated effects of college quality for male 
students are higher than those in the pooled regression, although the differences are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. When the estimated effects for female students 
and male students are compared, a pattern opposite to that in Anderson and Hearn (1992) 
is revealed: The estimated effects of college quality in each category are uniformly 
smaller for female students than for male students, although the differences are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level.49 In other words, although graduating from high-
quality colleges clearly improves the life chances of both female and male students, 
outcomes for female students are somewhat less advantageous than they are for male 
students. The relatively smaller effect of college quality (not statistically significant) for 
female than for male students as found here, however, are consistent with the relatively 
smaller proportion of female students (also not statistically significant) at high-quality 
institutions as shown in the previous chapter. 
Do high-quality colleges benefit female students more than male students? It 
appears the answer is “No.” Social reproduction theory is not particularly helpful in 
explaining the relationship between gender and the returns to educational attainment 
because gender is not an important parameter of social class. The relatively lower returns 
to college quality for female students may be better explained by labor market conditions. 
                                                 
49 Because statistical significance partially reflects the sample size, as sample size becomes smaller in 
separate regression, the significance test becomes less informative. As a result, in the remaining part of this 
chapter, I am more concerned with point estimates, especially when the pattern is quite clear as in this case. 
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For example, in studying labor market segregation, Rosenfeld (1980) suggests that 
because credentials could be evaluated differentially for women and men in the core 
sector of the labor market, women would have to be over-qualified to get the same 
position as men. In other words, because women are less likely to be selected into the 
primary and competitive sector than men with equal educational attainment, the returns to 
educational attainment in terms of college quality are lower for women. 
 
Variations by Race  
Like gender, race and ethnicity also figure into patterns of economic status. Farley 
(1980) shows that the average Black family’s income then is less than 60% of that of the 
average White family. A recent study by Kominski and Adams (1994) suggest that in 
1993 earnings among 25-34-year-old Black males are only 83% of that of White males of 
the same age. Educational attainment has been identified as the primary explanation of 
this considerable earnings gap. For example, Kominski and Adams show that in the same 
year of 1993, the percentage of 25-29-year old Black males who are college graduates is 
only half that of White males of the same age (12.6% relative to 24.4%). Considering the 
influential impact of college education on earnings, we would reasonably expect that 
earnings differences by race should be much smaller, if not eliminated, among college 
graduates. Indeed, results from the baseline model do not reveal a significant earnings 
gap between White and non-White graduates after controlling for college quality.50
                                                 
50 In the baseline (Table 4.2), Asian is the only race/ethnicity variable with a positive effect on earnings. In 
discussing racial difference, Asian graduates (N = 122) are not included in the non-White category. That is, 
the non-White category aggregates Native Americans, Blacks, and Hispanics, with a total of 445 graduates. 
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However, this type of ceteris paribus comparison has obscured much of the 
inequity among racial groups. For example, being Black not only has a negative direct 
effect on the probability of earning degrees from high-quality colleges, but it also has a 
negative indirect effect through significantly lower academic achievement. This type of 
inequity regarding educational attainment in terms of college quality was discussed in the 
previous chapter; the question here is whether college quality affects graduates’ earnings 
in the same way for individuals of different races and ethnicities. That is, do high-quality 
colleges yield more economic advantages to White students than non-White students? 
In studying market segregation, Rosenfeld (1980) suggests that the return to 
educational attainment is lower for non-White than for White individuals because Whites 
are more likely to be selected into the primary and competitive sector that yields greater 
returns. In contrast, in reviewing previous studies on different returns to educational 
attainment by race and ethnicity (e.g., Chiswick, 1987; Featherman & Hauser, 1978; 
Jencks et al., 1979; Murphy & Welch, 1989), Anderson and Hearn (1992) conclude that 
educational attainment in terms of years of schooling has a greater impact on Blacks than 
it does on Whites. A recent study by Dale and Krueger (1999) reveals similar results. 
These results are consistent with higher discount rates faced by Black students. In this 
analysis, differences in the effect of educational attainment in terms of college quality 
between white and non-white students are examined. 
Table 4.6 displays the mean annual earnings for White and non-White (including 
Native Americans, Blacks, and Hispanics) graduates by types of college quality. Among 
college graduates, the mean earnings of White graduates are slightly higher than that of  
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Table 4.6 
Means of Annual Earnings, by College Quality and by Race/Ethnicity
College quality White Non-White
All $ 34,425 $ 32,447
Low-quality, public institution $ 30,965 $ 31,148
Low-quality, private institution $ 36,408 $ 28,785
Middle-quality, public institution $ 33,974 $ 32,152
Middle-quality, private institution $ 35,213 $ 32,927
High-quality, public institution $ 37,769 $ 36,696
High-quality, private institution $ 39,298 $ 47,517
 
College quality White Non-White
All 10.3324 10.2767
Low-quality, public institution 10.2246 10.2346
Low-quality, private institution 10.3742 10.0974
Middle-quality, public institution 10.3270 10.2817
Middle-quality, private institution 10.3607 10.3243
High-quality, public institution 10.4504 10.4666
High-quality, private institution 10.4121 10.6519
Note: The upper panel represents the means of annual earnings in dollars and the lower panel in logged 
value. 
 
non-White graduates, and the difference is not statistically significant. However, the 
mean earnings by college quality suggest that the effect of college quality may differ 
between White and non-White graduates. For example, for low-quality and middle-
quality institutions, the mean earnings of White graduates appear higher than that of non-
White graduates, yet the relationship reverses for high-quality institutions. It seems that 
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the earnings of non-White graduates from different colleges are more dispersed than 
those of whites. These simple descriptive statistics suggest that the effect of college 
quality could be greater for non-White students than for White students. 
To control for other covariates that may also have contributed to the differences in 
the effect of college quality on earnings for White and non-White graduates, separate 
regressions are estimated for White and non-White graduates, and the results are 
presented in Table 4.7. The first column presents the estimated effect of college quality 
for the pooled (White and non-White graduates) sample, the second column provides the 
estimates for the sample of non-White graduates, and the last column shows that for the 
sample of White graduates. 
The regression results in Table 4.7 confirm and further amplify the observations 
from the simple descriptive statistics in Table 4.6. The effect of college quality on 
earnings displays quite different patterns for White and non-White graduates. For non-
white graduates, earning degrees from middle-quality institutions has a very small and 
statistically non-significant effect on earnings relative to graduating from low-quality 
public colleges. The effect of graduating from low-quality private colleges is negative, 
although it is not statistically significant. However, substantial earnings advantages are 
provided to non-White graduates from high-quality institutions. For example, compared 
with earning a degree from low-quality public college, a degree from high-quality public 
college yields almost 30% (0.2639 log points evaluated at the mean of earnings 
distribution for non-White graduates) earnings advantages, and even more (43%, 0.3585 
log points evaluated at the mean of the earnings distribution for non-White graduates)  
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Table 4.7 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation, by Race 
College quality Pooled Non-White White 
Low-quality, private institution 0.0530 (1.42) -0.0813 (0.97) 0.1242 (2.91) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0920 (4.41) 0.0527 (0.84) 0.1028 (4.66) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1066 (4.61) 0.0441 (0.64) 0.1198 (4.86) 
High-quality, public institution 0.1800 (5.46) 0.2639 (2.18) 0.1999 (5.62) 
High-quality, private institution 0.1754 (4.47) 0.3585 (2.63) 0.1610 (3.86) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. The estimates for the full model are provided 
in Appendix E, Table E.2.  
 
advantages are associated with obtaining a degree from high-quality private institutions. 
Clearly, graduating from high-quality colleges provides enormous earnings advantages 
for non-White students relative to other non-White students at low-quality and middle-
quality institutions. Moreover, it is probably true that non-White students usually have 
larger financial aid packages and hence lower net costs, which would greatly increase the 
net advantages for non-White students. For White graduates, earning a degree from all 
categories of colleges yields large and statistically significant earnings advantages 
relative to obtaining a degree from low-quality public institution, and having a degree 
from a high-quality college does not seem to provide the same earnings advantage for 
Whites as for non-Whites. 
The above analyses reveal a pattern of the effect of college quality on earnings by 
race/ethnicity more complex than what Rosenfeld (1980) and Anderson and Hearn (1994) 
report. Rosenfeld’s hypothesis is partially supported in that middle-quality institutions 
and low-quality private institutions seem to provide greater earnings advantages for 
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White graduates than for non-White graduates relative to low-quality public institutions. 
But clearly, statistical discrimination and market segregation do not appear to explain the 
large effect of high-quality institutions for non-White graduates.51 So too, Anderson and 
Hearn’s (1994) conclusion has obscured the complexities of the effect of different types 
of colleges on graduates’ earnings by race. 
The complexity in the pattern of different effects of college quality on earnings 
for White and non-White graduates cannot be easily explained by social reproduction 
theory although it does provide some insights into the effects of college quality for 
different racial groups. For example, White students may be more likely to take full 
advantage of the resources at better institutions. This explains the greater effect of 
middle-quality colleges for White students than for non-White students; however, the 
huge earnings advantage provided by high-quality colleges to non-White graduates is in 
need of other interpretation. One possible explanation is the special halo effect provided 
by high-quality colleges. For example, a non-White student who graduated from Harvard 
may be perceived first as a Harvard graduate and then as non-White, and a non-White 
student who graduated from low-quality or middle-quality colleges may be perceived 
first as non-White and then as a college graduate. Another possible explanation, from the 
screening hypothesis, may argue that the large effect of high-quality colleges for non-
White graduates may reflect the fact that non-White graduates from high-quality colleges 
constitute a special group of individuals. Then the larger effect of college quality for non-
                                                 
51 Statistical discrimination would argue in this case that because the educational credential in terms of 
college quality is less reliable for non-White than for White graduates, race is used as a screening device. 
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White students than for White students may reflect that non-White students are more 
dispersed in productivity related traits than white students. Finally, a typical demand-
supply argument may suggest that because the number of non-White graduates from 
high-quality colleges is so small, the interplay of demand and supply may drive up their 
earnings. In this regard, affirmative action in the labor market might have played a role in 
opening up more opportunities for minority students. 
 
Variations by Family Income 
The previous two sections examined the effect of college quality by demographic 
characteristics such as gender and race/ethnicity. In this section and the next, I study the 
effect of college quality across social classes. We have learned, whether through 
empirical evidence or everyday observations, that education may be the best avenue for 
upward mobility in society. College quality, as one dimension of educational attainment, 
clearly contributes to upward mobility on average, as various previous studies and the 
current research have shown. The subsequent question is whether college quality 
contributes uniformly for students of different social classes. 
Analysis in the two previous sections suggests that college quality may have 
different effects on earnings for graduates from different racial and gender groups. While 
race and ethnicity have certain connotations of social class (e.g., non-Whites are more 
likely to be from lower social classes than Whites), the link between these demographic 
characteristics and social classes are not direct. To explicate the effect of college quality 
across students from different social classes, I examine the pattern in the effect of college 
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quality by two major elements of social class: family income and parental education. The 
general question is whether students from different social classes can benefit equally 
from earning degrees from high-quality colleges. 
In higher education research, the evidence of the positive effect of socioeconomic 
factors on outcomes in the next generation is overwhelming (both direct effect and 
indirect effect mainly through education); yet little research has been conducted on the 
interplay among those socioeconomic factors and other factors such as college quality. 
These two are different types of equity issues: The former speaks to how socioeconomic 
factors figure into the educational attainment of the next generation, and the latter focuses 
on how socioeconomic factors influence the ability to realize socioeconomic mobility 
from educational attainment. The effect of socioeconomic factors on educational 
attainment and on the effect of educational attainment could be in different directions. 
For example, high socioeconomic status may lead to high educational attainment, and 
high educational attainment may matter more to the socioeconomically less advantaged 
than to the more advantaged. 
As in the previous sections, I estimate separate baseline models for students of 
different family income, which is divided into three groups of the same size according to 
the distribution of family income. Table 4.8 presents the estimated effect of college 
quality for each group of students. The first three columns present the estimated effect of 
college quality for graduates with lowest, middle, and highest family income,  
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Table 4.8 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation, by Family Income
College quality Bottom 1/3 Middle 1/3 
Low-quality, private institution -0.1271 (2.46) 0.0925 (1.59) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0375 (1.19) 0.1188 (3.70) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.0316 (0.86) 0.1583 (4.30) 
High-quality, public institution 0.1214 (2.33) 0.2431 (3.44) 
High-quality, private institution 0.1163 (1.57) 0.3544 (5.71) 
 
College quality Top 1/3 Top 10% 
Low-quality, private institution 0.1960 (2.28) 0.0301 (0.20) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0887 (2.08) -0.0361 (0.57) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.0833 (1.77) -0.1025 (1.44) 
High-quality, public institution 0.1451 (2.78) -0.0254 (0.30) 
High-quality, private institution 0.1240 (1.95) -0.0386 (0.36) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. The estimates for the full model are provided 
in Appendix E, Table E.3. 
 
respectively. The last column is the estimated effect of college quality for the group of 
students in the top 10% of family income.52
A couple of important observations can be drawn. First, the effects of college 
quality across family income are far from uniform. For example, earning degrees at high-
quality private institutions provides about 12%, 43%, 13%, and -4% (i.e., 0.1163, 0.3544, 
                                                 
52 I tried dividing students into different numbers of groups (3, 4, and 5), and the patterns in the effect of 
college quality across family income were more or less the same as that presented in Table 4.8. I also 
estimated the effect of college quality for the group of students with the top 5% of family income, and the 
results are provided in Appendix E. It should be cautioned, however, that the number of observations for 
the top 5% group was just slightly above 200. 
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0.1240, and -0.0386 in log points in Table 4.8, last row) earnings premiums for students 
from the bottom third, middle third, top third, and top 10% of family income, 
respectively. Clearly, the average 20% earnings advantage as estimated in the baseline 
model disguises such uneven effects of college quality for different groups of students. 
Second, it appears that the middle group benefits most from earning degrees from high-
quality colleges. For example, relative to graduating from low-quality public colleges, 
graduating from high-quality colleges provides about 12-13% (i.e., 0.1214 log points for 
high-quality public institutions and 0.1163 log points for high-quality private institutions) 
earnings advantages for the bottom third group and about 13-15% (i.e., 0.1451 log points 
for high-quality pubic institutions and 0.1240 log points for high-quality private 
institutions) for the top third group. For the middle third group, graduating from high-
quality public colleges yields about a 27% (0.2431 log points) earnings advantage and an 
even larger effect when graduating from high-quality private institutions (43%). 
Interestingly, the estimated effect of college quality is negative (although not statistically 
significant) for graduates from the top 10% of families. 
The above results suggest that although, on average, earning degrees from high-
quality colleges improves graduates’ earnings, outcomes for students from middle-
income families are somewhat greater than they are for other students. In particular, the 
earnings of those who are from the very top of the family income distribution are not very 
sensitive to college quality. This observed pattern seems to be contradictory to what 
social reproduction theory would suggest. Clearly, social reproduction theory provides 
some insights in explaining the relatively higher effect of college quality for students 
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from middle-income families than for low-income families, but it seems not to be capable 
of explaining the declining effect of college quality for students from high-income 
families. To have a deeper understanding of the interplay between the effect of college 
quality and socioeconomic factors, I examine the effect of college quality across other 
dimensions of social class (i.e., parental education) in the following section. 
 
Variations by Parental Education  
Parental education is another important factor that characterizes one’s 
socioeconomic status. Parental education clearly impacts the economic status of the next 
generation. As the results of the baseline model show (Table 4.2), first-generation college 
graduates receive lower earnings than those whose parents are college graduates. Not 
only does parental education have a direct effect on graduates’ earnings, it also exerts 
indirect influence through individuals’ educational attainment. For example, the results in 
the last chapter suggest that college quality is positively correlated with mothers’ 
education. In this section, I examine the interplay between parental education and the 
effect of college quality. That is, do high-quality colleges yield more earnings advantages 
to students from highly educated families than to others? 
Graduates are divided into five groups according to their mothers’ education: less 
than high school, high school graduates, some college, college graduates, and advanced 
degrees. Separate regressions are estimated for each group. Because the estimated effects 
of college quality are very similar for the first three groups (namely, less than high 
school, high school graduates, and some college education), a new category of less than 
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college degree is created to include all three groups. The results of separate regressions 
for each of the three groups (namely, less than a college degree, a college degree, and an 
advanced degree) are presented in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation, by Mother’s Education 
College quality Less than BA BA Advanced degree
Low-quality, private institution 0.0642 (1.36) 0.1032 (0.71) 0.0358 (0.26) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0821 (2.99) 0.1747 (3.85) 0.0876 (1.46) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1128 (3.71) 0.1308 (2.57) -0.0021 (0.03) 
High-quality, public institution 0.2013 (4.15) 0.2195 (3.35) 0.0779 (0.76) 
High-quality, private institution 0.1481 (2.64) 0.2844 (3.74) 0.0228 (0.21) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. The estimates for the full model are provided 
in Appendix E, Table E.4. 
 
Regression results suggest that the effects of college quality are not uniform 
across different levels of parental education. For example, earning degrees at high-quality 
private institutions provides about 16% (i.e., 0.1481 log points in last row of Table 4.9), 
32%, and 2% earnings advantages for students with mothers having less than a college 
degree, a college degree, and an advanced degree, respectively. The average 20% 
earnings advantage as estimated in the baseline model disguises these uneven effects of 
college quality across students with different parental education. Table 4.9 also reveals a 
pattern of small effects for children of mothers having a higher level of education. For 
example, the estimated effect of high-quality public institutions is more than 20% (0.2195 
log points) for students with mothers having a BA or less, but the corresponding effect is 
less than 10% (0.0779 log points) for students with mothers having advanced degrees. 
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To check the robustness of the above findings, fathers’ education and parental 
education (mother’s or father’s education, whichever is higher) are used to replicate the 
above analyses. The results are presented in Table 4.10 (by father’s education) and Table 
4.11 (by parental education). Because fathers’ education and mothers’ education are 
highly correlated, examining the effect of college quality across fathers’ education or 
parents’ education yields similar qualitative results.53 That is, the effect of college quality 
is negatively correlated with fathers’ education and parental education. 
The above results suggest that although, on average, earning degrees from high-
quality colleges improves graduates’ earnings, the positive effect is more evident for 
students from families of low and middle level of education. In particular, the earnings of 
those who are from the best educated families are not very sensitive to college quality. 
Social reproduction theory does not seem to explain the declining effect of college 
quality for students from well-educated families. 
 
Variations by Ability 
Finally, in this section and the next I examine the variations in the effect of 
college quality by two academic factors: ability and major field of study. Both are 
perhaps linked to social class. For example, the quality of schools chosen by upper-class 
families is arguably higher than that chosen by lower-class families. If educational  
                                                 
53 The high correlation between fathers’ education and mothers’ education is illustrated by the size of the 
sample in separate regressions. For example, a total of 1,028 students have mothers with bachelor degrees 
or higher, and 1,490 students have fathers with bachelor degrees or higher. The number of students whose 
parents have bachelor degree or higher is 1,739. 
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Table 4.10 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation, by Father’s Education 
College quality Less than BA BA Advanced degree
Low-quality, private institution 0.0973 (2.09) -0.0646 (0.74) 0.1373 (0.87) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0947 (3.26) 0.0764 (2.06) 0.1025 (2.10) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1407 (4.39) 0.0622 (1.48) 0.0564 (0.99) 
High-quality, public institution 0.2660 (5.92) 0.0820 (1.46) 0.1316 (1.59) 
High-quality, private institution 0.2461 (5.24) 0.1582 (2.01) 0.1108 (1.35) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. The estimates for the full model are provided 
in Appendix E, Table E.5.  
 
Table 4.11 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation, by Parental Education 
College quality Less than BA BA Advanced degree
Low-quality, private institution 0.1006 (2.13) -0.0974 (1.15) 0.1364 (1.00) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0920 (2.98) 0.0743 (2.09) 0.0843 (2.17) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1426 (4.23) 0.0711 (1.79) 0.0364 (0.79) 
High-quality, public institution 0.2684 (5.48) 0.1130 (2.04) 0.1248 (1.86) 
High-quality, private institution 0.1949 (3.43) 0.2047 (2.90) 0.0858 (1.19) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. The estimates for the full model are provided 
in Appendix E, Table E.6. 
 
quality matters at all to cultivate students’ intellectual ability, then students from upper-
class families should have higher measured intellectual ability (such as test scores) than 
those from low-class families. Chapter 3 has shown that social class variables such as 
family income and parental education have a large and significant effect on students’ 
SAT/ACT scores. Other studies focus on the class bias of tests such as the SAT: The 
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content and format of such tests favor upper-class students. Given the linkage between 
social class and measured intellectual ability, examining the variability in the effect of 
college quality for students with different measured intellectual abilities would be helpful 
in understanding the variability in the effect of college quality across social classes. 
Because SAT/ACT scores are coded in quartiles in the original data set, I 
conveniently divide the sample into four groups by quartile: the lowest, the second 
lowest, the second highest, and the highest group. Separate baseline models are estimated 
for each group of students, and the results pertaining to the effect of college quality are 
presented in Table 4.12.  
Table 4.12 
 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation, by SAT/ACT Quartile 
College quality Lowest quartile Second lowest quartile 
Low-quality, private institution -0.0441 (0.65) 0.0165 (0.17) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0705 (1.85) 0.0314 (1.01) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1083 (2.42) -0.0409 (1.12) 
High-quality, public institution 0.3119 (2.52) 0.1369 (2.46) 
High-quality, private institution 0.2859 (2.44) 0.0871 (1.16) 
 
College quality Second highest quartile Highest quartile 
Low-quality, private institution 0.2338 (2.30) -0.1188 (0.98) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.1934 (3.28) 0.0381 (0.67) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.2449 (3.85) 0.0260 (0.40) 
High-quality, public institution 0.3153 (3.90) 0.0472 (0.68) 
High-quality, private institution 0.3342 (4.04) 0.0600 (0.79) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. The estimates for the full model are provided 
in Appendix E, Table E.7. 
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The pattern revealed here is similar to that in the last two sections. For example, 
the effects of college quality for students with different intellectual abilities do not seem 
to be uniform. Earning degrees at high-quality private institutions provides about 33%, 
9%, 40%, and 6% (i.e., 0.2859, 0.0871, 0.3342, and 0.06 log points) earnings advantage 
for students from the lowest, the second lowest, the second highest, and the highest 
quartile of SAT/ACT scores, respectively. Clearly, the average 20% earnings advantage 
as estimated in the baseline model disguises the uneven effects of college quality for 
different groups of students. 
The interaction between ability quartile and the effect of college quality is not 
very clear. It appears that the highest effect of college quality appears for students in the 
lowest and second highest quartiles, and students in the highest quartile are the most 
insensitive to college quality. Especially for the lowest quartile, graduating from high-
quality colleges seems to provide a special boost relative to graduating from middle-
quality colleges. The relatively small effect of college quality for students in the highest 
quartile might be explained by the fact that most of the students in this group are still 
enrolling in graduate programs. For example, in the B&B sample, the highest quartile 
consists of 1596 students. In April 1997, among the 673 students who were working full 
time, only 80 students had enrolled in graduate programs.54 In contrast, among 922 
students who were not working full time (hence not in the analysis of the effect of college 
quality), 609 students attended graduate schools. More importantly, among those 609 
                                                 
54 The number of students who were working is slight smaller here than 673 in the regression analysis 
because 4 of them do not have valid graduate enrollment information. 
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students who attended graduate schools and were not working, 275 (45%) of them are 
from high-quality colleges. Thus, the immediate monetary return of attending high-
quality colleges most likely under estimates the total economic effect of college quality 
for these student in the top quartile of test scores. The effect of college quality through 
further education is explored in Chapter 6. 
Although the pattern in the effect of college quality by SAT/ACT quartiles as 
revealed in this section is not totally clear, it is safe to conclude that students with low 
and middle abilities benefit the most from attending high-quality colleges, and students 
with the highest measured intellectual ability are most insensitive to college quality. This 
pattern seems to confirm the findings in the last two sections. 
 
Variations by Field of Study  
The final element considered in this section is major field of study. Previous 
studies have shown that major field of study is an important factor affecting graduates’ 
earnings (e.g., Berger, 1988; Griffen & Alexander, 1978; James et al, 1989; Rumberger, 
1984; Rumberger & Thomas, 1993; Thomas, 2000a). This line of research has 
consistently shown that certain major fields of study such as business, engineering, and 
health have a very large positive effect on graduates’ earnings. Math science and social 
science majors also earn substantially more than education and history majors who are at 
the bottom of the earnings hierarchy. The analysis for the baseline model reveals similar 
patterns in the effect of college majors on graduates’ earnings. The average effect of 
college major on graduates’ earnings covers the possible interaction between college 
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quality and college major, however. For example, it is highly plausible that college 
quality matters more to certain majors than to others. Hence, if the return to college 
quality varies by major field of study, then the interaction between college quality and 
college major must be considered simultaneously to make optimal college choice 
decisions. 
How might college quality and major interact with each other? Unfortunately, we 
do not have good theories at hand that would guide us in this inquiry. Intuitively, 
assuming individuals are rewarded by being selected into certain sectors of the economy 
because of their relatively high credentials, we would expect that in these sectors of the 
economy, educational credentials should have large effects for those who have been 
selected into these sectors. That is, if we view both college quality and major as 
educational credentials, then the effect of college quality should be positively related to 
the effect of college majors. For example, graduating from high-quality colleges may 
matter a great deal for business majors but may matter little for history and education 
majors. It should be cautioned, however, that the distribution of majors could be quite 
different across institutions. High-quality institutions usually have large business, 
engineering, and science programs but small or no education programs.  
In the data set, fields of study are coded into 12 categories (see the baseline model 
for these 12 major fields of study; the omitted category is education). Six major fields of 
study are chosen for the current analysis, namely, business, engineering, health, social 
science, humanity, and education. Those fields have the largest number of observations 
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(28.9%, 6.4%, 6.1%, 9.1%, 7.2%, and 11.5%, respectively. See Table 4.1).55 Among 
these six fields, business, engineering, and health are usually regarded as the most 
lucrative majors; social science is in the middle; and humanity and education are at the 
bottom of the earnings hierarchy. Separate regressions are estimated for each field, and 
the results are presented in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation, by Field of Study
College quality Business Engineer Health 
Low-quality, private institution -0.0406 (0.57) 0.1169 (0.70) 0.2527 (2.78) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0666 (1.40) 0.0159 (0.35) 0.0092 (0.16) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.0996 (1.94) 0.1337 (2.33) 0.0748 (1.29) 
High-quality, public institution 0.1720 (1.46) 0.0668 (1.17) 0.2197 (2.35) 
High-quality, private institution 0.2576 (2.15) 0.1686 (1.96) 0.1572 (1.82) 
 
College quality Soc. Sci. Humanity Education 
Low-quality, private institution -0.2849 (2.11) 0.2026 (1.52) 0.0990 (0.93) 
Middle-quality, public institution 0.1010 (1.58) -0.0254 (0.46) 0.0692 (1.50) 
Middle-quality, private institution 0.0888 (1.24) -0.0421 (0.57) 0.0034 (0.06) 
High-quality, public institution 0.2851 (3.18) 0.1154 (1.39) 0.0756 (1.10) 
High-quality, private institution 0.0951 (0.77) 0.0312 (0.32) 0.2266 (2.14) 
Note: Absolute value t statistics are included in parentheses. The estimates for the full model are provided 
in Appendix E, Table E.8. 
 
                                                 
55 Six percent of the whole sample (3,965 students) is about 240 observations. Giving this relatively small 
sample, most of the estimated effects in Table 4.13 are not significant. So, caution must be taken in 
interpreting the results. 
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Some observations can be drawn from the results. First, substantial variations 
exist in the effect of college quality across graduates of different majors, suggesting that 
where to go and what to study should be considered simultaneously in making college 
and major choices. Second, the interaction between major field of study and college 
quality is not very clear. For business majors, college quality is a strong determinant of 
their earnings. This result confirms our intuition. For engineering majors, college quality 
does not seem to be a particularly important factor in determining their earnings. 
Although it appears that graduates from private institutions have some advantages over 
those from public institutions, college quality does not matter much within each sector. It 
seems that for engineering majors, where to go is not as important as for business majors. 
For health majors, college quality appears to matter, with the exception that low-quality 
private institutions have the largest estimated effect. It might be the case that both 
students and curricula in low-quality private institutions are more career/market oriented. 
The pattern for social science majors is quite clear, with high-quality public colleges 
providing the most advantages and low-quality private institutions the least. The 
estimated effects of middle-quality and high-quality private institutions are small and not 
statistically significant. For the two lowest-paid majors, humanities and education, only 
low-quality private institutions are shown to affect graduates earnings positively for 
humanity majors, and only high-quality private colleges stand out for education majors. 
Due to relatively small sample size in each regression, I hesitate to make a strong 
statement regarding the interaction between college quality and college major. 
Nevertheless, two general observations might be drawn from the above analysis. First, 
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the variation in the effect of college quality across different major fields of study suggests 
the importance of considering the college quality and college major simultaneously in 
making college choices. Second, these results suggest that college quality matters more 
for more lucrative majors than for others. Two exceptions are noteworthy. College 
quality does not seem to matter much for engineering majors, and for some majors such 
as health and humanities, low-quality private institutions seem to provide special earnings 
advantages. 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter first set up a baseline model to estimate the effect of college quality 
on graduates’ earnings. Results from the pooled model showed a large effect of college 
quality on graduates’ earnings. Other things being equal, graduates from high-quality 
institutions enjoyed nearly 20% earnings premium relative to those from low-quality 
public colleges. Graduating from middle-quality institutions also yielded about a 10% 
earnings advantage over graduating from low-quality colleges. This substantial earnings 
premium was consistent with what recent studies have found (Brewer et al., 1999; 
Thomas, 2003). More importantly, the cost-benefit analysis suggested that on average the 
benefit associated with attending higher-quality institutions was sufficient to cover the 
cost associated with it. That is, it paid to attend high-quality colleges, on average. 
After resolving a couple of technical issues in the baseline model, I checked the 
robustness of the findings in the face of different measures of college quality. Although 
the analysis showed that the main conclusion from the baseline model, that it paid to 
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attend high-quality colleges, still held when different measures of college quality were 
used, the estimated effect of college quality did appear to be sensitive to the measure of 
college quality. For example, in the baseline model when mean SAT score of the entering 
class and Carnegie category were used, the estimated effect of college quality was much 
smaller than when the Barron’s rating was used. This relatively small effect of college 
quality was consistent with what some earlier studies found (Mueller, 1988; Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 1991; Thomas, 2000). It appeared that the measure of college quality served as 
a partial explanation of the discrepancy in the estimated effect of college quality in 
previous research. 
The bulk of this chapter contributed to exploring the different effects of college 
quality across different groups of students. The equity issue discussed here was quite 
different from the one I studied in Chapter 3, where the equity issue related to educational 
attainment. The outcomes of higher education might be considered equitable if students 
had the same probability of earnings degrees from high-quality institutions, regardless of 
their demographic characteristics and socioeconomic status. Higher education was not 
viewed as an equitable system, from the results in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the equity 
issue spoke to the effects of educational attainment (college quality) on graduates’ 
outcomes (earnings). The outcomes of higher education might be considered equitable if 
students with same educational attainment were able to enjoy similar advantages, 
regardless of their demographic characteristics or socioeconomic status. Higher education 
was not an equitable system, either. However, the inequity here seemed to be in favor of 
students from lower- and middle-class families. 
  
 
 
125
I examined the interplay of the effect of college quality with six variables: gender, 
race/ethnicity, family income, parental education, ability, and major field of study. As far 
as gender was concerned, female graduates appeared to benefit less from earning degrees 
at high-quality colleges than did male graduates although the difference was not 
statistically significant. Nor was the effect of college quality uniform by race/ethnicity. 
Counter-intuitively, graduating from high-quality colleges provided a special boost to 
non-White students although the effect of college quality was also substantial for White 
students. Examining the effect of college quality by two major parameters of 
socioeconomic status yielded more or less the same counter-intuitive results. The effect 
of college quality appeared to be larger for students from low- and middle-income 
families than for those from the top-income families. So too, the effect of college quality 
was larger for students from low- and middle-educated families than for those from 
highly educated families. The pattern in the effect of college quality by students’ ability 
further confirmed the above conclusion. Finally, analysis of the effect of college quality 
for different majors suggested that college quality might matter more for lucrative majors 
than for others and that college quality and college major should be considered 
simultaneously in deciding college choices. 
Four of these six factors either directly characterized or are indirectly linked with 
one’s socioeconomic status. Results from these analyses, namely, the different effect of 
college quality by race/ethnicity, family income, parental education, and ability suggested 
a pattern that was very counter-intuitive. In many ways, the results represented here do 
not follow the logic of critical reasoning. If college quality has a smaller effect for the 
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more advantageous class than for the less advantageous class, why are there more upper-
class students at high-quality institutions? Certainly, most researchers are skeptical, if not 
cynical, about results of this sort. At a recent professional conference, a presenter, who 
was White and clearly a critical researcher, bemoaned that some researchers found that 
the effect of education was greater for Black than for White students. 
The social reproduction theory, which is powerful in interpreting the role of 
education in society, seems incapable of explaining the results if one interprets the social 
reproduction theory as I have done in Chapter 2. Whether the above results contradict or 
enhance the social reproduction interpretation needs to be carefully considered. I return to 
this in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COLLEGE QUALITY AND EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION 
 
5.1 Perspective 
In Chapter 4, I examined the effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings, on 
average and by different groups of students. The analyses suggested that graduating from 
high-quality colleges had positive and significant effects on earnings although substantial 
variations existed across different groups of students. These positive effects, by the 
design of econometric models used, were all evaluated at the mean of the earnings 
distribution (of the whole sample or of specific sub-samples). Although the finding of a 
positive average effect of college quality on earnings is convincing and important, it is 
plausible that the effect of college quality differs across graduates’ final positions in the 
earnings distribution. Put in a slightly different way, the predictive power of college 
quality may be different for students at the top of the earnings distribution than it is for 
students at the bottom. Intuitively, if one ends up in a low-paid job, a degree from a high-
quality college might not help much. On the other hand, if one ends up in a high-paid job, 
a degree from a high-quality college should matter much more.  
Clearly, the above question extends the effect of college quality in another 
direction as in the last chapter, where the average effect of college quality was detailed 
into specific effects of college quality for different groups of graduates by individual 
characteristics. By examining the effect of college quality at different points of the 
earnings distribution, the average effect of college quality is detailed into specific effects 
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of college quality for graduates by their final positions in the earnings distribution. In 
effect, the question here is very much like the one Judge et al. (1995) explore, where they 
sample a group of executives and find that these successful individuals disproportionately 
hold degrees from Ivy League universities and other prestigious institutions. That is, in 
the language consistent with this chapter, college quality has a very large effect at the top 
of the earnings distribution. 
A simple way to look at the problem is to examine the earnings distribution for 
each type of college. In order to control for the effect of other variables, I use quantile 
regression. Quantile regression is a technique to estimate the effects of independent 
variables at different points in the distribution of the dependent variable. The technique 
has more flexibility than OLS regression in that the latter only estimates the effects of 
independent variables on the conditional mean of the dependent variable. Quantile 
regression aims at minimizing the following objective function: 
∑∑
<∈≥∈∈
−−+−
}:{}:{
)1(
βββ
βθβθ
tttt
K
xytt
tt
xytt
tt
R
xyxyMin  
where  is the dependent variable,  is a vector of independent variables, ty tx β  is a vector 
of coefficients, and θ  is an arbitrary distributional point to be estimated, e.g., 10th 
percentile, median, 90th percentile, etc. Typically, the coefficient vector β  will differ 
depending on the particular quantile being estimated. 
 The literature related to quantile regressions can be traced back to Koenker and 
Bassett (1978), where the authors use quantile regressions to get a robust estimation when 
the standard normality assumption fails. Other authors use this regression method to 
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analyze censored data (e.g., Powell, 1986). One study which is particularly relevant to 
this analysis is done by Eide and Showalter (1999). In that study, the authors use quantile 
regression to examine intergenerational earnings mobility at different points of sons’ 
earnings distribution. They find that intergenerational earnings mobility is more rigid at 
the bottom of sons’ earnings distribution than at the top. They also suggest that education 
is relatively more valuable at the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution and that 
a college education tends to both raise and compress the earnings distribution. These 
findings are very important from a policy perspective: It seems that college education 
functions more like an equalizer. Eide and Showalter’s study also raises a question 
regarding the effect of college quality across different points of the earnings distribution. 
If it is true that a college education tends to compress the earnings distribution, what is 
the effect of college quality on earnings distribution?  
 
5.2 Analysis 
In this analysis, I take the sample of graduates as in the baseline model (i.e., 3,965 
graduates) and examine the effect of college quality at different points in earnings 
distribution. I present some descriptive statistics first before turning to quantile 
regressions. Looking at descriptive statistics helps understand what quantile regression is 
actually estimating in this particular analysis. The logic is essentially the same as in OLS 
regression: If we are to estimate the average effect of college quality on earnings, we will 
probably first calculate the average earnings for students from each college type to see 
whether there exist suggestive patterns among them. In fact, what OLS quantifies is 
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precisely the differences among these conditional means, with the only exception being 
that OLS takes other control variables into consideration. Because in this analysis we are 
interested in the effect of college quality at different points in the earnings distribution, 
we first look at earnings at different percentile points across college types. Although this 
simple tabulation does not control for other variables that may affect earnings, it 
nonetheless gives us some insight for more advanced econometric analysis. These 
distributions are presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 reports the minimum, 10th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 
75th percentile, 90th percentile, and maximum values of graduates’ earnings for students 
graduating from each college type. A couple of observations can be drawn from the 
descriptive statistics. First, except for the tails of the earnings distribution, earnings are 
positively related to college quality for both public and private institutions. For example, 
for public institutions, the medians of log earnings distribution for graduates from low-
quality, middle-quality, and high-quality institutions are 10.24, 10.34, and 10.44, 
respectively. For private institutions, those medians are 10.31, 10.34, and 10.46, 
respectively. This pattern of positive relation between college quality and earnings 
generally holds at all of the distributional points listed in Table 5.1. It suggests that 
college quality has a positive effect on graduates at most points in the earnings 
distribution. 
Second, the earnings differences by college types vary widely at different points 
of earnings, suggesting that the average earnings difference (calculated as the differences 
in means) may have disguised important variations in earnings differences at different 
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Table 5.1 
Annual Earnings for Each Type of College by Distributional Points 
College quality N Min. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Max Mean
Low-quality, public 599 $1,534 $17,056 $22,000 $28,000 $36,900 $49,964 $140,000 $31,215
Low-quality, private 209 $2,700 $15,561 $19,500 $30,000 $40,000 $59,100 $198,000 $34,157
Middle-quality, public 1883 $1,000 $18,200 $24,000 $31,000 $40,000 $50,000 $280,000 $34,076
Middle-quality, private 824 $5,328 $18,086 $24,000 $31,000 $40,600 $53,000 $206,002 $35,085
High-quality, public 193 $12,000 $20,900 $28,800 $34,320 $41,600 $55,000 $175,000 $37,392
High-quality, private 257 $2,400 $20,000 $25,000 $34,800 $48,000 $65,000 $500,000 $40,423
 
College quality N Min. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Max Mean
Low-quality, public 599 7.34 9.74 10.00 10.24 10.52 10.82 11.85 10.23
Low-quality, private 209 7.90 9.64 9.88 10.31 10.60 11.00 12.20 10.29
Middle-quality, public 1883 6.91 9.81 10.09 10.34 10.60 10.82 12.54 10.33
Middle-quality, private 824 8.58 9.80 10.09 10.34 10.62 10.88 12.24 10.36
High-quality, public 193 9.39 9.94 10.26 10.44 10.64 10.92 12.07 10.45
High-quality, private 257 7.78 9.90 10.13 10.46 10.78 11.08 13.12 10.45
Note: The upper panel represents the means of annual earnings in dollars and the lower panel in logged value.   
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points of distribution. For example, the difference between graduates from low-quality 
public institutions and high-quality private institutions at mean is 0.22 (10.45-10.23). 
This difference is 0.44, 0.16, 0.13, 0.22, 0.26, 0.26, and 1.27 at the minimum, 10 
percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th percentile, 90th percentile, and the 
maximum of the log earnings distribution.  
The above descriptive statistics suggest that the effect of college quality on 
earnings may differ across the whole earnings distribution. To control for other covariates 
which may affect the earnings at different points in the earnings distribution, I turn to 
quantile regression. The observed differences at particular percentile points of log 
earnings distribution across each college type resemble the estimates for the effect of 
college quality at those percentile points as evaluated by quantile regression, with the 
exception that quantile regression is able to take the effect of other factors into 
consideration and quantifies these differences more precisely.  
Quantile regressions are estimated at 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, and 0.95 
quantiles of the earnings distribution, and the results are presented in Table 5.2. As in 
log-earnings models in Chapter 4, the estimates in Table 5.2 are in log points. Again, 
those log points can be converted into percentage points by evaluating them at the mean 
of the earnings distribution. For the convenience of reference, I use the estimated log 
points in the following discussion. Column 1 gives OLS estimates, and Column 2 through 
Column 8 present estimates of quantile regressions evaluated at the above points. 
Because I am especially interested in the effect of college quality at the tails of log 
earnings distribution, more regressions are estimated at the tails than in the middle of log 
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Table 5.2 
Quantile Estimates for the Earnings Equation 
  (1) OLS (2) 0.05 (3) 0.10 (4) 0.25 
Low-quality, private institution 0.0530 (1.42)    0.0089 (0.11) -0.1054 (1.91) -0.0287 (0.58)
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0920 (4.41)    
    
    
    
    
0.0532 (0.94) 0.0750 (2.14) 0.0727 (2.53)
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1066 (4.61) 0.0383 (0.54) 0.0429 (0.96) 0.0701 (2.08)
High-quality, public institution 0.1800 (5.46) 0.0666 (0.83) 0.1830 (3.00) 0.1504 (3.03)
High-quality, private institution 0.1754 (4.47) 0.1011 (1.33) 0.0445 (0.75) 0.1499 (3.44)
 
  (5) 0.50 (6) 0.75 (7) 0.90 (8) 0.95 
Low-quality, private institution -0.0121 (0.37)    0.0726 (2.10) 0.1268 (1.78) 0.0308 (0.38)
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0696 (3.64)    
    
    
    
0.0727 (3.66) 0.0954 (2.20) 0.0482 (0.90)
Middle-quality, private institution 0.0624 (2.80) 0.0848 (3.53) 0.0996 (1.91) 0.1329 (2.11)
High-quality, public institution 0.1577 (4.68) 0.1536 (4.40) 0.0958 (1.45) 0.1407 (1.56)
High-quality, private institution 0.1421 (4.71) 0.2098 (6.65) 0.2597 (3.71) 0.2962 (3.47)
Note: In estimating the quantile model, the procedure qreg in STATA is used. Ideally, other procedures such as iqreg and sqreg should be used instead 
to test whether there is statistical difference among the estimated coefficients at different points of the distribution. Unfortunately, weights cannot be 
applied for those procedures. As a check, I run another set of quantile regressions without weights and find that the estimated effect for private high-
quality institutions at different points of distribution is statistically different. Absolute value t statistics in parentheses. The estimates for the full model 
are provided in Appendix E, Table E.9.  
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earnings distribution. All quantile regressions have exactly the same specifications as the 
baseline model in last chapter. 
The OLS estimates in Column 1 provide a benchmark for quantile regressions in 
Column 2 through Column 8. By construction, the OLS results are more or less the same 
as the results by median regression (i.e., regression at 50th percentile) because both 
regressions calculate coefficients at the “middle” of earnings distribution although the 
minimization problems are different for OLS and quantile repression. For example, the 
effect of high-quality public institutions as given by the median regression is 0.1577 
(Column 5), which is similar to that provided by OLS regression, 0.1800 (Column 1). 
And the effects of high-quality private colleges are 0.1421 and 0.1754 by median and 
OLS regressions.  
The observations from descriptive statistics have suggested that high-quality 
colleges would probably stretch the log earnings distribution upward. That is, earning 
degrees at high-quality colleges has a larger effect at the top of the earnings distribution 
than at the bottom. This hypothesis is confirmed by the results of the quantile regressions. 
Although it is generally true that at most points of the earnings distribution, college 
quality has a positive effect on graduates’ earnings, this effect is by no means uniform 
across the whole distribution. Specifically, at the low end of log earnings distribution, 
i.e., 5th, 10th, and 25th percentiles, there exist either non-significant or insubstantial 
differences among the coefficients for different types of colleges. Thus, it appears that 
college quality does not seem to matter much if one ends up in a low-paying job.  
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In contrast, at the high end of the earnings distribution, the estimated effects 
among college types are substantial. For example, evaluated at the 95th percentile, the 
coefficients for middle-quality publics, high-quality publics, low-quality privates, 
middle-quality privates, and high-quality privates are 0.0482, 0.1407, 0.0308, 0.1329, and 
0.2962, respectively. The positive effect of college quality is also clear at the 75th and 90th 
percentiles. In particular, graduating from private high-quality institutions provides very 
large advantage at the 90th and 95th percentiles. It implies that college quality is a stronger 
determinant of earnings at the top of the earnings distribution than at the bottom. 
Intuitively, if one ends up with a high-paying job, a degree from a prestigious institution 
will help a great deal. 
 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I used quantile regressions to examine the effect of college quality 
across the earnings distribution. Results indicated that at the bottom of log earnings 
distribution (e.g., 5th, 10th, and 25th percentiles), the effect of graduating from other types 
of colleges relative to low selective publics was either insubstantial or insignificant. The 
earnings gap became substantial when moving toward the top of earnings distribution. 
The largest divergence occurred at the very top of the earnings distribution (e.g., the 90th 
and 95th percentiles). For example, this advantage exceeded 30% for graduates from 
private high-quality colleges relative to low-quality institutions. Taken together, the 
results suggested that graduating from high-quality colleges, especially private elite 
institutions, would both lift and stretch the earnings distributions. 
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The above patterns implied that conditional on graduating from colleges, students 
who ended up at the bottom of log earnings distribution would not have benefited from 
graduating from high quality institutions. However, graduating from high-quality 
institutions, especially from private elite institutions, would disproportionately benefit 
students who ended up at the top of log earnings distribution. Taken together, the results 
suggested that graduating from high-quality colleges, especially private high-quality 
institutions, would both lift and stretch the log earnings distributions. In reaching the 
above conclusion, I could emphasis the term conditional on graduating from colleges 
enough because previous research (Eide & Showalter, 1999) has shown that attendance in 
colleges would lift and compress log earnings distribution.  
This conclusion is broadly consistent with what social reproduction theory would 
suggest. When going to college becomes a relatively universal phenomenon, it cannot 
serve as a mechanism to differentiate the most capable and wealthy students from others. 
Attending an elite college, then, becomes such a differentiating apparatus. Graduating 
from an elite institution may not guarantee higher economic return (e.g., the effect of 
high-quality college is not substantial at the low end of log earnings distribution); 
however, if one ends up near the top of earnings distribution, a degree from an elite 
institution becomes extremely important. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COLLEGE QUALITY AND GRADUATE EDUCATION 
 
6.1 Perspective 
In previous chapters, I studied the variability in the effect of college quality across 
different groups of students. Like many previous studies exploring the effect of college 
quality on career outcomes of college graduates, the effect of college quality in previous 
chapters was evaluated as the earnings differences among graduates from different types 
of colleges. The strength of such a focus is partially due to the popular (mis)perception 
that greater economic rewards are the single most important outcome of graduating from 
college and partially due to the fact that employment and wage data are readily available 
in many national data bases of college graduates. Exclusive focus on the economic 
outcomes of college neglects a host of other outcomes, however. In this chapter and the 
next, I extend the study of the effects of college quality beyond the area of earnings 
differences. Specifically, I consider the effects of college quality on two outcome 
variables: graduate education and job satisfaction.  
Graduate education may enhance the effect of college quality in two ways. First, 
obtaining an advanced degree itself may be considered as a triumph to many individuals. 
Second, graduate education is an integral stage of human capital accumulation, and 
usually it is a prerequisite to many desirable professions (e.g., lawyer, physician, and 
professor). Thus, if it can be shown that college quality has a positive effect on graduate 
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education, then estimates of the effects of college quality based on earning differences 
among terminal baccalaureate recipients is likely underestimated.56  
Analysis in Chapter 4 showed that college quality had a positive and significant 
effect on graduates’ earnings, on average. Certainly, when choosing a college to attend 
and a major field to study, one important factor that students consider is the expected 
earnings from different types of college and different major fields. Although the findings 
from previous chapters and other similar studies are convincing, they do not typically 
describe the decision-making process of students and families. For example, early 
research suggests that many students choose their major fields never intending to 
terminate their education with an undergraduate degree, but rather intending to enroll in 
professional or academic graduate programs (Eide & Waehrer, 1998). 
Similarly, because of the option value for further education, students may choose 
to attend colleges that provide greater possibilities for advancing to the graduate level. In 
fact, Thomas (2000a) suggests that terminal baccalaureate graduates of more prestigious 
colleges may be viewed as “damaged goods” and hence may not receive the economic 
returns one might expect. These results suggest we need to include the effect of college 
quality and various factors on graduate education in the analysis of the effect of college 
quality on students. 
A few studies have examined the effect of college quality on graduate education. 
Tinto (1980), Smart (1986), and Ethington and Smart (1986) have shown that college 
                                                          
56 The direction of bias is not certain in that some students might attend graduate school due to non-
pecuniary reasons. For example, Ph.D. in English could earn less than B.A. in English. Generally speaking, 
if graduate education has positive effects on earnings, then comparing earnings among students only with 
college education could underestimate the effect of college quality on earnings. 
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quality has a small though statistically significant effect on graduate school enrollment. 
Further, Henson (1980) and Lang (1987) suggest that graduating from high-quality 
undergraduate colleges increases the probability of attending high-quality graduate 
schools. Recently, Eide et al. (1998), using NLS-72 and HSB, find that attendance at an 
elite private college significantly increases the probability of attending graduate school, 
and more specifically, graduate school at a major research institutions.   
It seems, then, that undergraduate college quality may have effects on various 
aspects of graduate education. In this section, I first examine the extent to which college 
quality affects college graduates’ enrollment in graduate programs within four to five 
years after college graduation.57 Second, by differentiating master’s and doctoral 
programs, I study the effect of college quality on the levels of graduate programs in 
which students enrolled. Third, I consider the extent to which college quality may have 
affected the quality of graduate schools in which students enrolled. The same questions 
may be examined for graduate degree attainment. For example, what is the effect of 
college quality on graduate degree attainment within four to five years after BA receipt? 
Does college quality affect the level of graduate program and quality of graduate school? 
                                                          
57 Although the time span from BA receipt to the second follow-up of B&B is not long enough to expose 
the complete pattern of graduate enrollment for baccalaureate recipients, previous research shows that the 
majority of graduate students enroll in graduate school during the time period covered by the second 
follow-up of the B&B survey, i.e., four to five years after college graduation. For example, in studying the 
enrollment pattern of doctoral students, Bowen, Turner, and Witte (1992) find that a typical time span from 
BA receipt to Ph.D. receipt is nine years. Given the typical length of a doctoral program (usually five to six 
years), it is reasonable to assume that the majority of doctoral students enroll in graduate programs within a 
couple of years of BA receipt. Admittedly, for some professional degrees such as the MBA, which typically 
requires three to five years of working experience, four to five years after BA receipt may not be long 
enough to observe the complete enrollment pattern. 
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Finally, I remark on how to integrate the results of this section into the results of the 
conventional research on the effect of college quality on earnings.  
 
6.2 Analysis 
The sample of students for this analysis is limited to those who (1) were in BB: 
93/97 (N = 11,192), (2) never received a bachelor’s degree before 1992 or 1993 (N = 
9,438), (3) had valid data on graduate enrollment and degree attainment (N = 9,410), and 
(4) had school-level data available (N = 8,610). A detailed distribution of their graduate 
enrollment and degree attainment is presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 
Distribution of Post-Baccalaureate Enrollment and Degree Attainment
  
Degrees Earned 
  No degree Other 
degrees
Master’s 
degrees
Doctoral 
degrees 
Total
No enrollment 4,157     4,157
Other programs 1,233 402 8  1,643
Master’s program 1,382 144 978  2,504
En
ro
llm
en
t 
 Doctoral program 150 7 119 30 306
 Total 6,922 553 1,105 30 8,610
 
Among the 8610 college graduates in the sample, 4,157 (48.3%) have not been 
enrolled since their graduation; and 2,504 (29.1%) students have enrolled in master’s 
programs, including MBA and first professional programs. Another 306 (3.6%) have 
enrolled in doctoral programs. The term graduate enrollment in this chapter is restricted 
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to enrollment in the master’s (including MBA and first professional) programs and 
doctoral programs but does not include any certificate or licensing programs. By this 
definition, a total of 2,810 (32.6%) students in the final sample have attended various 
graduate programs. 
Certainly, enrollment in graduate programs before April 1997 did not necessarily 
guarantee graduate degree completion in 1997. Among the 2,504 students enrolled in 
master’s programs, 1,382 had not received degrees by 1997; that is, only 978 (39.1% of 
2,504) had completed their master’s degrees. Students enrolled in other degree programs 
could also receive master’s degrees. For example, 119 students who enrolled in doctoral 
programs had completed their master’s degree by the second follow-up. Altogether, up to 
April 1997, 1,105 (12.8% of 8,610) students had finished their master’s degrees, and 30 
had completed their doctoral degrees. Similarly, the term graduate degree in this analysis 
was restricted to master’s and doctoral degrees but excluded certificates and licenses.  
Several dependent variables are of interest in this analysis. The first is graduate 
enrollment, indicating whether one has been involved in any type of graduate enrollment, 
including master’s and doctoral programs (GRDENR = 1 if ever enrolled in a graduate 
program, GRDENR = 0 otherwise). A second outcome variable used in this analysis 
identifies those BA graduates who have enrolled in a doctoral program (PHDENR = 1 if 
enrolled in a doctoral program, PHDENR = 0 if enrolled in a master’s program). A third 
variable captures the Carnegie Classification of the school in which a student enrolled for 
graduate study (CCENR = 0 if enrolled in comprehensive universities, CCENR = 1 if 
enrolled in doctoral universities, and CCENR = 2 if enrolled in research universities). In 
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this analysis, I do not differentiate Type I and Type II institutions in each Carnegie 
category. 
 Two other variables describe students’ completion of graduate degrees in 1997. 
One of these indicates whether a student has obtained a graduate degree by 1997 
(GRDDGR = 1 if attained graduate degree, GRDDGR = 0 otherwise). Unlike in the 
analysis of graduate enrollment, I do not attempt to differentiate between master’s 
degrees and doctoral degrees because of the small number of doctorates awarded. The 
final outcome variable used in this analysis captures the Carnegie Classification of the 
school conferring the advanced degree (CCDGR = 0 if received degree from 
comprehensive universities, CCDGR = 1 if received degree from doctoral universities, 
and CCDGR = 2 if received degree from research universities). 
The method employed in this section is straightforward binomial logit and 
multinomial  logit (three discrete outcomes) models. Specifically, for binomial choices 
(graduate enrollment or not, master’s program or doctoral program, and graduate degree 
or not), binomial logit models are used, and for multinomial outcomes (comprehensive, 
doctoral, or research institutions), multinomial logit are employed.58 The estimated logit 
coefficients show how graduating from undergraduate colleges of varying quality affect 
                                                          
58 I do not attempt to model the potential nested structure among these choices. For example, it could be the 
case that students first decide to enroll in a graduate program and then decide which program or which 
school to attend, resulting in nested discrete choice structures. Although statistical tools dealing with these 
nested choice structures are readily available, I do not intend to use them because these nested structures 
are not all that clear. Similarly, one may argue that some of the choices could be inherently ordered; I 
ignore the potential ordered structure of these choices due to the same ambiguity. Finally, these models 
suffer from potential selection bias. The discussion of selection bias in Appendix A is also applicable to 
these discrete choice models. As a partial remedy, I control for the selection bias by including various 
demographic and family background variables in these discrete choice models.  
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the log odds of various choice variables. For the convenience of interpretation, only the 
marginal effects are reported. 
 
Graduate Program Enrollment  
I first estimate a logit model of the impact of college quality on the probability of 
graduate program enrollment with the dependent variable GRDENR. The marginal 
effects from this analysis are reported in Table 6.2. The predictive power of the model is 
fairly good; overall, it predicts 70 percent of the binomial choices correctly. College 
quality emerges as a strong predictor for graduate program enrollment. Relative to BA 
graduates from low-quality public colleges, BA recipients from high-quality colleges are 
about 16% (private) and 18% (public) more likely to enroll in some kind of graduate 
program within four to five years after BA receipt. Students from middle-quality 
institutions also enjoy about 10% advantages in graduate school attendance over low-
quality institutions. It appears that in terms of graduate school attendance, institutional 
control has little effect. This pattern is very much like the pattern for the effect of college 
quality on earnings as reported in Chapter 4.  
The probability of graduate school attendance also varies by undergraduate major. 
Business graduates are least likely to attend graduate school among all major areas. 
Compared with education graduates, business graduates are 22% less likely to attend 
graduate schools. This may have been because of the high opportunity costs associated 
with graduate school attendance for business majors. In contrast, students from the 
relatively low-paid majors (education, bio-science, math science, social science, history,  
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Table 6.2 
Binomial Logit Estimates of Graduate Enrollment, Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
 Constant -0.4100 3.65 
Institutional Characteristics   
 Low-quality, private institution -0.0334 1.12 
 Middle-quality, public institution 0.0843 5.00 
 Middle-quality, private institution 0.1057 5.67 
 High-quality, public institution 0.1768 7.31 
 High-quality, private institution 0.1576 7.05 
 Historically Black colleges and institutions 0.0933 2.60 
Demographic Characteristics   
 Female -0.0528 4.95 
 Native American 0.0544 0.84 
 Asian 0.0589 2.36 
 Black 0.1017 4.18 
 Hispanic 0.0648 2.68 
Family Background   
 Family income (in $10,000) 0.0037 3.83 
 First-generation college graduate -0.0283 2.61 
 Age -0.0226 3.93 
 Age squared / 100 0.0244 3.32 
Academic Background   
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.2187 20.02 
 Business major -0.2244 12.37 
 Engineering major -0.0347 1.43 
 Health major -0.0917 3.95 
 Public affairs major -0.0858 2.83 
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Table 6.2 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
 Biological science major 0.0898 3.66 
 Math science major 0.0213 0.92 
 Social science major -0.0285 1.44 
 History major -0.0155 0.44 
 Humanity major -0.0772 3.73 
 Psychology major 0.0677 2.58 
 Other major -0.1145 6.05 
N 8,610  
2χ  1,074  
Prediction 70%  
Notes:  
1. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
2. Education major is the left-out group in the regression. 
3. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variables for continuous variables; marginal effects for 
dummy variables are for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
4. Absolute value t statistics included. 
and psychology) are among the group who are most likely to attend graduate school. 
Following from the logic above, the latter’s attendance may have been because of low 
opportunity costs relative to business majors. 
Results of the effect of other variables are consistent with findings from previous 
research in this area. For example, academic performance is a strong predictor of 
graduate school attendance. On average, one quartile increase in the SAT/ACT scores is 
associated with almost a 22% increase in the likelihood of enrolling in a graduate 
program. On average, female graduates are less likely to attend graduate school and 
graduates of minority groups are more likely to attend graduate school. Higher family 
income is associated with a higher probability of graduate school attendance and being a 
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first-generation college graduate is associated with a lower probability of graduate school 
attendance. Finally, the analysis shows that the probability of graduate school attendance 
is a convex function of age. Considering that salary is a concave function of age, this 
result is understandable because higher opportunity cost is associated with lower 
probability of graduate school attendance. 
 
Enrollment in Master’s or Doctoral Program 
 In the next step, I sample those students who actually have enrolled in graduate 
programs within four to five years after college graduation and estimate the effect of 
college quality on their choice of degree program. In effect, I estimate the impact of 
college quality on the probability of enrolling in a doctoral program relative to enrolling 
in a master’s program.  
Table 6.3 reports the marginal effects from the binomial logit model with the 
dependent variable PHDENR. The prediction of this binomial model is quite good; 
overall, it predicts 89% of the binomial choice classified correctly. College quality, 
except for those graduating from high-quality public institutions, does not have a 
significant effect on the probability of enrolling in doctoral programs. Students from 
high-quality public colleges are more likely to enroll in doctoral programs, relative to 
students from low-quality publics; however, the effect is small. “Academic majors,” on 
the other hand, has a strong effect on the probability of enrolling in a doctoral program. 
In the final sample, none of the students from public affairs majors attended doctoral 
programs (this dummy is dropped from the regression). Not only are business majors less  
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Table 6.3 
Binomial Logit Estimates of Doctoral Enrollment, Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
 Constant -0.0825 0.74 
Institutional Characteristics   
 Low-quality, private institution -0.0033 0.11 
 Middle-quality, public institution 0.0112 0.69 
 Middle-quality, private institution -0.0060 0.33 
 High-quality, public institution 0.0679 3.67 
 High-quality, private institution 0.0253 1.40 
 Historically Black colleges and institutions -0.0389 1.00 
Demographic Characteristics   
 Female -0.0349 4.09 
 Native American 0.0239 0.51 
 Asian -0.0463 2.41 
 Black -0.0127 0.50 
 Hispanic -0.0104 0.52 
Family Background   
 Family income (in $10,000) -0.0025 2.49 
 First-generation college graduate -0.0215 2.37 
 Age -0.0137 2.41 
 Age squared / 100 0.0001 1.96 
Academic Background   
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0634 6.24 
 Business major -0.0722 2.47 
 Engineering major 0.0324 1.64 
 Health major 0.0300 1.31 
 Public affairs major   
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Table 6.3 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
 Biological science major 0.1122 6.68 
 Math science major 0.1105 6.53 
 Social science major 0.0364 2.15 
 History major 0.0214 0.74 
 Humanity major 0.0401 2.21 
 Psychology major 0.0642 3.17 
 Other major 0.0221 1.17 
N 2,810  
2χ  328  
prediction 89%  
Notes:  
1. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
2. Education major is the left-out group in the regression. 
3. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variables for continuous variables; marginal effects for 
dummy variables are for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
4. Absolute value t statistics included. 
likely to attend graduate school, they are also less likely to enroll in doctoral programs. 
Bio-science, math/science, social science, humanity, and psychology majors are among 
those who are most likely to enroll in doctoral programs. Opportunity costs could serve 
as a reasonable explanation for different probabilities of attending doctoral programs 
among these fields of major. Another possible explanation is that master’s degrees are 
often regarded as the terminal degree for some fields such as business while in other 
fields such as social sciences a large proportion of students enroll in doctoral programs. 
In fact, economics graduate programs rarely accept applicants who only intend to get a 
master’s degree. Admittedly, the variation in the probability of enrolling in doctoral 
programs across different major fields of study may have reflected individual 
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heterogeneity among those who major in those undergraduate fields. For example, it 
could be the case that bio-science and math/science undergraduate majors are more 
research oriented; thus, they are more likely to enroll in doctoral programs.59
 Other variables also impact enrollment in doctoral programs. Better academic 
performance increases the probability of attending doctoral programs. Surprisingly, 
family income has a negative impact on the probability of attending doctoral programs. It 
could be the case that students from high-income families are more likely to enroll in 
professional degrees, such as business and law. It could also be the case that doctoral 
programs are relatively inexpensive because of various financial aids such as fellowships, 
teaching assistantships, and research assistantships. Being a first-generation college 
graduate not only lowers the probability of enrolling in graduate programs as Table 6.1 
shows, but also lowers the probability of enrolling in doctoral programs for those going 
on to graduate school. The effect of age on enrollment in doctoral programs is similar to 
its effect on enrollment in graduate programs generally; that is, the probability of 
enrolling in a doctoral program is a convex function of age. Again, opportunity costs 
could be the explanation. 
 
Quality of Graduate School Enrolled 
 For those students who actually have enrolled in graduate programs, I also 
analyze the effect of undergraduate college quality on the probability of attending 
                                                          
59 To test heterogeneity or statistical dependence, we need to model students’ choice of undergraduate 
major first. Research along this line brings together the individual choice of undergraduate major and the 
effect of undergraduate major on graduate education.  
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different types of graduate institutions. In effect, I examine the extent to which 
undergraduate college quality affects the quality of graduate schools. As is true for the 
quality of undergraduate colleges, the quality of graduate schools is also difficult to 
measure. In this analysis, the Carnegie Classification is used to characterize the quality of 
graduate schools.60  
I estimate a multinomial logit model with three outcomes: attendance at 
comprehensive, doctoral, and research institutions. The marginal effects are reported in 
Table 6.4. The prediction of the model is reasonably good; overall, it predicts 58% of the 
trinomial choices correctly. Undergraduate college quality appears to have dominating 
effects in determining graduate school destination. For example, on average, students 
from high-quality undergraduate institutions, relative to those from low-quality 
undergraduate colleges, are about 40% less likely to enroll in comprehensive universities 
and more than 50% more likely to enroll in research universities. Students from middle-
quality colleges are more than 10% less likely to enroll in comprehensive universities and 
about 20% more likely to enroll in research universities relative to those from low-quality 
undergraduate colleges. Again, institutional control of undergraduate colleges does not 
seem to affect the destination of graduates pursuing advanced degrees. 
 Graduate school destinations also vary across academic majors. Compared with 
education majors, students from the fields of engineering, bio-science, and math/science  
 
                                                          
60 The Carnegie Classifications emphasize graduate programs (doctoral programs and federal research 
funds) more than undergraduate programs.  
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Table 6.4 
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Graduate School Enrolled, Marginal Effects 
 Comprehensive  Doctoral  Research 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
 Constant -0.0726 0.29  0.4067 1.54  -0.3341 1.11
Institutional Characteristics         
 Low-quality, private institution -0.0248 0.33  -0.0124 0.20  0.0373 0.40
 Middle-quality, public institution -0.1333 3.37  -0.1377 4.18  0.2710 5.47
 Middle-quality, private institution -0.1410 3.25  -0.0410 1.17  0.1820 3.42
 High-quality, public institution -0.3309 5.61  -0.2357 4.59  0.5666 9.04
 High-quality, private institution -0.4164 7.34  -0.0840 2.01  0.5004 8.45
 Historically Black coll. and inst. 0.1768 2.35  0.0482 0.74  -0.2250 2.35
Demographic Characteristics         
 Female 0.0659 2.74  0.0195 0.96  -0.0855 3.33
 Native American 0.3069 1.88  -0.2142 0.99  -0.0927 0.47
 Asian 0.0043 0.07  -0.1283 2.08  0.1239 2.06
 Black -0.0117 0.22  -0.0291 0.62  0.0408 0.66
 Hispanic 0.0988 1.88  -0.0645 1.27  -0.0343 0.57
Family Background         
 Family income (in $10,000) -0.0006 0.29  0.0020 1.39  -0.0014 0.68
 First-generation college graduate 0.0619 2.57  0.0200 0.97  -0.0820 3.13
 Age 0.0363 2.74  -0.0047 0.33  -0.0316 1.98
 Age squared / 100 -0.0299 1.74  0.0016 0.09  0.0283 1.35
Academic Background         
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile -0.1536 5.89  -0.0951 4.29  0.2487 8.69
 Business major -0.0088 0.22  0.0523 1.45  -0.0435 0.91
 Engineering major -0.2763 4.89  0.0319 0.71  0.2444 4.44
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Table 6.4 – Continued 
 Comprehensive  Doctoral  Research 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
 Health major -0.1294 2.50  0.0214 0.47  0.1080 1.90
 Public affairs major -0.1189 1.75  -0.0174 0.28  0.1363 1.80
 Biological science major -0.2990 4.84  -0.0408 0.80  0.3399 5.80
 Math science major -0.2615 5.28  -0.0344 0.79  0.2959 5.82
 Social science major -0.0550 1.33  0.0223 0.60  0.0328 0.72
 History major -0.1781 2.24  0.0515 0.83  0.1266 1.58
 Humanity major -0.1631 3.49  0.0410 1.04  0.1221 2.48
 Psychology major -0.0851 1.57  0.1000 2.19  -0.0149 0.24
 Other major -0.1356 3.34  0.0222 0.62  0.1135 2.51
N 2,242   
2χ  625   
prediction 58%   
Notes:  
1. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
2. Education major is the left-out group in the regression. 
3. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variables for continuous variables; marginal effects for 
dummy variables are for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
4. Absolute value t statistics included. 
are more likely to enroll in research universities. Some of those are the most expensive 
graduate programs and thus are disproportionately hosted in research universities. This 
finding is not a surprise. Academic performance is positively associated with the 
probability of attending research universities. This could be a result of higher admission 
standards in research universities.  
Family income does not seem to impact graduate school destination while being a 
first-generation college graduate does decrease the probability of attending research 
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universities significantly. The impact of being a first-generation college graduate is 
enormous throughout this analysis. Compared with their counterparts, first-generation 
college graduates are less well paid in the labor market and less likely to enroll in 
graduate programs. Even when they actually attend graduate programs, they are less 
likely to enroll in doctoral programs and to attend research universities. Being female 
and/or Black also reduces the probability of attending a research university. 
 
Graduate Degree Attainment 
Having examined the effect of college quality on graduate enrollment, I further 
look at the effect of college quality on graduate degree completion within four to five 
years after college graduation. It must be cautioned, however, that less than half of 
college graduates who have ever enrolled in graduate programs completed their study 
within that time period.61 In particular, for those who enrolled in doctoral programs, 
fewer than 1 out of 10 obtained a doctorate. I estimate a logit model of the impact of 
college quality on the probability of graduate degree completion with dependent variable 
GRDDGR. The marginal effects are reported in Table 6.5. The prediction of the model is 
fairly good; overall, it predicts 87% of the binomial choices correctly. It should be 
cautioned that because the dependent variable is not conditional on graduate school 
enrollment, the estimated effect represent the overall effect of college quality on graduate 
degree attainment. 
                                                          
61 Obviously, the information on graduate degree attainment is right censored. Due to this data limitation, I 
can only examine the effect of college quality on the probablility of obtaining graduate degrees within four 
to five years after graduation. 
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Table 6.5 
Binomial Logit Estimates of Graduate Degree Attainment, Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient t 
 Constant -0.3599 5.13 
Institutional Characteristics   
 Low-quality, private institution -0.0131 0.65 
 Middle-quality, public institution 0.0346 3.13 
 Middle-quality, private institution 0.0459 3.85 
 High-quality, public institution 0.0730 5.07 
 High-quality, private institution 0.0688 5.14 
 Historically Black colleges and institutions -0.0010 0.04 
Demographic Characteristics   
 Female -0.0160 2.48 
 Native American 0.0742 2.23 
 Asian 0.0313 2.25 
 Black 0.0441 2.88 
 Hispanic 0.0360 2.53 
Family Background   
 Family income (in $10,000) 0.0021 4.40 
 First-generation college graduate -0.0130 1.98 
 Age -0.0087 2.43 
 Age squared / 100 0.0085 1.84 
Academic Background   
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.1057 16.27 
 Business major -0.0531 4.59 
 Engineering major 0.0241 1.68 
 Health major 0.0122 0.90 
 Public affairs major 0.0040 0.22 
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Table 6.5 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t 
 Biological science major 0.0144 0.97 
 Math science major -0.0029 0.20 
 Social science major 0.0164 1.38 
 History major 0.0032 0.15 
 Humanity major -0.0098 0.77 
 Psychology major 0.0369 2.36 
 Other major -0.0119 1.00 
N 8,610  
2χ  506  
prediction 87%  
Notes:  
1. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
2. Education major is the left-out group in the regression. 
3. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variables for continuous variables; marginal effects for 
dummy variables are for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
4. Absolute value t statistics included. 
Table 6.5 is analogous to Table 6.2 with the only difference being that the 
dependent variables in Table 6.5 are graduate degree attainment instead of graduate 
enrollment. The qualitative results are also very similar. For example, college quality has 
a significant effect on graduate degree attainment. Relative to graduates from low-quality 
public colleges, graduates from high-quality private and public colleges are about 7% 
more likely to receive graduate degrees within four to five years after graduation. 
Business majors are least likely to receive graduate degrees. For one reason, business 
majors are less likely to attend graduate programs as Table 6.2 shows. Moreover, there is 
the working experience usually required for graduate level business-related programs.  
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Results of the effect of other variables are also similar to those in Table 6.2. For 
example, academic performance is a strong predictor of graduation degree receipt within 
four to five years after college graduation. On average, a one quartile increase in the 
SAT/ACT scores is associated with a 10% increase in the probability of receiving a 
graduate degree. On average, female graduates are less likely and graduates of minority 
groups are more likely to complete graduate study within four to five years of college 
graduation. Higher family income increases the probability and being a first-generation 
college graduate lowers the probability of completing graduate study. 
 
Quality of Graduate School Conferring Degrees 
 Finally, for those students who actually received a graduate degree, I analyze the 
effect of college quality on the probability of receiving graduate degrees from different 
types of institutions. I again estimate a multinomial logit model with three outcomes: 
attendance at comprehensive, doctoral, and research institutions. The marginal effects are 
reported in Table 6.6. The model predicts 59% of the trinomial choices correctly. Table 
6.6 is analogous to Table 6.4, with the only difference being that in Table 6.6 the 
dependent variable is the Carnegie Classification of the graduate school conferring the 
degree, and in Table 6.4 the dependent variable is the Carnegie Classification of the 
graduate school in which a graduate enrolled. The results in Table 6.6 are also very 
similar to those found in Table 6.4. For example, undergraduate college quality has a 
large effect on the type of institution conferring the degree. On average, students from 
high-quality undergraduate institutions, relative to those from low-quality public  
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Table 6.6 
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Graduate School Conferring Degree, Marginal Effects
 Comprehensive  Doctoral  Research 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
 Constant -0.3815 0.77  0.3943 0.81  -0.0128 0.02
Institutional Characteristics         
 Low-quality, private institution 0.1748 1.32  0.0871 0.81  -0.2619 1.42
 Middle-quality, public institution -0.0377 0.61  -0.1800 3.44  0.2177 2.81
 Middle-quality, private institution -0.0307 0.46  -0.0418 0.77  0.0726 0.88
 High-quality, public institution -0.1048 1.29  -0.2905 3.74  0.3953 4.16
 High-quality, private institution -0.3615 4.35  -0.0712 1.17  0.4326 4.79
 Historically Black coll. and inst. -0.0436 0.33  0.1171 1.05  -0.0734 0.43
Demographic Characteristics         
 Female 0.1289 3.52  -0.0028 0.09  -0.1261 3.08
 Native American 0.2537 1.32  -0.1260 0.57  -0.1277 0.50
 Asian -0.0317 0.37  -0.1376 1.49  0.1693 1.80
 Black 0.0273 0.32  -0.0859 1.06  0.0586 0.54
 Hispanic 0.1003 1.26  0.0268 0.39  -0.1271 1.32
 Age 0.0451 1.63  0.0050 0.18  -0.0501 1.33
 Age squared / 100 -0.0388 1.04  -0.0056 0.15  0.0444 0.86
Family Background         
 Family income (in $10,000) -0.0020 0.51  0.0060 2.45  -0.0039 1.09
 First-generation college graduate 0.1192 3.20  0.0016 0.05  -0.1208 2.80
Academic Background         
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile -0.1600 3.77  -0.1399 3.70  0.2999 6.00
 Business major -0.0642 1.05  0.0167 0.30  0.0475 0.62
 Engineering major -0.2070 2.34  -0.2047 2.26  0.4117 4.32
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Table 6.6 – Continued 
 Comprehensive  Doctoral  Research 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
 Health major -0.1404 1.98  -0.0289 0.44  0.1693 2.01
 Public affairs major -0.1412 1.35  -0.1717 1.46  0.3129 2.54
 Biological science major -0.0755 0.91  -0.1441 1.74  0.2196 2.25
 Math science major -0.2889 3.39  -0.0721 0.98  0.3610 3.91
 Social science major -0.1002 1.60  -0.0190 0.34  0.1191 1.63
 History major -0.4867 2.49  0.0182 0.15  0.4686 2.75
 Humanity major -0.2190 2.88  -0.0078 0.13  0.2269 2.74
 Psychology major -0.1279 1.53  0.0955 1.35  0.0325 0.31
 Other major -0.1592 2.53  -0.0037 0.07  0.1629 2.19
N 940   
2χ  329   
prediction 59%   
Notes:  
1. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
2. Education major is the left-out group in the regression. 
3. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the variables for continuous variables; marginal effects for 
dummy variables are for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
4. Absolute value t statistics included. 
colleges, are about 40% more likely to earn graduate degrees from research universities. 
The effects of other variables such as demographic characteristics, family background, 
and major fields of study are also similar to those in Table 6.4.  
 
Economic Effect of Graduate Education 
The above analysis shows that graduating from high-quality undergraduate 
institutions increases the probability of attending graduate school and, more specifically, 
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increases the probability of enrolling in doctoral programs and at research universities. 
These positive effects add substantially to the economic effect of undergraduate college 
quality. A very natural extension of the above analysis is to examine the subsequent 
economic effect of graduate education. If graduate education has a positive effect on 
earnings, then comparing the earnings differences among terminal BA holders would 
most likely understate the economic effect of college quality because part of the 
economic effect of college quality is through the effect of graduate education. From the 
human capital perspective, graduate education further enhances one’s human capital and 
thus leads to additional economic benefits.  
Previous studies have not examined this issue adequately. Some studies have 
limited the sample of students to those with only a baccalaureate degree. These studies 
have failed to consider the extent to which institutional quality affects graduate 
education, which may in turn have affected subsequent earnings. Other studies have 
considered the effects of graduate education on earnings; however, they have treated final 
undergraduate and graduate degree status as exogenous and independent of college 
quality. We need to consider the effects of attending a high-quality undergraduate college 
on graduate education and the effect of graduate education on subsequent labor market 
outcomes simultaneously to better understand the full impact of education on earnings 
and labor market outcomes.  
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Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I am not able to address this issue in this 
study.62 Because most of individuals with graduate education have a very short time in 
the labor market when the second follow-up of B&B takes place, comparing their 
earnings with those terminal BA recipients with four to five years of working experience 
probably underestimates the effect of graduate education. Further, if individuals with BA 
degrees and advanced degrees have different earnings trajectories over their career, 
focusing on the very early stage of career could be misleading63. Another possibility is 
that graduate education might not have positive effect on earnings but have a positive 
effect on occupational status.   
 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the effect of college quality was extended to include its effect on 
graduate education. Generally speaking, graduates from high-quality colleges were more 
likely to enroll in graduate programs; among those who actually enrolled in graduate 
programs, graduates from high-quality colleges were more likely to enroll in doctoral 
programs and in research universities. Similarly, graduates from high-quality colleges 
were more likely to finish their graduate degree within four to five years of college 
                                                          
62 I explored this issue in a separate analysis. Basically, I used the sample in Chapter 4, and added another 
sample of individuals who had completed their graduate education and were in the labor market in April 
1997. Then, a structural model was set up to estimate both the effect of college quality on graduate 
education and the effect of graduate education on earnings. As expected, the analysis did not reveal a 
positive effect of graduate education on earnings. If anything, the effect is negative. Because most of 
students who enrolled in graduate program have not graduated before the second follow-up of the B&B 
survey and for those who have completed their graduate education, the time is not long enough to expose 
the effect of graduate education fully; it would be more appropriate to address this issue when more waves 
of B&B data are available. 
63 We have learned from Appendix D that college quality has time variant effects on earnings. Similarly, 
graduate degree holders and terminal BA holders could have quite different earnings trajectories. 
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graduation; among the graduates who had actually obtained their graduate degree within 
four to five years, those from high-quality colleges were more likely to have received 
their degrees from research universities. It seems, then, that undergraduate college quality 
increased the probability of enrolling in graduate programs and helped determine the 
quality of graduate schools selected.  
Higher education researchers have noticed this “chain” effect in educational 
outcomes. For example, in studying college graduation rates, Adelman (1999) discovered 
that the most significant predictor of the probability of college graduation was not college 
quality but the “academic resources” (this measure was dominated by the intensity and 
quality of secondary school curriculum) the student brought forward from secondary 
school into higher education. Bringing all these results together, the pattern becomes 
clear: Students are not randomly rearranged after graduating from each educational level. 
The quality of institutions at the previous level helped determine the quality of 
institutions chosen at the following levels and also influenced the educational outcomes 
of the following levels.  
I also examined different patterns of graduate enrollment and degree attainment 
among different majors. Quite contrary to the findings in the earnings equation, students 
from low-paid majors were more likely to attend graduate schools and attain graduate 
degrees. In studying college major choice, Eide and Warhrer (1998) operationalized the 
idea of the “financial option return” to education. They argued that the benefit from 
college education was distinct from the standard expected income gain from investing in 
a college education; it also involved the opportunity to obtain further education and thus 
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the rewards accompanying such further education. The extra utility gained from such 
opportunity was operationalized as the option value of a college education. This 
framework provided motivation for students to choose undergraduate majors that yielded 
relatively low economic return in the labor market.64 The concept of option value is also 
applicable to college choice. High-quality colleges not only yield immediate economic 
benefits, but also provided the option value of going further and going to better places for 
graduate education. Although the reason college quality affects graduate school quality so 
strongly is not entirely clear, families and students who are serious about their academic 
career need to ponder this evidence when making college choices.  
Analyses in this chapter extended those in the previous three chapters. First, 
graduating from high-quality undergraduate colleges was shown to increase the 
probability of graduate school enrollment and degree attainment, and more importantly, it 
had a large and significant impact on the quality of graduate school attended. Considered 
as a non-monetary outcome, graduate education added significantly to the effect of 
college quality on earnings. Second, graduate education was an integral part of human 
capital accumulation and it was a necessary step toward some desirable professions. In 
this sense, there were option values that accrued to college quality, in that it increased the 
probability of graduate education, and the latter yielded further earnings premium. Thus, 
considered as an economic outcome, graduate education enhanced the effect of college 
quality on earnings. 
                                                          
64 Although obtaining an advanced degree generally helps increase one’s income, many students who get 
master’s degree gain very little, as they earn those degrees in low-paying fields. Nonetheless, they can still 
derive extra utility from earning an advanced degree per se.  
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Clearly, the results in this chapter further support the social reproduction 
hypothesis. Socioeconomic factors such as family income and parental education 
continue to have an impact on graduate school enrollment and the type of graduate school 
(although the effect of family income is small; it may be because family income is not a 
good measure of family wealth, or that graduate studies usually provide various financial 
supports). Being a first-generation college graduate, however, lowers the probability of 
attending graduate school; more importantly, it lowers the probability of enrolling in 
doctoral programs and/or research universities. Academic variables such as test scores 
and undergraduate college quality have strong effects on graduate education. 
Socioeconomic factors also exert influences on graduate education through these 
academic factors.    
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CHAPTER 7 
COLLEGE QUALITY AND JOB SATISFACTION65
 
7.1 Perspective 
Graduate education can be seen as both an economic and a non-economic 
outcome of a college education. In this chapter, another non-economic outcome of 
college education, job satisfaction, is considered. The effect of college quality on 
individuals’ job satisfaction has been controversial. Perhaps most obviously, it may have 
a positive effect on job satisfaction by raising not only one’s earnings but also one’s 
professional status. There are, however, other possibilities. For example, college quality 
(and the high tuition and fees paid) may increase one’s occupational expectations more 
than one’s skill to achieve those expectations, resulting in a negative effect on job 
satisfaction. In either case, it is useful to investigate the relationship among college 
quality, earnings, and job satisfaction.  
Despite the wealth of research addressing the impact of college on labor market 
rewards, little is known about the ways in which different types of college impact non-
pecuniary outcomes such as graduates’ job satisfaction. This is not to say that we know 
little about job satisfaction. On the contrary, job satisfaction constitutes a very important 
focus in the areas of human relations and personnel management. However, the majority 
                                                          
65 An earlier version of this analysis was presented at the 27th ASHE conference in Sacramento, CA in 
November 2002 (Thomas & Zhang, 2002). In that paper, we used one sample from the first follow-up of 
the B&B and another sample from the second follow-up to study the determination of graduates’ job 
satisfaction. In this chapter, I use half of the sample from the co-authored paper and highlight the effect of 
college quality on job satisfaction and the relationship among college quality, earnings, and job satisfaction. 
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of work in this area is more general, and the impact of college on job satisfaction is 
relatively less examined. Among the fewer studies addressing this issue, most focused on 
the effect of a college education on job satisfaction among workers with different 
educational credentials, especially between college graduates and high school graduates. 
Studies of this kind have generally shown a positive link between a college education and 
job satisfaction (Glenn & Weaver, 1982; Quinn & Baldi de Mandilovitch, 1975, 1980; 
Quinn & Staines, 1979). 
Implicit in much of this work focusing on the relationship between job 
satisfaction and quantity of education is the notion that there may also be a relation 
between job satisfaction and the quality of college education received or the prestige of 
the institution from which one graduated. The reasons are numerous. It could be the case 
that students from high-quality institutions find it easier than graduates from institutions 
of lesser quality to find well-paying jobs that yield high satisfaction. It could also be the 
case that graduates from more prestigious institutions are given more training 
opportunities that also yield higher satisfaction. Conversely, it could be the case that 
more prestigious colleges produce graduates expecting greater labor market rewards. To 
the degree that this is true, lower levels of satisfaction might be reported when such 
heightened expectations are not met. In extreme cases, graduating from a higher-prestige 
college could prove a pressure in working with graduates from institutions that might be 
perceived as “lesser” in nature. This too could also result in lower levels of satisfaction 
for graduates from more prestigious institutions.  
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Only a very small number of studies have explicitly addressed the relationship 
between job satisfaction and college prestige. The most comprehensive work of this type 
is by Solmon and his colleagues (Bisconti & Solmon, 1977; Ochsner & Solmon, 1979; 
Solmon, Bisconti, & Ochsner, 1977). Results from these early studies show that after 
controlling for salient variables, college selectivity has a statistically non-significant 
direct impact on job satisfaction. Work conducted by Sharp and Weidman (1987) 
examines the effect of college quality on job satisfaction for majors in the humanities. 
Their results suggest that college quality has no statistically significant impact on the 
satisfaction of women, but it has a negative and significant effect on job satisfaction for 
men. McClelland (1990) explains that this negative relationship might be a result of the 
higher occupational expectations of graduates from high-quality colleges.  
Throughout the 1990s, college pricing policies and the broader public discussion 
of the value of a college education encouraged an emphasis on the private returns of 
college education. Graduates and their families paid an increasingly greater share of the 
rapidly escalating costs of higher education during this period. Escalating costs borne by 
students and the evolving public discourse emphasizing college as a private good resulted 
in a sense of increasing commoditization of higher education and served to fuel the 
“student as consumer” mentality that many observers of higher education bemoaned in 
recent years. Embedded in this consumerism may be a heightened expectation that 
college confers distinct advantages that can be translated into a quantifiably better set of 
life circumstances immediately after graduation (regardless of inevitable fluctuations in 
the labor market and the broader economy). Thus to the degree that McClelland’s 
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observations were true in 1990, I might expect an even stronger negative relationship 
between college prestige and job satisfaction today. 
 
7.2 Analysis 
 I use the sample in Chapter 4 as the initial sample and further limit it to students 
who reported their satisfaction toward their jobs, resulting in a sample of 3,870 students. 
The dependent variable in this study is job satisfaction, which is measured by nine 
indicators, capturing graduates’ satisfaction with various aspects of their jobs. Indicators 
include measures of respondents’ satisfaction with (1) pay, (2) fringe benefits, (3) job 
challenge, (4) working conditions, (5) promotion opportunity, (6) job security, (7) 
relations with superiors, (8) relations with co-workers, and (9) educational benefits. Each 
of these outcome variables is measured by three choices: not satisfied, somewhat 
satisfied, and very satisfied. The frequency distributions for each of the nine satisfaction 
indicators are provided in Table 7.1, and the correlations between these satisfaction 
indicators are in Table 7.2. 
Most previous studies on related outcomes suffer from two potential problems. 
The first problem is raised by the nature of the dependent variable. Job satisfaction is 
usually measured in a discrete manner with three to five inherently ordered categories 
such as very dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, moderately satisfied, and very satisfied. 
More often than not, previous studies have used either simple OLS or multinomial 
logit/probit regression techniques. OLS models are not appropriate when modeling 
categorical outcomes because the technique treats ranks as interval data. Moreover,  
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Table 7.1 
Frequencies of Job Satisfaction Indicators 
Satisfaction with Not Satisfied Somewhat 
Satisfied 
Very 
Satisfied
(1) Pay 12.8 55.0 32.1
(2) Promotion opportunity 18.7 41.9 39.4
(3) Educational benefits 18.8 36.2 45.1
(4) Fringe benefits 8.3 35.3 56.4
           Average 14.6 42.1 43.2
           Material benefits 11.2 40.7 48.0
(5) Job challenge 8.2 36.4 55.4
(6) Working condition 8.1 36.5 55.3
(7) Job security 7.1 28.1 64.8
(8) Supervisor 10.1 30.7 59.2
(9) Co-worker 1.4 18.1 80.4
           Average 7.0 30.0 63.0
           General working conditions 6.7 31.1 62.3
Notes  
1. Numbers are in percentage points. 
2. Average is the simple average of the percentages within each group. 
3. Material benefits and General Working Conditions are two constructed variables for each group. For the 
actual coding strategy, please refer to Footnote 67. 
results from such models are difficult to interpret when the dependent variable is 
categorical. Thus, these studies rely on the percentage of variance explained by college 
selectivity variables and the significance levels of regression coefficients instead of 
estimating the magnitude of the effect of college quality on job satisfaction. Nor are 
multinomial logit or probit models appropriate because they fail to account for the ordinal 
nature of the dependent variable. Given the ordered, categorical nature of dependent 
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Table 7.2 
Pearson Correlation between Nine Aspects of Job Satisfaction 
Satisfaction with  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Pay [1]        
Promotion opportunities [2] 0.40        
Educational benefits [3] 0.29 0.40       
Fringe benefits [4] 0.36 0.30 0.31      
Job challenge [5] 0.29 0.44 0.32 0.24     
Working condition [6]  0.26 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.32    
Job security [7] 0.20 0.32 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.29   
Supervisor [8] 0.20 0.33 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.26  
Co-workers [9] 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.24
Note: All estimates are significant at 0.01 level. In calculating the above correlation table, I treated job 
satisfaction as interval data, that is, 0 = not satisfied, 1 = somewhat satisfied, and 2 = very satisfied. 
variables used here, ordered logit techniques are employed in estimating the job 
satisfaction equations in this analysis. The adoption of this approach remedies the key 
challenges in previous analyses outlined above. 
A second problem that has gone unaddressed in previous research is the indirect 
effect of college quality on job satisfaction via graduates’ earnings. In reviewing studies 
on the effect of college quality on job satisfaction, Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) 
pointed out that previous research often addressed the direct impact of college quality on 
job satisfaction and no attempt was made to examine possible indirect effects. For 
example, while college quality appeared to have a negative direct effect on job 
satisfaction, it might have an indirect positive effect on job satisfaction through its 
positive impact on earnings as the analysis in Chapter 4 has shown. My analysis is based 
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on a system of two simultaneous equations. The first equation assumes that individual i’s 
job satisfaction ( ) is a function of the quality of institution j he or she actually attended 
( ), demographic characteristics ( ), family background ( ), academic background 
( ), job market conditions ( ), log earnings ( ), and an individual disturbance 
term (
iS
ijQ iD iF
iA iJ )ln( iY
iε ). 
 iiiiiiiji YJAFDQS εβββββββ +++++++= )ln(6543210                (7.1) 
In Chapter 4, I showed that individual i’s log earnings ( ) is a function of the same 
set of variables, that is,  
)ln( iY
                           iiiiiiji JAFDQY µαααααα ++++++= 543210)ln(                         (7.2) 
Then the indirect effect of college quality on job satisfaction can be represented 
as 16 αβ ⋅ , which is most likely to be positive. In subsequent analyses, I estimate a 
reduced form of equation 7.1 to obtain the total effect of college quality on job 
satisfaction. 
        iiiiiiji JAFDQS υγγγγγγ ++++++= 543210                             (7.3) 
By comparing the direct effect in equation 7.1 and the total effect in equation 7.3, I am 
able to examine the extent to which the negative direct effect of college quality is eased 
by its positive indirect effect through earnings.  
 There are two distinct steps in my analysis. In the first step, models are estimated 
for each of the nine satisfaction indicators, and the results are then arrayed to allow an 
inventory of the effects of various factors on job satisfaction. In a second step, I attempt 
to synthesize the findings from these nine models by creating factor analytic satisfaction 
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composite indices. The factor structure of the nine satisfaction items suggests that they 
define two distinct dimensions of job satisfaction: satisfaction with material benefits and 
satisfaction with general working conditions. I conclude this step by estimating 2 
additional models using these two constructs. While my primary interest is in assessing 
the relationship between college quality and a number of dimensions of job satisfaction, 
net of salient characteristics of the graduates themselves, this approach allows me to also 
comment on the net impact of a number of these individual characteristics.  
 First, on a descriptive level, graduates report being quite satisfied with their jobs 
in general. Table 7.1 shows that, on average, over 50% of the graduates report that they 
are very satisfied their jobs. Conversely, the percentage of students who report being “not 
satisfied” is quite low. Second, a general pattern emerges in graduates’ evaluation of the 
different aspects of job satisfaction. Part of this pattern can be seen in the higher 
percentages of graduates who report being “not satisfied” with pay, promotion 
opportunity, and educational benefits. Not surprisingly, lower percentages of graduates 
report being “very satisfied” with pay, promotion opportunity, and educational benefits. 
Inter-correlations among the nine items are also noteworthy, and these are considered 
subsequently. 
In the first step of the analysis, I estimate ordered logit regressions for each of the 
nine satisfaction indicators with and without the earnings variable in the model. Because 
the literature has shown that earnings are the major component of job satisfaction, the 
results from the models with the earnings variable can be understood to represent the 
direct effect of the other indicators of job satisfaction. Results from the series of models 
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that exclude the earnings variable can then be understood to represent the total effects of 
the other indicators of job satisfaction—including any indirect effect operating through 
earnings. A total of 18 ordered logit models are estimated using this strategy (9 with 
earnings and 9 without earnings).66 The direction and significance of the estimated 
coefficients in those 18 models are inventoried in Table 7.3.  
  There are a number of noteworthy findings from this series of models. Consistent 
with the corpus of literature in this area, earnings are the most consistent determinant of 
every job satisfaction outcome I analyze, having a strong and significant effect on job 
satisfaction in most of the models. Among those nine aspects of job satisfaction, earnings 
have a large and significant impact on satisfaction with pay, promotion opportunities, 
educational benefits, fringe benefits, and job challenge. However, the effect of earnings 
on working conditions, job security, relations with superiors, and relationships with co-
workers is relatively small and sometimes non-significant. It suggests that there is more 
to satisfaction than the amount of earnings. Another financial variable measuring the total 
educational debt an individual still hold does not seems to affect one’s job satisfaction 
significantly. 
Generally speaking, in regard to job satisfaction college quality does not seem to 
matter for graduates from public institutions, but graduates from private institutions are 
generally less satisfied. This is true for both the direct and total effects. For example, 
graduating from middle- and high-quality public institutions has a statistically non-
significant effect on most of the nine indicators (relative to low-quality public  
                                                          
66 The estimates for these 18 models are presented in Appendix E, Table E.10.  
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Table 7.3 
Count of Significant and Non-significant Coefficients 
Direct Effects Positive & 
Significant
Negative & 
Significant
Positive & 
Non-sig. 
Negative & 
Non-sig.
  Log earnings 8 0 0 1
  Educational debt (in $1,000) 0 0 5 4
  Low-quality, private institution 0 4 1 4
  Middle-quality, public institution 0 0 6 3
  Middle-quality, private institution 0 3 2 4
  High-quality, public institution 0 1 1 7
  High-quality, private institution 0 5 0 4
  Historically black coll. and inst. 0 0 2 7
  Female 5 0 4 0
  Native American 0 0 7 2
  Asian 0 4 0 5
  Black 0 4 2 3
  Hispanic 3 0 5 1
  Family income (in $10,000) 1 0 8 0
  First generation college graduate 3 0 5 1
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 1 0 7 1
  Business major 5 1 0 3
  Engineering major 1 0 5 3
  Health major 1 1 5 2
  Public affairs major 0 0 6 3
  Biological science major 0 0 3 6
  Math science major 2 0 4 3
  Social science major 0 1 2 6
  History major 2 0 3 4
  Humanity major 0 2 5 2
  Psychology major 1 0 3 5
  Other major 1 2 4 2
  Age 0 3 1 5
  Age squared / 100 3 0 4 2
  Tenure 2 3 2 2
  Tenure squared /100 2 0 4 3
  Number of hours per week 3 1 2 3
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Table 7.3 – Continued 
Total Effects Positive & 
Significant
Negative & 
Significant
Positive & 
Non-sig. 
Negative & 
Non-sig.
  Educational debt (in $1,000) 0 0 4 5
  Low-quality, private institution 0 3 1 5
  Middle-quality, public institution 1 0 6 2
  Middle-quality, private institution 0 2 4 3
  High-quality, public institution 0 1 3 5
  High-quality, private institution 0 2 0 7
  Historically black coll. and inst. 0 2 2 5
  Female 4 0 3 2
  Native American 0 0 8 1
  Asian 0 3 1 5
  Black 0 4 2 3
  Hispanic 3 0 5 1
  Family income (in $10,000) 4 0 5 0
  First generation college graduate 2 0 6 1
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 1 0 7 1
  Business major 5 1 1 2
  Engineering major 3 0 4 2
  Health major 3 1 4 1
  Public affairs major 1 0 6 2
  Biological science major 1 0 4 4
  Math science major 4 0 2 3
  Social science major 1 1 2 5
  History major 0 0 4 5
  Humanity major 2 2 4 1
  Psychology major 1 0 3 5
  Other major 3 1 2 3
  Age 0 3 3 3
  Age squared / 100 2 0 4 3
  Tenure 2 3 3 1
  Tenure squared /100 2 0 4 3
  Number of hours per week 5 0 3 1
Note: Significant at 0.05 level. 
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institutions). On the other hand, graduating from private institutions appears to create 
some negative job satisfaction. High-quality private institutions have negative effects on 
all nine indicators, and five of them are significant. Similarly, for low- and middle-quality 
private institutions, most of the estimated effects are negative, and some significantly 
negative. This could be explained by the higher tuition and fees charged at private 
institutions than at public institutions of comparable quality (see Table 4.3 for the average 
tuition and fees). 
The second step of this analysis synthesizes the findings reported in the above 18 
regression models by creating factor analytic composite indices from the nine indicators 
used as outcomes in the previous step. A cursory review of Table 7.2 suggests a general 
pattern of correlations among these nine indicators. For example, satisfaction with pay, 
promotion opportunities, educational benefits, and fringe benefits are relatively highly 
correlated with each other. The high correlation between satisfaction with working 
conditions and relations with superiors is also worthy of attention. While these 
correlations raise a number of interesting questions about the inter-correlation of various 
indicators of job satisfaction, they do not provide a direct tool to tie these indicators into 
conceptually meaningful groups. To accomplish this, I separate the nine items into two 
distinct groups using factor analysis (I chose principal axis factoring with an oblique 
rotation to retain the correlation between these two groups of items). The results of this 
factor analysis confirm the observation about potential inter-correlations among these 
items and suggest that these nine indicators define two distinct dimensions of job 
satisfaction (see Table 7.4). The first of these dimensions is labeled satisfaction with  
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Table 7.4 
Factor Structure of Nine Satisfaction Indicators 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Satisfaction with pay 0.6199  
Satisfaction with fringe benefits 0.5689  
Satisfaction with promotion opportunities 0.5406  
Satisfaction with education benefits 0.4309  
Satisfaction with job challenge  0.2585 
Satisfaction with supervisor  0.6196 
Satisfaction with working conditions  0.5431 
Satisfaction with co-workers  0.4048 
Satisfaction with job security  0.2911 
Note:  
1. Factors derived using Principal Axis Factoring with oblique rotation. 
2. Factor 1 is labeled as satisfaction with material benefits, and Factor 2 as satisfaction with general 
working condition. 
 
material benefits (including satisfaction with pay, promotion opportunity, educational 
benefits, and fringe benefits). The second dimension (that includes satisfaction with 
working conditions, relations with superiors, co-worker, job security, and job challenge) 
is called satisfaction with general working conditions. Additive scales were created using 
the variables defining each of these dimensions. The scales were then recoded into three 
categories (“Not Satisfied,” “Somewhat Satisfied,” and “Very Satisfied”) to render them 
comparable to those used on the individual items used as outcomes in the first stage of 
the analysis.67
                                                          
67 The actual coding scheme is as follows. First, I code “Not satisfied” = 0, “Somewhat satisfied” = 1, and 
“very satisfied” = 2 for each satisfaction indicator. These numbers are then added for each of the two 
composite satisfaction indices. That is, for satisfaction with material benefits, the range is from 0 to 8, and 
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After constructing these two composite indices of job satisfaction, I estimate ordered 
logit models for each index. Following the modeling strategy used in the first step, I 
estimate the direct and total effect of salient variables on each index. Detailed results 
from these models are reported in Table 7.5. This approach essentially synthesizes the 
results from the nine individual indicators of job satisfaction reported in the first step. 
Some major findings are presented as follows.  
Consistent with the findings from the first step, earnings have a strong and 
significant positive effect on the two constructed indices of job satisfaction. However, 
this effect seems to be much larger on satisfaction with material benefits than with 
general working conditions. This suggests that higher-paid respondents are more satisfied 
with the material aspects of their jobs than they are with working conditions in general. 
The main interest in this section is the presumed ability of high-quality colleges to 
benefit their graduates in the labor market. Decades of research has demonstrated the 
wage premiums associated with graduation from more prestigious schools. Although no 
research to date has focused on job satisfaction as a function of college quality, a general 
sense exists that better colleges do indeed graduate students who wind up in better jobs 
with higher satisfaction. This analysis however calls this assumption into question. I find 
that college quality generally exerts a negative direct influence on satisfaction with 
material benefits and on satisfaction with general working conditions. These results show  
                                                                                                                                                                             
for satisfaction with general working conditions, the range is from 0 to 10. Finally, I recode these scales 
back to three categories, making the distribution similar to the average of each group. In particular, for 
satisfaction with material benefits, I code 0-2 as “Not satisfied,” 3-5 as “Somewhat satisfied,” and 6-8 as 
“Very satisfied.” For satisfaction with general working conditions, I code 0-4 as “Not satisfied,” 5-7 as 
“Somewhat satisfied,” and 8-10 as “Very satisfied.” The distribution of these constructed indices and the 
average for each group is presented in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.5 
Ordered Logit Models of Job Satisfaction, Marginal Effect 
Satisfaction with Material Benefits, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.0990 12.81  -0.1773 12.45  0.2763 13.77
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0007 1.19  0.0012 1.19  -0.0018 1.19
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0509 2.60  0.0656 3.43  -0.1165 3.04
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0003 0.04  -0.0006 0.04  0.0009 0.04
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0132 1.29  0.0223 1.29  -0.0355 1.29
  High-quality, public institution  0.0304 1.65  0.0445 1.94  -0.0749 1.83
  High-quality, private institution  0.0361 2.04  0.0514 2.43  -0.0875 2.27
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0162 0.69  0.0258 0.78  -0.0420 0.74
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0196 3.12  -0.0348 3.18  0.0545 3.19
  Native American  -0.0149 0.40  -0.0298 0.36  0.0446 0.37
  Asian  0.0564 2.53  0.0692 3.97  -0.1256 3.20
  Black  0.0280 1.77  0.0420 2.15  -0.0700 1.99
  Hispanic  -0.0378 3.64  -0.0884 2.89  0.1263 3.11
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0008 1.12  -0.0014 1.12  0.0021 1.12
  First generation college graduate  -0.0099 1.61  -0.0177 1.61  0.0276 1.62
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0004 0.12  -0.0007 0.12  0.0010 0.12
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Table 7.5 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Material Benefits, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0179 1.85  -0.0338 1.78  0.0517 1.81
  Engineering major  -0.0122 0.91  -0.0237 0.85  0.0359 0.87
  Health major  -0.0171 1.36  -0.0344 1.23  0.0515 1.27
  Public affairs major  -0.0132 0.88  -0.0259 0.80  0.0390 0.83
  Biological science major  -0.0018 0.10  -0.0032 0.10  0.0050 0.10
  Math science major  -0.0405 3.83  -0.0954 3.10  0.1359 3.27
  Social science major  0.0101 0.74  0.0170 0.78  -0.0270 0.77
  History major  -0.0066 0.30  -0.0124 0.29  0.0190 0.29
  Humanity major  -0.0050 0.38  -0.0092 0.37  0.0142 0.38
  Psychology major  -0.0131 0.79  -0.0257 0.72  0.0388 0.74
  Other major  -0.0031 0.28  -0.0057 0.28  0.0088 0.28
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0086 2.22  0.0153 2.22  -0.0239 2.23
  Age squared / 100  -0.0001 1.93  -0.0002 1.93  0.0003 1.93
  Tenure  0.0023 1.12  0.0041 1.12  -0.0064 1.12
  Tenure squared /100  -0.0001 0.85  -0.0002 0.85  0.0002 0.85
  Number of hours per week  -0.0008 2.27  -0.0014 2.27  0.0022 2.28
N 3,870   
2χ  378   
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Table 7.5 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Material Benefits, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0007 1.26  0.0012 1.27  -0.0019 1.27
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0469 2.29  0.0568 3.19  -0.1037 2.71
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0085 0.95  -0.0138 0.95  0.0223 0.95
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0038 0.36  0.0060 0.36  -0.0098 0.36
  High-quality, public institution  0.0128 0.73  0.0191 0.80  -0.0319 0.77
  High-quality, private institution  0.0134 0.82  0.0200 0.89  -0.0335 0.86
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0303 1.14  0.0402 1.41  -0.0705 1.28
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0107 1.65  -0.0172 1.66  0.0279 1.66
  Native American  -0.0244 0.68  -0.0471 0.57  0.0715 0.61
  Asian  0.0402 1.93  0.0503 2.57  -0.0904 2.25
  Black  0.0268 1.65  0.0370 1.96  -0.0638 1.82
  Hispanic  -0.0431 4.12  -0.0929 3.19  0.1360 3.46
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0015 2.04  -0.0024 2.03  0.0039 2.04
  First generation college graduate  -0.0090 1.39  -0.0146 1.40  0.0236 1.40
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0018 0.54  -0.0029 0.54  0.0046 0.54
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Table 7.5 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Material Benefits, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0440 4.77  -0.0805 4.35  0.1244 4.52
  Engineering major  -0.0476 4.77  -0.1039 3.70  0.1515 4.00
  Health major  -0.0514 5.47  -0.1155 4.18  0.1669 4.51
  Public affairs major  -0.0261 1.84  -0.0502 1.57  0.0762 1.65
  Biological science major  -0.0179 1.06  -0.0327 0.94  0.0506 0.98
  Math science major  -0.0649 7.73  -0.1599 5.64  0.2248 6.14
  Social science major  -0.0110 0.89  -0.0190 0.84  0.0300 0.86
  History major  0.0001 0.00  0.0001 0.00  -0.0002 0.00
  Humanity major  -0.0166 1.33  -0.0298 1.21  0.0464 1.25
  Psychology major  -0.0257 1.64  -0.0495 1.39  0.0752 1.47
  Other major  -0.0183 1.74  -0.0325 1.59  0.0509 1.65
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0052 1.28  0.0084 1.28  -0.0135 1.28
  Age squared / 100  -0.0001 1.06  -0.0001 1.06  0.0001 1.06
  Tenure  0.0006 0.26  0.0009 0.26  -0.0014 0.26
  Tenure squared /100  -0.0001 0.66  -0.0001 0.66  0.0002 0.66
  Number of hours per week  -0.0021 6.01  -0.0034 5.94  0.0055 6.08
N 3,870   
2χ  170   
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Table 7.5 – Continued 
Satisfaction with General Working Conditions, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.0185 4.01  -0.0567 4.05  0.0752 4.08
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0004 1.04  -0.0012 1.04  0.0016 1.04
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0358 2.55  0.0880 3.20  -0.1238 3.04
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0007 0.12  0.0021 0.12  -0.0028 0.12
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0170 2.20  0.0484 2.38  -0.0653 2.38
  High-quality, public institution  0.0238 1.73  0.0628 2.03  -0.0867 1.96
  High-quality, private institution  0.0462 2.98  0.1074 3.99  -0.1535 3.71
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0068 0.47  0.0200 0.50  -0.0268 0.49
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0094 2.21  -0.0287 2.25  0.0381 2.24
  Native American  -0.0224 1.11  -0.0811 0.95  0.1035 0.98
  Asian  0.0167 1.28  0.0458 1.43  -0.0625 1.39
  Black  0.0523 3.69  0.1179 5.27  -0.1702 4.69
  Hispanic  -0.0151 1.87  -0.0512 1.70  0.0663 1.74
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0008 1.70  -0.0024 1.71  0.0032 1.71
  First generation college graduate  -0.0075 1.78  -0.0228 1.79  0.0303 1.78
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0052 2.39  -0.0160 2.40  0.0212 2.41
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Table 7.5 – Continued 
Satisfaction with General Working Conditions, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major 0.0035 0.49  0.0106 0.50  -0.0141 0.50
  Engineering major 0.0000 0.00  0.0000 0.00  0.0000 0.00
  Health major 0.0181 1.52  0.0495 1.68  -0.0676 1.65
  Public affairs major -0.0034 0.31  -0.0107 0.30  0.0141 0.31
  Biological science major 0.0036 0.27  0.0108 0.28  -0.0144 0.27
  Math science major -0.0020 0.20  -0.0062 0.20  0.0082 0.20
  Social science major 0.0101 1.04  0.0293 1.10  -0.0394 1.09
  History major -0.0208 1.72  -0.0740 1.50  0.0948 1.54
  Humanity major 0.0035 0.37  0.0105 0.37  -0.0140 0.37
  Psychology major 0.0094 0.67  0.0271 0.71  -0.0366 0.70
  Other major 0.0021 0.26  0.0063 0.27  -0.0084 0.27
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0102 3.92  0.0312 3.97  -0.0414 3.99
  Age squared / 100 -0.0001 3.48  -0.0004 3.51  0.0005 3.53
  Tenure 0.0012 0.86  0.0036 0.86  -0.0048 0.86
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0001 1.55  -0.0003 1.55  0.0004 1.56
  Number of hours per week -0.0006 2.42  -0.0017 2.43  0.0023 2.44
N 3,870   
2χ  187   
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Table 7.5 – Continued 
Satisfaction with General Working Conditions, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0004 0.99  -0.0011 0.99  0.0015 0.99
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0350 2.51  0.0859 3.14  -0.1209 2.97
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0008 0.14  -0.0025 0.14  0.0034 0.14
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0150 1.97  0.0428 2.12  -0.0577 2.11
  High-quality, public institution  0.0203 1.53  0.0542 1.75  -0.0745 1.70
  High-quality, private institution  0.0406 2.73  0.0967 3.55  -0.1373 3.33
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0095 0.64  0.0272 0.68  -0.0367 0.67
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0077 1.83  -0.0235 1.85  0.0312 1.85
  Native American  -0.0231 1.16  -0.0833 0.98  0.1064 1.02
  Asian  0.0137 1.09  0.0380 1.19  -0.0517 1.16
  Black  0.0524 3.68  0.1172 5.25  -0.1695 4.67
  Hispanic  -0.0159 1.99  -0.0539 1.80  0.0698 1.84
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0009 1.95  -0.0028 1.95  0.0038 1.95
  First generation college graduate  -0.0072 1.70  -0.0219 1.72  0.0291 1.71
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0054 2.46  -0.0164 2.47  0.0217 2.47
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Table 7.5 – Continued 
Satisfaction with General Working Conditions, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0017 0.25  -0.0053 0.25  0.0070 0.25
  Engineering major  -0.0075 0.83  -0.0239 0.80  0.0314 0.80
  Health major  0.0083 0.79  0.0241 0.83  -0.0324 0.82
  Public affairs major  -0.0060 0.57  -0.0190 0.55  0.0250 0.55
  Biological science major  0.0002 0.02  0.0006 0.02  -0.0008 0.02
  Math science major  -0.0085 0.93  -0.0272 0.88  0.0357 0.90
  Social science major  0.0066 0.70  0.0192 0.73  -0.0258 0.72
  History major  -0.0188 1.47  -0.0652 1.30  0.0840 1.34
  Humanity major  0.0013 0.14  0.0039 0.14  -0.0052 0.14
  Psychology major  0.0068 0.50  0.0198 0.52  -0.0266 0.52
  Other major  -0.0006 0.08  -0.0018 0.08  0.0024 0.08
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0095 3.66  0.0288 3.70  -0.0383 3.71
  Age squared / 100  -0.0001 3.23  -0.0003 3.26  0.0004 3.27
  Tenure  0.0009 0.63  0.0027 0.63  -0.0035 0.63
  Tenure squared /100  -0.0001 1.51  -0.0003 1.51  0.0004 1.51
  Number of hours per week  -0.0008 3.58  -0.0025 3.61  0.0033 3.63
N 3,870   
2χ  170   
Notes:  
1. Also included in the model are dummies indicating missing values of independent variables. 
2. Absolute value t statistics included. 
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that, all else being equal, compared with students graduating from low-quality public 
institutions, graduates from high-quality private institutions are about 9% and 15% (last 
Column of Table 7.5) less likely to be “very satisfied” with material benefits and general 
working conditions, respectively. The estimated direct effects of other types of colleges 
are usually negative and sometimes significant relative to low-quality public institutions. 
In some cases, the positive relationship between college quality and earnings 
alleviates the negative effect of college quality on job satisfaction to a certain extent. For 
example, graduating from high-quality private institutions has strong negative direct 
effects on satisfaction with material benefits; however, the total effects are small and 
non-significant. In other cases, the indirect effect of college quality on job satisfaction 
through earnings does not alleviate the negative effect of college quality on job 
satisfaction. This could happy in two ways. First, the positive relation between college 
quality and earnings is not strong. For example, graduating from low-quality private 
institutions has strong negative effects on satisfaction with material benefits, both directly 
and indirectly. Second, the positive relation between earnings and satisfaction is not 
strong. For example, graduating from private institutions has negative and significant 
effects on satisfaction with general working conditions, both directly and indirectly.  
In both direct effect models, job satisfaction is consistently shown to be a convex 
function of one’s age. But after taking the effect of earnings into consideration, age does 
not seem to have a significant total effect on satisfaction with material benefits although 
the total effect on satisfaction with general working conditions still exists. If it is true that 
middle-aged respondents hold higher career expectations, then their expectations for pay 
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and other benefits are generally met by their realized earnings. Non-material aspects of 
their jobs seem to fall short of their expectations however.  
Women express higher levels of job satisfaction with both material benefits and 
general working conditions than their male counterparts. This could be due to their 
different vocations. For example, in the second follow-up of B&B cohort, about 15.6% of 
male graduates have their primary jobs in manufacture industry while this figure is 7.2% 
for female graduates. Female graduates, on the other hand, are more likely to have jobs in 
health care (14.5% versus 5.8%) and education (18.4% versus 6.7%). After adding the 
indirect effect through earnings, the satisfaction level of female graduates is reduced, 
especially with material benefits. This finding informs our understanding of the effect of 
gender on job satisfaction. Previous studies have consistently documented the positive 
link between being female and job satisfaction. For example, Bisconti and Solmon 
(1977), arriving at a finding consistent with those reported here, namely that women have 
notably higher satisfaction than men, suggest that this result might be an artifact of their 
decision to use women as their reference group (a reference group that apparently 
contained a large number of homemakers). However, this positive link is based on a 
convenient assumption of “other things being equal” (most importantly here is pay), 
which we know from previous research is anything but a safe assumption. After taking 
women’s realized earnings into consideration, the positive link between being female and 
job satisfaction is reduced by the large salary difference between men and women.  
Consistent with the analyses from the first step, Asian and Black graduates are 
found to be less satisfied with their jobs compared with White graduates. The relative 
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dissatisfaction of Asians is found to be attenuated by their marked earnings advantages. 
Family background variables such as family income and parental education do not appear 
to affect graduates’ job satisfaction significantly, nor do test scores have large effects on 
job satisfaction. College majors do not have direct effects on job satisfaction when 
earnings are controlled in the model; however, students of high-paid majors such as 
business, engineering, and health are more satisfied than their counterparts in other 
majors when the total effect is examined. It illustrates that the effect of college majors on 
satisfaction is mainly operated through their impact on earnings.  
 
7.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I further extended the effect of college quality to include its 
impact on more psychological aspects of graduates’ life. More importantly, the 
relationship among college quality, earnings, and job satisfaction was examined. 
Consistent with earlier research, I found earnings to emerge as the strongest predictor of 
job satisfaction. Although earnings drove a large part of one’s assessment of job 
satisfaction, I have shown that there were other dimensions of satisfaction that operated 
quite independently of earnings and that were influenced by a variety of individual and 
college-level factors.  
Other things being equal, college quality generally had a negative direct effect on 
graduates’ job satisfaction; this was especially true for private institutions; however, this 
negative direct effect of college quality was attenuated by its positive indirect effect 
through earnings, resulting in non-significant effects in some cases. For example, the 
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negative effect of high-quality private institutions on graduates’ satisfaction with material 
benefits was greatly reduced by the positive effect of high-quality private institutions on 
earnings. In cases where the link between earnings and satisfaction was weak, the 
negative direct effect of college quality could not be attenuated by its positive effect on 
earnings. The negative effect of college quality on graduates’ satisfaction with general 
working conditions was not alleviated when earnings were excluded from the model.      
The findings pointing to a negative relationship between college prestige and job 
satisfaction raised many questions. Was this relative dissatisfaction among graduates 
from more prestigious colleges a function of their presumably higher costs? Higher costs 
might result in higher expectation, and higher expectations would exacerbate 
dissatisfaction in jobs that were considered to be inferior in quality or “not good enough.” 
Or perhaps this negative relationship could be explained by the reality that although these 
colleges placed their graduates in high-prestige jobs, many of these jobs were inherently 
stressful. All of this is to suggest that much more work needs to be done in this area. As 
students and families pay an ever-increasing share of the cost of college and these costs 
continue to rise, decisions directly impacting extrinsic realities such as those explored in 
this chapter will become more important. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
American higher education has experienced massive expansion in the 20th 
century, especially over the last 40 years. As the majority of high school graduates in the 
United States came to attend college, the differentiation of educational attainment 
increasingly went beyond the dichotomy of college graduates versus non-college 
graduates. This reality encouraged greater attention to other bases on which employers 
could and apparently did discriminate: bases that include perceived quality of 
undergraduate institutions. As Fussell (1983) poignantly observed, despite the massive 
expansion of the American higher education system, the same percentage of students 
attended “colleges” today as 100 years ago. His observation pointed to the distinct 
hierarchy and stratification among American universities and colleges. 
Many researchers in finance of higher education and in labor economics, in one 
way or another, have made the case that college quality was an important element in the 
formation of human capital and transmission of socioeconomic status. Weisbrod and 
Karpoff (1968), Reed and Miller (1970), Solmon (1973, 1975), and Wise (1975) were 
among the first to explore the effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings. Behrman 
and Birdsall (1983) suggested that quantity alone was not sufficient to capture the return 
of education and that quality should be incorporated into the standard Mincerian (1962, 
1974) framework. Recently, studies by Brewer and his colleagues (Brewer & Ehrenberg, 
1996; Brewer et al., 1999; Eide et al., 1998) and Thomas (2000a, 2003) have significantly 
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improved our understanding of the effect of college quality on an array of student 
outcomes. Implicitly or explicitly recognized in these studies was that the quality of 
college education, in addition to a college education itself, might have significant and 
profound effects on student outcomes. These scholars, however, did not emphasize the 
context in which college quality took effect (e.g., they did not underscore the centrality of 
socioeconomic status in determining college quality) and did not extend the analysis of 
the effect of college quality to other aspects of students’ life (except Eide et al., 1998). 
My study drew heavily on the work of these scholars, especially through an 
ongoing conversation and collaborative work with some of them. In return, my analysis 
expanded previous work in a couple of important ways. First, I explored the 
discrepancies between the empirical findings of the relatively small effect of college 
quality on graduate’ earnings and what social theories would suggest about the effect of 
college quality. This was achieved by examining the variability in the estimated effect of 
college quality among individuals and by extending the effect of college quality into non-
pecuniary aspects of students’ outcomes. Second, I moved on to examine the role of 
college quality in society by linking the analysis of the effect of college quality with the 
analysis of the effect of socioeconomic status on college quality, thus enabling me to tie 
these elements together and paint a more complete picture. Indeed, this study was mainly 
inspired by Professor Larry Leslie’s statement that elite institutions “enable” class to 
work its advantage (Personal communication, May, 2001). 
In this chapter, I structure the major findings of my study around two issues. First, 
the findings presented here help reconcile empirical results and social theories regarding 
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the effect of college quality on students’ outcomes. In summarizing my major findings in 
the first half of this chapter, I discuss variations in the effect of college quality, 
suggesting that the average economic effect of college quality as estimated in previous 
studies disguises many variations of the effect across an array of factors. And more 
importantly, in the second step, findings presented here help us better understand the role 
of college quality in society. In the second half of this chapter, I examine the social role 
of college quality by integrating various components of the analysis in this study, arguing 
that college quality, while providing an important mechanism for economic and social 
mobility, at the same time plays a significant role in preserving and perpetuating 
socioeconomic structure in American society. 
Previous research generally found a relatively small although statistically 
significant positive effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings. Two types of 
discrepancies were noteworthy. First, findings of these studies were not totally 
unequivocal. Studies by Solman and Wachtel (1975), Mueller (1988), and Dale and 
Krueger (1999) have shown very small effects of college quality on earnings, yet Brewer 
et al. (1999) and Thomas (2003) revealed quite a substantial effect of college quality on 
graduates’ earnings. Second, the majority of findings that college quality had a relative 
small effect on earnings run against our every day observations and social theories. As 
tuition and fees at elite institutions have been rising in recent decades, we had every 
reason to expect that college quality should pay off. The major findings of this study that 
helped reconcile these discrepancies were inventoried as follows. 
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First, the estimated effect of college quality on earnings is sensitive to the 
measure of college quality although the conclusion that it pays to attend high-quality 
colleges is robust to different measures of college quality. Whenever the effect of college 
quality is discussed, a primary concern of researchers is how to measure college quality. 
Many have argued that measures of quality such as those used in this dissertation are 
actually measuring “selectivity” instead of “quality.” Ignoring any potential profound 
differences between these two concepts, implicit in the suggestion are a couple of 
important points: College quality is multidimensional, and there has yet been no agreed-
to way to measure college quality. In fact, this study shows that the effect of college 
quality may be sensitive to how college quality is measured.  
Previous research uses a host of measures of college quality, including the 
Carnegie Classification system, mean or median SAT score of entering freshmen class, 
tuition and fees, per FTE educational expenditure, Gourman ratings, and recently 
Barron’s ratings. Some of them (Barron’s ratings, mean SAT score of entering freshmen 
class, tuition and fees, and Carnegie Classification) are experimented with in this study to 
examine the sensitivity of the estimated effect of college quality to different measures. If 
it turns out that the estimated effect of college quality is sensitive to these different 
measures, then the various measures of college quality used in previous studies may 
explain some of the discrepancies among the different estimated effects reported.  
My analysis shows that great variation in the effect of college quality exists across 
different measures although the estimated effect of college quality is generally positive 
and statistically significant regardless of its measure. For example, the estimated earnings 
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advantage of graduating from high-quality institutions (both public and private) is about 
20% relative to graduating from low-quality institutions when Barron’s ratings are used. 
However, this figure reduces by half when the mean SAT score is used instead. Because 
the Carnegie Classification system is based on number of doctoral programs and federal 
research funds (both criteria emphasize faculty research and graduate program more than 
undergraduate education), it does not seem to capture the “quality” of undergraduate 
education well. For example, earning a degree from a Liberal Arts I institution does not 
appear to provide particular earnings advantages relative to graduating from a Liberal 
Arts II institution. Or, in view of later findings in this study, it is safe to say that students 
graduating from Liberal Arts I institutions fail to convert institutional quality into 
immediate economic benefits. Tuition and fees appear to be highly correlated with 
graduates’ earnings, especially for private institutions. My general sense is that the 
smaller the proportion of institutions tagged as high-quality, the larger the estimated 
effect of college quality.  
The sensitivity of the estimated effect of college quality to how it is measured 
helps resolve some of the discrepancies among previous studies. For example, using the 
college quality measure constructed from Barron’s ratings, Brewer et al. (1999) found 
that the effect of private elite colleges was in the order of 20-40% relative to low-quality 
public institutions. I find an effect of college quality with similar magnitude to that in 
Brewer et al. in the current analysis when Barron’s ratings are used. Thomas (2003), 
however, using the college quality measure constructed from the mean SAT scores of the 
entering class, found that the effect of private elite colleges was in the order of 10% 
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relative to low-quality institutions. Other studies using mean SAT score as college quality 
usually end up with a relatively small or no effect of college quality on earnings (e.g., 
Dale & Krueger, 1999; Griffin & Alexander, 1978; Loury & Garman, 1995; Morgan & 
Duncan, 1979; Mueller, 1988; Rumberger & Thomas, 1993; Trusheim & Crouse, 1981).  
Despite the sensitivity of the estimated effect of college quality to its measures, 
the general conclusion that it pays to attend high-quality college holds. My sense is that 
when a small proportion of institutions are tagged as high-quality and the estimated effect 
is relatively large, the average cost differences between high-quality and low-quality 
colleges are also large. Similarly, when a relatively large proportion of institutions are 
tagged as high-quality and the estimated effect is relatively small, the average cost 
differences between high-quality and low-quality colleges are also small. The most 
intuitive comparison is provided by the regression where tuition and fees are used as a 
measure of college quality. The analysis indicates that a $1,000 increase in tuition and 
fees annually at private institutions is associated with $733 earnings increase annually, 
and at public institutions the same amount increase in tuition and fees is associated with a 
$570 earnings increase annually. Put in a slightly different way, assuming an average of 
four-year period of college education and no discounting factor, on average it takes less 
than six years for students from the private institutions and about seven years for students 
from the public institutions charging higher tuition and fees to break even on the 
differences in tuition and fees.  
Second, graduates from colleges of varying quality may have different earnings 
trajectories over their careers, so comparing earnings differences at the early stage of 
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graduates’ careers may be misleading. Due to the lack of available longitudinal data, 
most work on economic returns has focused on the returns to college quality at discrete 
points in time. Because extensive national data on labor market outcomes of college 
graduates are still a recent phenomenon, most studies can only compare the earnings 
differences at the early stage of graduates’ career. For example, the B&B: 93/97 has 
earnings data only four to five years after college graduation. Many studies on this 
subject examine the 1986 earnings for the well-known NLS-72 cohort, a span of about 10 
years since college graduation.68 However, college quality may have different effects 
over one’s lifetime. That is, college quality influences earnings trajectories; focusing on 
one point in time could well be misleading. 
Studies such as Brewer et al. (1999) have noted a trend of increasing impact of 
college quality during the early stage of graduates’ careers. Yet to date, no serious 
consideration of modeling and testing has been given to this issue. Due to the same data 
limitation, I am unable to examine the effect of college quality over one’s lifetime. To 
test the hypothesis that college quality may have different effects over time, however, 
earnings data at two points several years apart are instructive. In this study, I compare the 
effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings one to two years and four to five years 
after graduation.  
My analysis shows that the earnings gap between graduates from low-quality and 
high-quality colleges has significantly increased between the two points in time. For 
                                                 
68 It is noteworthy here that the B&B is representative of baccalaureate recipients whereas most surveys 
such as HSB, NLS-72, and NELS-88 are not. 
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example, the wage gap between graduates from high-quality private college and those 
from low-quality public institutions has more than tripled between 1994 and 1997 (a 22% 
gap versus a 7% gap). Similarly, the wage gap between graduates from high-quality and 
low-quality public institutions has increased from about 9% to 20%, suggesting a more 
than doubled gap in 1997 relative to 1994. Thomas (2003) showed that, on average, 
earnings of graduates from all types of colleges have grown significantly between these 
two time periods, but those graduates from high-quality institutions, especially high-
quality private colleges, increased their earnings the most. 
Considering that the earnings gap examined here is the relative gap, the increasing 
earnings dispersion among graduates from colleges of varying quality is indeed an 
important finding. Given that graduates from low-quality colleges earn less than those 
from high-quality colleges, it is not surprising that the absolute earnings gap (in actual 
dollar terms) widens over time, assuming that all graduates share the same growth rate. It 
is perhaps more than that, however. My analysis shows that the earnings of those from 
high-quality institutions grow at a faster pace than those from low-quality institutions, 
resulting in a widening relative gap (in terms of logged earnings) among graduates from 
colleges of different quality. If earnings partially reflect one’s occupational position, this 
increasing earnings gap would probably suggest quite different career paths among 
graduates from colleges of varying quality. I do not attempt to identify the mechanism 
through which college quality plays a role in one’s career development; however, it 
appears that college quality has an influential impact not only on one’s initial 
occupational position but also on one’s career paths. 
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College quality may have different effects on earnings over individuals’ career 
spans. Therefore, the relative small effect of college quality on earnings usually examined 
at the early stage of graduates’ career may be valid but problematic if it is generalized 
over one’s lifetime.  
Third, there exists variability in the effect of college quality among students with 
different characteristics such as gender, race/ethnicity, family income, parental 
education, ability, and major field of study; the average effect of college quality disguises 
much of the variation. Previous studies have consistently shown that demographic 
characteristics, family backgrounds, and educational experience all figure into patterns of 
economic status (e.g., James et al., 1989). For example, females and minorities earn 
significantly less in the labor market; socioeconomic variables have both direct and 
indirect effects on earnings; and academic performance and major fields of study affect 
earnings significantly. Yet less is known about how these factors figure into the relation 
between college quality and earnings. Essentially, the question here is whether different 
groups of students are able to realize the same economic advantage from earning degrees 
at high-quality colleges. The research on this issue is rather thin, and the recent existing 
evidence is ambiguous. Based on a few studies, Anderson and Hearn (1992) reached 
some vague conclusions with regard to the interaction between individual characteristics 
and the effect of educational attainment.  
My analysis explores this interaction on a larger scale by examining the different 
effects of college quality on various dimensions. As far as gender is concerned, female 
students benefit less from earning degrees at high-quality colleges than do male students 
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although the difference is not statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the 
observation that female students are somehow less likely to attend high-quality colleges 
than male students (although the difference is not statistically significant either). Because 
earning a degree at a high-quality college is worth slightly less for female students, they 
have less incentive to do so. My conclusion with regard to the interaction between gender 
and the effect of college quality seems to run against what Anderson and Hearn (1992) 
conclude in their review of previous studies although they caution that the complexity of 
measuring returns and the different career and family patterns of men and women make 
definitive conclusions difficult.     
If the variation in the effect of college quality on earnings by gender is not all that 
clear, the variation by race/ethnicity is much more obvious. For non-White graduates 
(technically defined as Native Americans, Hispanics, and Blacks), earning degrees from 
middle-quality institutions and low-quality private institutions has very small and 
statistically non-significant effects on earnings relative to graduating from low-quality 
public colleges; however, substantial earnings advantages are provided to non-White 
graduates of high-quality institutions. A degree from a high-quality public college yields 
an almost 30% earnings advantage, and even greater advantages (43%) are associated 
with receiving a degree from a high-quality private institution. That is, for non-White 
students, all that matters is high-quality institutions. For White graduates, all categories 
of college provide large and statistically significant earnings advantages relative to low-
quality public institution; however, having a degree from a high-quality college does not 
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provide the same level of boost to their earnings that non-Whites enjoy. In short, college 
quality matters more for non-White graduates than for White graduates.  
I also examine the interaction between the effect of college quality and 
socioeconomic status. In particular, effects of college quality among students of different 
family income and parental education level are studied. In terms of family income, it 
seems that earnings of students from low- and middle-income (especially middle-income) 
families are more sensitive to college quality than those from the top-income families. 
That is, college quality matters more for students from low- and middle-income families 
than for those from upper-income families. The results with regard to the other dimension 
of socioeconomic status, parental education, are very similar to those shown for family 
income. That is, although, on average, earning degrees from high-quality colleges 
improves graduates’ earnings, the positive effect is more evident for students from 
families of low and middle levels of education than for those from well-educated 
families. In fact, my results suggest that the earnings of those who are from the best-
educated families are not very sensitive to college quality.  
Finally, variability in the effect of college quality exists along academic 
dimensions such as intellectual ability (measured as SAT/ACT quartile) and 
undergraduate major. The interaction between ability and the effect of college quality is 
not very clear. It seems that the highest effect of college quality appears for students in 
the lowest and second-highest quartiles (the estimated effect of graduating from a high-
quality college is near 40% for these two groups), and earnings of students in the highest 
quartile are the most insensitive to college quality (the estimated effect of graduating 
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from a high-quality college is about 6%). If a pattern exists, it would suggest that students 
with low and middle abilities benefit the most from earning degrees at high-quality 
colleges, and students with the highest measured intellectual ability are most insensitive 
to college quality. Given the intricate relation between ability and socioeconomic factors, 
this pattern seems to confirm what I have concluded with regard to the effect of college 
quality along socioeconomic dimensions. 
The interaction between undergraduate major and college quality has been less 
often examined in higher education research (see Rumberger & Thomas, 1993 for such a 
study). Usually, college quality and college major enter earnings equation independently, 
explicitly assuming that college quality would affect students of different majors in much 
the same way. Yet great variation in the effect of college quality exists among different 
major fields of study. For example, for business majors, college quality is a strong 
determinant of their earnings, and for engineering majors, college quality does not seem 
to be a particularly important factor in determining their earnings. For social science 
majors, only high-quality public institutions matter. And for education majors, only high-
quality private colleges matter.69 Low-quality private institutions provide large benefits 
for certain majors such as health, perhaps due to their more career-oriented programs.  
The above analyses point to the variability in the effect of college quality among 
different groups of graduates. Hence the relatively small effect of college quality on 
                                                 
69 One possible explanation is that education majors from high-quality colleges may not hold education 
related jobs. In the full sample, Among the 456 (11.5% of the full sample 3,965 students) education majors, 
39 of them are from high-quality colleges, with the remaining from other categories. About 40% of the 39 
education majors from high-quality colleges and 62% of the education majors from other categories hold 
education related jobs in April 1997.       
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earnings documented in previous studies disguises much of the dynamics of the impact of 
college quality across individuals. In short, the average effect of college quality might not 
be generalizable to a particular group of students.  
Fourth, the effect of college quality on earnings is not homogenous across the 
earnings distribution. College quality has little impact at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution but has a larger impact at the top of the distribution. The relatively small 
effect of college quality shown in previous studies not only disguises its dynamics among 
individuals but also masks its variation across the earnings distribution. Examining the 
effect of college quality across the earnings distribution helps resolve the discrepancy 
between two basic observations: (1) the relatively small effect of college quality on 
average, and (2) the disproportionate representation of individuals from high-quality 
institutions (especially private elite institutions) among the most successful group in 
American society. Taking these two observations as given, one may come up with a 
hypothesis that college quality may have a large effect at the top of the earnings 
distribution (which results in the high proportion of graduates from high-quality colleges 
among the most successful group) and a small effect at other places in the distribution 
(which results in relatively small average effect).  
My analysis using quantile regression confirms this hypothesis. Results indicate 
that at the bottom of log earnings distribution (e.g., 5th, 10th, and 25th percentiles), the 
effect of graduating from high-quality colleges relative to low selective publics is either 
insubstantial or non-significant. The earnings gap becomes substantial when moving 
toward the top of the earnings distribution, with the largest divergence occurring at the 
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very top of the earnings distribution (e.g., 90th and 95th percentiles), where the advantage 
exceeds 30% for graduates from private high-quality colleges relative to low-quality 
institutions. It seems, then, that although graduating from a high-quality college may not 
have large effects on average, it is a key in reaching the very top of the earnings 
distribution. 
Fifth, the non-economic effect of college quality may add substantially to the 
effect of college quality on students’ outcomes. Not only does college quality have a 
positive effect on earnings, it also has a significant non-economic effect as well. Since it 
can be shown that college quality has a positive effect on non-monetary outcomes, then 
focusing on economic benefits alone understates the effects of college quality. In this 
study, I analyze the effect of college quality on two non-economic outcomes: graduate 
education and job satisfaction. 
College quality has a large and significant positive effect on graduate education in 
several important ways. First, students from high-quality colleges are more likely to 
enroll in graduate programs within four to five years after college graduation. For 
example, relative to students from low-quality public colleges, students from high-quality 
private and public colleges are about 16-18% more likely to enroll in some kind of 
graduate program within four to five years of baccalaureate graduation.  
Second, among those students who actually enroll in graduate programs, students 
from high-quality public colleges are more likely to enroll in doctoral programs although 
the effect is relatively small. This relatively small effect could be explained by the fact 
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that, in the current analysis, MBA and first professional programs are considered as 
master’s programs.  
Third, among those students who actually enroll in graduate programs, students 
from high-quality colleges are more likely to attend research universities. The correlation 
between the quality of undergraduate colleges and the quality of graduate schools is very 
strong. For example, on average students from high-quality undergraduate institutions, 
relative to those from low-quality colleges, are about 40% less likely to enroll in 
comprehensive universities and more than 50% more likely to enroll in research 
universities. Students from middle-quality colleges are more than 10% less likely to 
enroll in comprehensive universities and about 20% more likely to enroll in research 
universities.  
Finally, I consider the effect of college quality on graduate degree attainment. 
Although the time span is not long enough to expose the effect of college quality 
completely, my analysis confirms the strong positive effect of college quality on graduate 
degree attainment. For example, students from high-quality colleges are more likely to 
complete their graduate degree within four to five years after college graduation; among 
those students who have actually received their graduate degree within four to five year, 
those from high-quality colleges are also more likely to have received their degrees from 
a research university. 
The positive effect of college quality on graduate education adds significantly to 
the relatively small effect of college quality on earnings in a couple of important ways. 
First, earning degrees at high-quality colleges not only provides direct economic benefits, 
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it also provides extra utility by enhancing the opportunity to obtain further education. 
Second, graduate education may in return further enhance individuals’ economic status. 
That is, college quality may have an indirect economic effect through its impact on 
graduate education. As such, in those studies where terminal BA recipients and advanced 
degrees holders are pooled together (i.e., the total effect of college quality is examined), 
the effect of college quality is usually larger than comparing the earnings differences 
among terminal baccalaureate holders. 
 The non-economic outcome analyzed in this study, job satisfaction, seems to be 
negatively affected by college quality. Other things being equal, college quality generally 
has a negative direct effect on graduates’ job satisfaction; this is especially true for 
graduates from private institutions. However, this negative direct effect of college quality 
is attenuated by its positive indirect effect through earnings, resulting in a non-significant 
total effect in some cases. For example, the negative effect of high-quality institutions on 
graduates’ satisfaction with benefits is greatly reduced by the positive effect of high-
quality institutions on earnings. In cases where the link between earnings and satisfaction 
is weak, the negative direct effect of college quality cannot be attenuated by its positive 
effect on earnings. For example, the negative effect of college quality on graduates’ 
satisfaction with general working conditions is not lessened when earnings are excluded 
from the model.      
This negative effect of college quality on job satisfaction points to the interaction 
among increased college costs, heightened expectation, and realized economics benefits. 
Bowen (1968) observed that tuition at a set of high-quality private institutions rose on 
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average two to three percentage points more than inflation each year during the 1905 to 
1965 period, and this trend continued during the period from 1966-67 to 1997-98 
(Ehrenberg, 2000). The increasing cost of attending colleges may not be a problem as 
long as family income keeps the same pace of growth, which is the case for most years 
before the 1980s. Since then family income has stagnated for various reasons, but the cost 
of attending college has kept increasing at a pace two to three percentage points more 
than inflation each year. The same period also witnesses a shift in public discussion from 
emphasizing a college education as a public good to a private good. All these trends have 
heightened students’ career expectation from attending colleges, especially high-quality 
colleges. The direct negative effect of college quality might be an indication that the 
realized benefits from attending high-quality colleges fall short of career expectations. In 
fact, Thomas and Zhang (2002) compared the effect of college quality on job satisfaction 
at two points in time and reported that as the effect of college quality became larger, the 
negative effect of college quality became smaller (in absolute value). 
In conclusion, previous economic studies on the effect of college quality have 
either ignored the variation in the economic effect of college quality across various 
dimensions (such as measures of college quality, different points in time over one’s 
career, students of different demographic characteristics and family backgrounds, and 
different points in the earnings distribution) or overlooked the non-economic aspect of 
the effect. Thus, the relatively small effect of college quality noted in previous studies is 
somewhat misleading or, at best, incomplete. Although it is important to identify the 
discrepancies among previous studies and between empirical results and social theories, it 
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is more constructive, from a sociological perspective, to formulate the social role of 
college quality from the analysis of this study. That is, what have we learned from this 
study about the role of college quality in society?  
Five major themes from this study are particularly important in understanding the 
role of college quality. First, college quality has a significant effect on graduates’ 
earnings although great variation in the effect of college quality exists along various 
dimensions. For example, graduating from a high-quality college provides a roughly 20% 
earnings advantage relative to graduating from a low-quality college. Further, this 
earnings advantage appears to increase over the early stage of graduates’ career. On the 
other hand, social class variables such as family income and parental education do not 
seem to have a large direct effect on graduate earnings. For example, an increase in 
family income by $10,000 only increases graduates’ earnings by less than 1%. Being a 
first-generation college graduate is associated with a small and usually statistically non-
significant earnings penalty. Apparently, socioeconomic factors such as family income 
and parental education do not tend to have direct effects on earnings. 
Second, socioeconomic factors such as family income and parental education 
have a positive and significant effect on the probability of earning a degree at a high-
quality college. This effect is both direct and, more importantly, indirect. Other things 
being equal, students from wealthier and better-educated families are more likely to hold 
degrees from high-quality colleges. But things are not equal. The analysis of the 
determination of individuals’ intellectual ability reveals that part of the socioeconomic 
factors have been crystallized in one’s intellectual ability. This indirect effect, through the 
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tight connection between socioeconomic factors and ability and between ability and 
college quality, is substantial. Indeed, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) found that family 
income crystallized in ability, instead of family income per se, was the major determinant 
of the family income-schooling relationship. It appears that socioeconomic factors such 
as family income and parental education tend to exert indirect effects on earnings through 
their impact on individuals’ propensity to invest in education rather than to have a direct 
effect on earnings (Hearn, 1984; Karabel & Astin, 1975; Rumberger, 1983). 
Clearly, in terms of earning degrees at high-quality colleges, social reproduction 
theory is strongly supported by the current analysis. It is supported not only by the strong 
effect of socioeconomic factors on the probability of earning degrees at high-quality 
colleges, but also more subtly by the strong connections among socioeconomic factors, 
ability, and college quality. The latter indirect connection disguises social reproduction 
by the principle of meritocracy. In essence, socioeconomic factors and academic factors 
are not all that separated; they work in tandem. The academically and socioeconomically 
“rich” become richer while the academically and socioeconomically “poor” become 
poorer (Hearn, 1984).  
Third, the emphasis on educational inequality among social classes should not 
dwarf the positive role of college quality in promoting economic and social mobility in 
American society. Graduating from high-quality colleges provides a special boost to non-
White students relative to White student although the effect of college quality is also 
substantial for White students. Examining the effect of college quality by two major 
parameters of socioeconomic status yields more or less the same results. The effect of 
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college quality appears to be larger for students from low- and middle-income families 
than for those from the top-income families. So too, the effect of college quality is larger 
for students from low- and middle-educated families than for those from highly educated 
families. The pattern in the effect of college quality by students’ ability further confirms 
the above conclusion.  
The relatively larger effect of college quality for lower-class students suggests 
that graduating from high-quality colleges provides them with great upward mobility in 
economic and social status. Social reproduction theory suggests that lower-class students 
might not have the necessary cultural capital to take full advantage of high-quality 
education; my analysis indicates otherwise. Bowen and Bok (1998), using data from 
College and Beyond, showed that attending selective institutions “pays off for individuals 
of all races, from all backgrounds” (p. 276) although due to data constraints they were 
unable to compare the magnitude of benefits from attending high-quality institutions 
among different students. These results suggest that disadvantaged students can equally 
or even better benefit from receiving high-quality college education if they are given the 
opportunities.  
Fourth, the relatively larger effect of college quality for lower-class students, 
however, does not suggest the advantageous position of lower-class students in American 
higher education. Certainly, most researchers in higher education are skeptical, if not 
cynical, about results that college quality has a larger effect for disadvantaged students. 
At a recent professional conference, one presenter, who was clearly a critical researcher, 
bemoaned that some researchers even found that effect of education was greater for 
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Black than for White students. My analysis and other work suggest that it is greater (see 
Anderson & Hearn, 1992, for a literature review and Dale & Krueger, 1999, for a recent 
study); however, the larger effect does not necessarily suggest that disadvantaged 
students are in an advantageous position in higher education.  
The key here is to distinguish the inequality in the educational attainment and the 
difference in the effect of educational attainment among social classes. In fact, my 
finding that lower-class students are less likely than upper-class students to attend high-
quality colleges yet at the same time lower-class students may benefit more from 
attending high-quality colleges is consistent with the human capital argument. From the 
human capital perspective, students equate the return of investing in high-quality 
education to the price of such an investment. Because lower-class families have fewer 
resources to finance a high-quality college education, the price of investing in high-
quality education is necessarily higher for lower-class families than for upper-class 
families.70 In other words, because a high-quality education is relatively more expensive 
for lower-class students than for upper-class students, the former tend to under-invest in it 
and at the same time the return to such an investment is higher for the former than for the 
latter.71 Thus, the empirical finding that the less advantaged student can actually benefit 
                                                 
70 Note that the argument here is different from the typical human capital argument with credit constraints 
(e.g., Card, 2001) where the lifetime income is maximized by choosing the quantity of education. By 
choosing different types of college education, the quantity of education is assumed to be the same (although 
many may argue that it takes less time to graduate at high-quality colleges than at lower-quality colleges). 
71 The return of receiving a high-quality education is analogous to the effect of college quality when the 
cost of a high-quality education is the same across individuals. Arguably, the absolute cost of attending 
high-quality colleges is less for low-class students than for upper-class students because the former usually 
receive substantial financial aid at those institutions; however, the relative price of a reduced cost of 
attending a high-quality college could still be higher for students from lower-class families than for those 
from upper-class families. In other words, despite the financial aid available at high-quality colleges, they 
are still less affordable for lower-class students than for upper-class students. 
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more from high-quality education does not contradict the fact that lower-class students 
are less likely to attend high-quality colleges than upper-class students.  
Fifth, having a degree from a high-quality college, especially a private elite 
institution, has a large effect at the top of the earnings distribution, suggesting that a high-
quality education is very important for individuals who wish to reach the very top 
positions. In this study, I use quantile regression to examine the effect of college quality 
across the earnings distribution and find that a larger divergence in earnings among 
students from colleges of varying quality occurs at the top of the earnings distribution 
rather than at the bottom of the distribution. The current analysis suggests that college 
quality may not have a large effect on average, but it provides special advantages to those 
who have reached the very top of the distribution. 
From all five major themes taken together, my conclusion is simple. College 
quality, while providing important opportunities for economic and social mobility, at the 
same time plays an important role in preserving and perpetuating the socioeconomic 
status in American society. The American politics of democracy and ideology of 
meritocracy endorse a social norm that stresses achievement, more so than ascribed 
advantages. In other words, the criterion for success is what you achieve rather than who 
you are. Thus high-quality college education provides a small yet important pipeline 
through which lower-class children are able to attend high-quality colleges and capture 
the associated rewards. In this sense, America can be pictured as the land of opportunity.   
Nevertheless, the emphasis on achievement by no means denies intergenerational 
transmission of socioeconomic status. Given the achievement criteria, members of the 
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upper class devote their wealth to providing the high-quality education necessary for their 
children in order to demonstrate/obtain achievement. College quality (as well as 
educational quality in general) serves well as an apparatus to convert wealth and social 
status into achievement. Arguably, from children’s early days of life, the quality of 
educational institutions selected by upper-class families, especially those with the highest 
income, in most cases is superior to the quality of institutions selected by lower-class 
families, especially those with the lowest income. Upper-class families, through choosing 
high-quality education for their children, are able to transmit their socioeconomic status 
to the next generation. In short, the elites are about achievement, but the 
accomplishments they triumph are easier to reach for those of status and wealth than for 
those lacking such advantages. In this sense, the United States can also be described as 
the place where the rich get richer and (most of) the poor stay poor. Indeed, college 
quality “enables” class to work its advantages. 
In sum, I see conflicting roles of high-quality colleges in American society. They 
offer mobility while preserving the status quo; they promote (some) equality while 
perpetuating inequality. As a result, theories often succeed in predicting and explaining 
some findings but not all of them. Human capital theory, which perhaps explains the 
positive effect of a high-quality college education, ignores the intricacy among social 
class, intellectual ability, and educational attainment. In contrast, social reproduction 
theory, which better captures the intertwining relationship among these factors, fails to 
recognize the substantial economic mobility enjoyed by lower-class students graduating 
from high-quality colleges.     
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In concluding my study, I look at the implications of my data and theory for the 
future of finance in American higher education. The findings of my analysis suggest that 
high-quality colleges have made certain successes in providing economic benefits to 
lower-class students, thus promoting the social and economic equality importantly. On 
other hand, my data and theory also suggest that not many lower-class students were 
given equal opportunities to receive a high-quality education. The bias is both directly 
through relatively higher costs and indirectly through relatively lower ability. For sure, 
were it not for the huge amount of need-based student aid, the situation would have been 
much worse. I suggest that equality could further be promoted at two levels.  
First, need-based aid especially need-based grants should be increased to take 
down the financial barrier of attending high-quality colleges for students from low-
income families. Despite the fact that these high-quality colleges put an enormous money 
and effort in providing equal opportunities for students from all class, my analysis in 
Chapter 3 still shows that everything being equal, students from upper-class families are 
more likely to earn degrees from high-quality colleges than those from lower-class 
families. The relatively larger effect of college quality for lower-class students is also 
suggestive that the relative price of attending high-quality colleges is higher for lower-
class students than for upper-class students. In many high-quality institutions, need-based 
financial packages still include a substantial proportion of loans that effectively create 
financial barriers for lower-class students.72  
                                                 
72 When resources are relatively plentiful, these high-quality institutions are able to eliminate need-based 
loans. Unfortunately, till now I am aware of only one institution (Princeton University) that is able to do so. 
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Second, students of disadvantaged classes should not only have the same 
opportunity in terms of college admission and choice as others (that is good but not 
enough), but this equal opportunity should be provided much earlier. Removing the 
financial barriers for students from lower-class families is likely to provide them with 
equal opportunities in attending high-quality colleges. Yet, as I have argued, because 
social reproduction is also through crystallized family factors in the form of individual 
ability, financial aid policies of postsecondary education are not likely to solve the long-
term inequality issue. Putting it simply, because not many students from poor families are 
qualified for high-quality institutions, even if financial barriers were completely removed, 
they would still represent a small proportion of students at high-quality institutions. Thus 
policies of postsecondary education are not effective in uprooting the causes of the 
realized inequality. 
This second policy implication clearly goes beyond the realm of higher education. 
Given the amount of public resources available to promote the social equality, policy 
makers should decide where and when best to allocate these resources. A recent study by 
Dearing, McCartney, and Taylor (2001) found that a small amount of money could make 
a big difference for young children from poor families in early stage of their academic 
career. The well-known Tennessee’s Project STAR provided further evidence that 
smaller class size (more financial resources) had a significant positive effect on students’ 
achievement during grades K-3 and this positive effect was much larger for minority 
students than for others. Furthermore, after the students had returned to regular size 
classes, achievement effects tended to persist in higher grades (Finn & Achilles, 1999; 
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Krueger, 1999; Krueger & Whitmore, 2001; Nye, Hedges, & Konstantopoulos, 1999). 
Considering the large and persistent effect of financial resources on students’ 
achievement at their young age, perhaps that is the best time when educational policies 
can make a real difference to those from poor families. 
The value of equality should be emphasized especially in view of the changing 
demographics of student body and increasing costs of high-quality education. Due to 
immigration and high birth rate, the under-represented minority population is growing at 
a faster rate than the White population. Non-White students represent an increasingly 
larger proportion in younger student cohort. For example, my own calculation from the 
published NCES Common Core data indicates that from school year 1997-98 to 2001-02 
the percentage of non-White high school graduates has steadily increased from 28.5% to 
30.7%.  It also reveals that in school year 2001-2002, non-White students represent 
32.2% of the 12th graders, 38.0% of the 8th graders, and 42.8% of the first graders. 
Another NCES survey shows that in 2000-2001 only less than half (49%) of the public 
school pre-kindergarten children are White, 24% are Hispanics, and 23% are Blacks 
(Smith et al. 2003). Meanwhile, due to stagnate median family income and rising tuition 
at high-quality colleges in last couple of decades, high-quality college education became 
less affordable for more American families. For example, Ehrenberg (2000) documented 
that the tuition and fees at Cornell University as a share of median family income in the 
United States rose from 28% in early 1980s to 49% in later 1990s. These dynamics urge a 
continued and expanded attention on the equality issue in American higher education. 
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It should be cautioned, however, that equality is not the single value pursued by 
high-quality institutions (higher education in general). In fact, other values such as 
efficiency and liberty are equally essential to high-quality colleges.73 For example, high-
quality institutions should take the responsibility for educating the best students in the 
nation and around the world, especially in the current political economy of global 
competition. Therefore, some preferential packaging and merit-based aid are necessary to 
encourage and attract the best students into fields of great importance to national 
economy. Because my data and theory in this study do not yield much insight into these 
issues, I leave those to future studies. 
                                                 
73 For a detailed discussion on some of the core values pursued by educational policy, see Garms, Guthrie, 
& Pierce (1978).  
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APPENDIX A 
SELF-SELECTION BIAS 
 
Theory 
The leading econometric problem in the baseline model is the self-selection bias. 
Arguably, students self-select colleges partially on the basis of students’ characteristics 
and the expected labor market payoff. That is, college type cannot be treated as an 
exogenous determinant of earnings. Correction for self-selection bias has been well 
known in econometrics since Heckman (1979) and Lee (1983)74. Yet, there has been no 
agreed upon way to achieve this goal. One way would be to use data for comparable 
groups to eliminate unobserved effects (1996; Dale and Krueger, 1999). A second way 
would be to find an instrumental variable to take care of the endogeneity problem 
(Berhmen et al., 1996). A third way would be the Heckman-type selection correction 
model. Usually, this type of selection model consists of two equations: 
ssss XY εβ +=*                                                            (A.1) 
0000 εβ += XY                                                            (A.2) 
(A.1) is often called the selection equation, and (A.2) is the outcome regression, where 
* >
0Y  
is only observed when  (i.e., sY  in the probit model). Various assumptions are 
imposed on the error terms (after normalizing 
1=Y 0
1)( =sV ε ),   
                                                 
74 Amemiya (1973) derived a Heckman-type selection correction element in a regression model when the 
dependent variable was truncated normal. 
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Because  is only observed when , the expectation of  is conditional on 
: 
0Y 0
* >sY 0Y
0* >sY
)0()( *
0000
>+= sYEXYE εβ                                              (A.4) 
From (A1), we have 
)()0(
00 ssss
* XEYE βεεε −>=>                                          (A.5) 
By applying the joint normality of error terms, we get 
λσβσβεεσβεε s
ss
sssssssss X
XEXE 0000 )(
)()( =Φ=−>=−>       
βφ
ss
X )(
         (A.6) 
In theory, if λ  can be estiamted consistently, it is possible to remove the selection 
bias in (A2) by adding  in the regression. There are several ways to estimate λˆ λ  by 
different assumptions for the error term (such as normal, uniform, and logistic 
distribution) in the selection equation. Due to the multinomial nature of the selection 
process in this study (i.e., more than two categories of colleges), Lee’s (1983) utitlity 
maximazing framework (i.e., multinomial logit model for the selection model) is used 
here. This approach has been employed to estimate the effect of college quality by 
equations: 
Brewer and Ehrenberg (1996) and Brewer et al. (1999). It consists of the following 
 jijiji ZI µδ +=                                                          (A.7) 
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Equation (A.7) defines a linear utility function for individual i in college type j.75  
jI i =  iff )( jkMaxII kjji ≠>                                    
Equation (A.8) suggests that the ind
          (A.8) 
ividual i chooses college type j if and only if his or 
her utility is maximized in college type j. A wfter e define jikjji MaxI µε −= , Equation 
(A.8) is transformed into Equation (A.9).   
jI i =  iff jiji Z δε <                    
Equation (A.9) can be estimated as a multinomial logit model: 
                                      (A.9) 
∑===< )exp()Pr()Pr(
ji
ijiji Z
jIZ δ
)exp(
ji
Z δδε                                    (A.10) 
Having estimated the choice model of Equation (A.10), we can construct the selectivity 
io  fo
  
correct n term r each individual, using the method developed by Lee (1983): 
)(
)(
ji
ji
H
H
Φji =
φλ , where jiji PH Φ=                                        (A.11) 1−
where (.)φ  and (.)Φ  are th
)(
e probability density function (PDF) and cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal. Finally, the estimated λ  is added to 
the original earnings equation (Equation 2.1 in the baseline model) and re-estimate it by 
mitting the college quality variables. 
ijij JFDY ελββββ ++++= ˆ)ln( 54210                           (A.12) 
 
o
ijij A ββ ++ 3 ijij
 
                                                 
 The linear utility function may not be as restrictive as it appears to be, because in theory polynomial 
terms can always be added to the equation to approximate any smooth utility functions.  
75
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Estimation 
As laid out above, the estimation of a selection model involves two stages: a
selection model to obtain the selection term λˆ  and a usual regresssion model with the 
selection term. In the baseline model, there does not seem to exist significant differences
in the effect of college quality by types of control; I simplify the model by using three 
categories instead of six categories of college quality. As a result, the first-stage selection 
model is identical to the multinomial logit model in the previous chapter. The only 
difference is that in this analysis, the sample is restricted to 3,965 students. Because
 
 
 the 
first stage multinomial estimates are not much different from tha
e 
 formula: 
βββ ˆˆˆˆ)ˆln( 43210 +++++= ijijijijij JAFDY
e is 
 
 the mean predicted log earnings without the selection term: 
43210 14) 
 The means of predicted log earnings, both conditional and unconditional, are 
presented in Table A.2. For example, the red g
10.3391, and 10.4480 for graduates from low-quality, middle-quality, and high-quality  
t in Chapter 3, only the 
regression results from the second stage is presented here. Table A.1 shows the estimates 
of Equation (A.12) for each category of college. I use these three regressions to calculat
earning differentials among graduates from different types of colleges. First, the mean 
predicted log earnings for each category is calculated using the following
λβ ˆˆˆ 5                               (A.13) ββ
The differences among the mean predicted log earnings can computed. This differenc
conditional on individual’s actual choice, and sometimes it is named as the conditional 
differential. The unconditional differential, with selection bias removed, is calculated by
differencing
   JAFDY ˆˆˆˆˆ)ˆln( βββββ ++++=                                    (A.ijijijijij
 conditional p icted log earnin s are 10.2477, 
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T
O on,  cte u
able A.1 
LS Estimates for Earnings Equati Selection Corre d (absol te value t statistics)
 L li M a low-qua ty iddle-qu lity High-qua ity 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
  Constant 2 4 1 18.7379 5.29 8.7489 1.84 0.8142 4.26
Institutional Characteristics      
ly Black coll. and inst. - -  
teristics 
- -
0.1685 0.97 0.0887 1.05 0.1500 1.61
-0.0676 1.18 -0.0029 0.07 0.0974 0.85
d      
10,000) -
n college 
- - -
     
artile -
jor 1
1
ajor 0.0294 0.37 0.1973 4.27 0.3501 2.21
  Biological science major 0.1874 1.81 0.1611 2.77 0.0692 0.57
0.4636 5.97 0.3931 8.71 0.1549 1.57
Social science major 9  
ajor - 3.4 2.6 0.2
 
  Historical 0.1087 1.46 0.0908 1.32  
Demographic Charac       
  Female 0.0413 1.17 0.1148 6.24 -0.0850 1.98
  Native American 
  Asian 0.1673 1.64 0.1355 2.92 0.0996 1.44
  Black 
  Hispanic 0.0121 0.12 0.0340 0.79 0.2241 2.12
Family Backgroun  
  Family income (in $ 0.0206 4.59 0.0066 3.06 0.0008 0.44
  First-generatio
graduate 0.0036 0.11 0.0303 1.77 0.0415 0.88
Academic Background  
  Merged SAT/ACT qu 0.0236 1.36 0.0168 1.82 0.0458 1.81
  Business major 0.2165 4.30 0.2871 9.49 0.3422 3.81
  Engineering ma 0.4983 7.74 0.4258 1.24 0.4169 5.02
  Health major 0.4851 7.90 0.4185 1.06 0.3947 4.41
  Public affairs m
  Math science major 
  0.1104 1.5 0.2182 5.41 0.1751 1.68
  History m 0.8250 2 0.1540 5 0.0364 0
  Humanity major 0.1874 3.15 0.1306 3.24 0.0472 0.51
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T ntinued 
Low-qua ty -quality High-quality 
able A.1 – Co
 li Middle
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
  Psychology major 0.0237 0.28 0.1693 3.58 -0.0144 0.15
  Other major 
     
-0.0461
enure 0.0 0.11 0 3.36 0.0 1.10
  Tenure squared /100 0.79 - 0.36 - 1.02
ber of hours per week 0.0153 6.56 0.0125 8.77 0.0094 2.82
0.1418 2.40 0.1606 4.53 0.0722 0.85
Labor Market   
  Age 0.0347 1.88 0.0397 3.65 1.11
  Age squared / 100 -0.0455 1.90 -0.0455 3.25 0.0533 1.06
  T 011 .0184 309
0.0356 0.0087 0.2548
  Num
Lamda (i) -0.0861 2.82 -0.0387 1.09 -0.0075 0.29
N 811  2671  483
2R  0.3361  0.2190  0.1893
 
colleges, respectively. So the conditional log earnings differential between graduates 
from middle-quality and low-quality colleges is about 0.09, and that between high-quality 
and low-quality colleges is about 0.20. These estimates are very similar to what we have 
obtained in the pooled baseline model. The unconditional log earnings differential
selection bias accounted for, are smaller than the conditional differentials. For example, 
the unconditional predicted log earnings are 10.3323, 10.3526, and 10.4530 for graduates
from low-quality, m
s, with 
 
iddle-quality, and high-quality colleges, respectively. So the 
unconditional log earnings differential between graduates from middle-quality and low-
quality colleges is about 0.02, and that between high-quality and low-quality colleges is 
about 0.12. 
 
  
 
 
223
 
Table A.2 
Conditional and Unconditional Earnings Differentials
  Low-quality Middle-quality High-quality
 Earnings S.E. Earnings S.E. Earnings S.E.
Predicted earnings (conditional) 10.2477 0.302 10.3391 0.218 10.448 0.216
Earnings differentials (conditional)   0.0914 0.373 0.2003 0.371
Predicted earnings (unconditional) 10.3323 0.307 10.3526 0.218 10.4530 0.216
Earnings differentials (unconditional)   0.0203 0.377 0.1211 0.375
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 Although this Heckman-type selection model is theoretically very appealing, 
empirical researchers have often encountered difficulties in implementing the model. The 
leading problem of this model is the identification problem. Models in economics and 
more generally in social science usually have very similar explanatory variables in both 
stages of regression. That is, equations A.1 and A.2 have very similar explanatory 
variables . In theory,  in equation A.2 is identified even if equation A.2 has identical 
explanatory variables as in equation A.1 because the functional form of  is non-linear 
in explanatory variables, although doing so generally creates serious problem of 
multicollinearity. As a result, researchers make great effort in justifying including some 
variables in the selection equation while at the same time excluding them in the outcome 
equation, either by referring to social theories or making up stories. For example, in the 
current analysis, I use individuals’ educational aspiration in the selection equation but not 
in the outcome equation. The story here is that educational inspiration affects students’ 
choice of colleges but may not affect graduates’ earnings. However, because most 
variables in economics and social science are related with each other, it is very difficult to 
justify including some of them in one equation but not in the other. In recent empirical 
work, the geographic distance to colleges or the number of colleges near one’s high 
school are frequently used as factors affecting the selection process but not the outcome. 
These factors, after a second thought, can also be endogeous to the outcome equation. 
λˆ
λˆ
 The second practical problem is that the unconditional earnings differentials are 
very sensitive to the variables included in the selection equation. Studies using this 
technique have resulted in different conclusions. For example, in a study examining the 
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effect of a college education on earnings by Strayer (2002) finds that the effect of a 
college education is reduced when individuals’ systematic selection of college education 
is taken into account. Other studies of the effect of college quality, however, do not find 
strong evidence that the Heckman-type correction for self-selection significantly affects 
the results (Brewer et al., 1999).  
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APPENDIX B 
HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING 
 
Theory 
 Due to the multilevel nature (i.e., institutional and individual) of the factors 
shown to have effects on the outcome of interest (i.e., earnings) in the current analysis, 
econometric techniques which characterize this nature such as hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) are often recommended (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Heck & Thomas, 
2000). Data with hierarchical structures are common in a variety of disciplines.76 The 
HLM model characterizes the multilevel nature of the data by simultaneously estimating 
two sets of equations, a within-unit set and a between-unit set. Taking the current analysis 
as an example, the within-unit set estimates the relationship between individual earnings 
and individual-level variables and the between-unit set estimates the relationship between 
the coefficients estimates from the with-in set and institutional-level variables. In other 
words, multilevel modeling allows individual characteristics to explain the variation 
among individuals within each unit and institutional characteristics to explain the 
variations in the effects of individual variables on the outcome variable among 
institutions. A formal HLM model consists of following equations: 
ijijjjij XY ηββ ++= 10)ln(                                                      (B.1) 
                                                 
76 The multilevel model has other names such random effects model and mixed effect model in other fields 
of social sciences.  
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where  is the matrix of individual-level variables. Equation B.1 can be estimated for 
each institution. The regression coeffcients are further assumed to be functions of 
institutional-level variables: 
ijX
jjj Z 0001000 µγγβ ++=                                                    (B.2) 
jjj Z 1011101 µγγβ ++=                                                      (B.3) 
By substituting equations B.2 and B.3 into B.1, the full estimating equation appears as 
ijijjjijjijjij XXZXZY ηµµγγγγ ++++++= 100111000100)ln(                     (B.4) 
In equation B.4, the term ijjijj XZXZ 0111000100 γγγγ +++  is usually referred to as the 
fixed component and the term ijijjj X ηµµ ++ 10  the random component. Hence, equation 
B.4 is also referred to as a mixed effect model in econometrics. The complexity in the 
error structure and interaction terms make this model very difficult to estimate and 
intepret. As a result, in empirical research, only a very small number of the coefficients in 
equation B.1 are allowed to vary across institutions. Typically, the effect of individual 
characteristics is restricted to be the same across institutions. That is, 
101 γβ =j                                                              (B.3’) 
With assumption B3’, the full equation is simplified as 
ijjijjij XZY ηµγγγ ++++= 01000100)ln(                                  (B.4’) 
 
e 
a model with no predictor variables in order to partition the total variance in outcomes 
Estimation 
 The estimation of HLM usually consists of two steps. The first step is to estimat
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within and between colleges in the sample. The model is usually referred to as the “null 
model” or one-way ANOVA model. In statistical terms, the model appears as 
ijjijY εβ += 0)ln(                                                       (B.5) 
ijj µγβ += 000                                                         (B.6) 
The information of the variance components is used to determine whether an HLM 
analysis is necessary, with the rationale that if the proportion of between variance is 
large, then the HLM analysis is necessary.77 The result of this simple one-way ANOVA 
analysis is presented in Table B.1: The majority of variance (78%) in log earnings is 
within colleges, and between variance makes up the remaining 22%. 
Table B.1 
Variance Components for Earnings 
 Variance
Total  928.8
Amount within colleges 725.5
Amount between colleges 203.3
Proportion between colleges 21.89%
 
 After the estimation of variance components, the formal HLM model (equation 
B.4’) is estimated using the same data as in the pooled baseline model.78 Table B.2 
presents HLM estimates of the effects of the various demographic, family background,  
                                                 
77 Because the proportion of between variance is very sensitive to the number of observations in each unit, 
this rationale is problematic. I discuss this further after the estimation. 
78 The estimation is done by the MIX procedure in SAS. The actual estimation method is Restricted 
Maximum Likelihood. 
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Table B.2 
HLM Estimates for Earnings Equation (absolute v cs)alue t statisti  
CoeVariable fficient t-ratio 
  Constant 8.7110 48.75 
Institutional Characteristics   
n 
d institutions -0.1014 1.79 
hic Characteristics   
-
American 
-
0.0349 0.98 
  
e graduate -0.0166 1.13 
  
T quartile 
ajor 
1
ajor 
ajor 0.3681 10.38 
  Low-quality, private institution 0.0352 0.82 
  Middle-quality, public institution 0.0719 2.60 
  Middle-quality, private institutio 0.0950 3.18 
  High-quality, public institution 0.1728 3.36 
  High-quality, private institution 0.1601 3.80 
  Historically Black colleges an
Demograp
  Female 0.0956 6.48 
  Native 0.1056 1.09 
  Asian 0.1081 2.78 
  Black 0.0258 0.81 
  Hispanic 
Family Background 
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0056 3.60 
  First-generation colleg
Academic Background 
  Merged SAT/AC 0.0060 0.78 
  Business major 0.2685 11.00 
  Engineering m 0.4183 11.76 
  Health major 0.4263 2.33 
  Public affairs major 0.1460 3.58 
  Biological science m 0.1373 3.01 
  Math science m
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Table B.2 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
  Social science major 0.1858 6.07 
  History major -0.1220 2.18 
  Humanity major 0.1015 3.12 
  Psychology major 0.1043 2.34 
  Other major 0.1373 5.06 
Labor Market    
  Age 0.0386 4.17 
  Age squared -0.0465 3.95 
  Tenure 0.0157 3.23 
  Tenure squared -0.0024 0.10 
  Number of hours per week 0.0131 17.10 
 
 
 
Table B.3 
Comparison between the OLS and HLM Estimates (absolute value t statistics)
 OLS  HLM 
 Coeff.  t Coeff.  t
Low-quality, private institution 0.0530 1.42 0.0352 0.82
Middle-quality, public institution 0.0920 4.41 0.0719 2.60
Middle-quality, private institution 0.1066 4.61 0.0950 3.18
High-quality, public institution 0.1800 5.46 0.1728 3.36
High-quality, private institution 0.1754 4.47 0.1601 3.80
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educational background, and labor market variables on graduates’ earnings. For 
comparison purposes, the OLS estimates and HLM estimates for college quality are 
presented in Table B.3. The comparison between OLS and HLM estimates shows that the 
HLM estimates are very similar to the OLS estimates, although the point estimates are 
generally smaller and standard errors are generally larger in HLM than their counterparts 
in OLS.79
 Although recently the use of HLM has become fashionable, there are still debates 
on whether the HLM is superior to the OLS model. Admittedly, the HLM model has 
many attracting features. For a detailed discussion of those features, see Bryk and 
Raudenbush (1992) and Heck and Thomas (2000). In this dissertation, the OLS is used 
for a number of reasons. First, the OLS estimates also take the multilevel nature of the 
data into consideration. Most supporters of the HLM model advocate that only the HLM 
is capable of characterizing the multilevel data structure. The arrangement of the 
individual and institutional variables in OLS, however, also entertains the multilevel 
structure, only in a different way than that in HLM. For example, individuals within the 
same unit have different individual characteristics but same institutional characteristics.  
Second, the proportion of between variance is very sensitive to the sample size in 
each unit. In an extreme scenario where each institution only has one individual, the 
between variance and the within variance become one and the same. In typical empirical 
research in social science, the sample size of the unit is in the order of hundreds, and the 
                                                 
79 The phenomenon that the HLM estimates are usually smaller than the OLS estimates is due to the so-
called shrinkage factor in HLM estimation (James & Stein, 1961; Morris, 1983; Raudenbush, 1988). The 
relatively larger standard errors are due to the assumptions of particular error structures in HLM. 
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sample size of individual is in the order of thousands. In the current analysis, 3,965 
students are from 500 institutions, with only 8 observations for each unit on average. The 
proportion of between variance can easily be driven up by the small sample size for each 
unit (even if there is no systematic difference between units at all).  
Third, when the sample size of each unit is small, the estimation of separate 
equations (i.e., equation B.2) for each institution is highly unreliable, if not impossible. 
As a result, researchers usually exclude those institutions with less than a certain number 
of individuals (5 or 10). This type of exclusion may, in the best scenario, toss away useful 
information and, in the worst scenario, cause sample selection problems and other 
consequent problems. For example, if institutions with small numbers of observations 
happen to have individuals with certain characteristics, then excluding those institutions 
results in a sub-sample of individuals that is not representative. 
Fourth, the HLM technique puts strong assumptions on the error terms of 
regression equations. To illustrate, the full model of HLM can always be written as 
 εµβ +Λ+= XY                                                          (B.7) 
In the full model,  may include explanatory variables; in simple models such as 
equation B.4’,  is a matrix mapping individuals to institutions. That is 
Λ
Λ
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where K is the number of individuals and J the number of institutions. The error terms in 
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he trix is a square matrix with number of rows equal to number of individuals in 
s variance matrix for Y, which is very much like the Chamberlain equi-
correlated variance matrix in panel data, puts many restrictions on the error structure. To 
test a structure like this and other similar structures is beyond the scope of this study; 
however, econometricians are generally suspicious of such a restricted structure. An 
unpleasant feature of this error structure is that in statistical inference, increasing the total 
number of individuals (K) alone does not help much to reduce the variance of the 
equation B.7 are assumed to distributed as 
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estimates if the number of institution rease. This provides partial 
explanation for the relat timates in Table B.2 
than that for the OLS estimates in Table 4.2. 
s (J) does not inc
ively larger standard errors for the HLM es
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 APPENDIX C 
MEASURES OF COLLEGE QUALITY 
 
 Studies on the effect of college quality on earnings have used different measures
of college quality, such as Barron’s rating, mean SAT score, Carnegie Classification, and
tuition and fees. Yet little is known about whether the estimated effect of college quality 
is sensitive to measures of college quality. This appendix uses three additional measures 
of college quality other than Barron’s rating in the baseline model, namely mean SA
score, Carnegie Classification, and tuition and fees, to explore the sensitivity of the 
estimated effect of college quality on earnings. 
 
 
T 
se three measures are constructed from data in the Integrated Postsecondary 
he 
ear when students graduate college quality
s. The fir e qual  base
thod used in 
s (2003), I break up the co e gro ith an 
ty colleges, those between 980 and 885 
are classified as m
80
e 
distinguished in each SAT group, yielding six college types of college quality measure 
                                                
 The
Education Data System (IPEDS). The 1992-93 IPEDS data is used because that is t
y from colleges, although the measures of  are 
fairly stable over the year st set of colleg ity variables is d on the 
average SAT scores of the entering freshman class. Following the me
Thoma lleges into thre ups: Colleges w average SAT 
score higher than 980 are classified as high-quali
iddle group, and the remaining colleges with average SAT scores lower 
than 885 belong to the low-quality group.  Similar to the college quality measures 
constructed from Barron’s ratings, the privately and publicly controlled institutions ar
 
80 For a detailed discussion of these thresholds, see Thomas (2003). 
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(high-quality privates, high-quality publics, middle-quality privates, middle-quality 
publics, low-quality privates, and low-quality publics), with the reference group being 
low-quality publics. The distribution of graduates among categories of colleges is 
presented in Table C.1.81 Clearly, under this measure of college quality, more students 
d as graduates from high-quality colleges than under the measure of college 
 one-
w classified as graduates from high-qualit hile with 
bout 10% of all graduates are classified as high-quality. One 
would expect, from this fact, that the effect of college quality as measured by SAT scores 
 that as measured by Barron’s ratings. 
s Colleges of Varying Qu y Mean SA res
are classifie
quality constructed from Barron’s ratings. For example, Table C.1 shows that about
third of graduates are no y colleges, w
Barron’s ratings only a
should be smaller than
Table C.1 
Distribution of Students acros ality b T Sco  
Public institutions Privat Total e institutions 
High-quality institutions 738 (19.1%) 14.6%) 03 (33.7%)565 ( 1,3
Middle-quality institutions 1,045 (27.0%) 425 (11.0%) 1,470 (38.0%)
ow-quality institutions 795 (20.6%) 301 (7.8%) 1,096 (28.3%)
Total (100%)
L
2,578 (66.7%) 1,291 (33.3%) 3,869 
Note: The percentages may not compute due to rounding. 
 
The second measure of college quality is the 1994 Carnegie Classification. The 
Carnegie Classification is based on degree programs and research volume, both of which 
measure some dimensions of institutional quality. Students are not evenly distributed 
                                                 
81 The final sample when the SAT score is used as a quality measure is slightly smaller than the sample 
when the Barron’s rating is used because of missing values. 
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among le, different types of Carnegie institutions. Table C.2 shows that in the final samp
the largest group of students is from Comprehensive I institutions, and graduates from 
Research I institutions constitute the second largest group.82 The reference group in the 
following analysis is graduates from Liberal Arts II institutions. 
Table C.2 
Distribution of Students across Colleges of Varying Quality by Carnegie Category 
Carnegie classification N Proportion 
Research I institution 858 20.8% 
Research II institution 305 7.4% 
Doctoral I institution 265 6.4% 
Liberal Arts I institution 186 4.5% 
4,131 100% 
Doctoral II institution 333 8.1% 
Comprehensive I institution 1,585 38.4% 
Comprehensive II institution 111 2.7% 
Liberal Arts II institution 488 11.8% 
Total 
Note: Th
 
s 
                                                
e percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
The final measure of college quality is the undergraduate tuition and fees. 
Although it is a very crude measure of college quality, it does provide a direct and 
intuitive way to compare the costs and benefits of attending colleges with different level
of tuition and fees. 
 
 
institutions. 
82 The final sample when the Carnegie Classification is used as a quality measure is slightly larger than the 
sample when the Barron’s rating is used because the Carnegie Classification variable is available for more 
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Earning equations similar to the baseline model are estimated for each of the 
etermined 
by the number of institutions which have institutio ilable.  from these 
analyses are presented in Table C.3 to C.9. Table C.3 p ates for the 
e by SAT scores. As expected, the est d effects are 
g seline model whe ati e used. 
R g equal, graduate igh-qua blic 
i gs advantage over om low-quality public 
i atings (see Tab ). Similarly, 
t ates from high-quality private institutions over graduates 
f titutions is about 10% in Table C.3, and the advan s about 18% 
in Table 4.2. The effects of other types of colleges such dle-qua -
quality privates, and middle-quality privates are also sm an the c onding 
e . 
 of college quality constructed from mean SAT score is 
m ge quality measu rron’s r . Meanwhile, 
as one would expect, the cost differentials among diffe leges ar ler when the 
SAT score is used. Are the relatively small earnings differentials sufficient to cover the 
r ifferentials? To answer this ques bulate rage tuition 
a ategory of college in Table C.4. The numbers show that the 
a igh-quality colleges measured by mean S ore are lower 
than the corresponding tuition and fees at high-quality ons measured by Barron’s  
above three measures of college quality. The sample size for each equation is d
nal data ava  Results
resents the OLS estim
ffect of college quality measured imate
enerally smaller than those in the ba re Barron’s r ngs ar
esults suggest that other things bein s from h lity pu
nstitutions enjoy about a 6% earnin those fr
nstitutions; this figure is 18% when Barron’s r are used le 4.2
he earnings advantage for gradu
rom low-quality ins tage i
 as mid lity publics, low
aller th orresp
stimates in Table 4.2
It appears that the effect
uch smaller than the effect of colle red by Ba atings
rent col e smal
elatively small cost d tion, I ta  the ave
nd fees level for each c
verage tuition and fees for h AT sc
instituti
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Table C.3 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation (quality mea an SA s)sured by me T score
Variable Coe t-ratio fficient
  Constant 8.7745 52.82 
Institutional Characteristics   
e institution -
y, public institution 
, private institution 0.0793 3.16 
quality, public institution 
e institution 
ally Black colleges and institutions -
ristics   
-
ative American 0 1.58
  Asian 3.88
0.0181 0.60 
 0.0471 1.04 
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0065 3.95 
ollege graduate .0198 1.35 
1.46 
1.22 
4.33 
3.88 
.143 3.29 
gical science major 3.28 
ajor 0.3773 9.97 
  Low-quality, privat 0.0018 0.06 
  Middle-qualit 0.0457 2.31 
  Middle-quality
  High- 0.0608 2.67 
  High-quality, privat 0.1005 4.13 
  Historic 0.1426 2.98 
Demographic Characte
  Female 0.0854 5.49 
  N .1044  
0.1423  
  Black 
  Hispanic
Family Background   
  First-generation c -0
Academic Background   
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0113
  Business major 0.2871 1
  Engineering major 0.4478 1
  Health major 0.4357 1
  Public affairs major 0 2
  Biolo 0.1548
  Math science m
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Table C.3 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
  Social science major 0.1961 5.73 
  History major -0.1429 1.41 
Labor Market    
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0106 0.51 
0.0128 11.09 
N 
  Humanity major 0.1314 3.97 
  Psychology major 0.1251 3.14 
  Other major 0.1402 4.75 
  Age 0.0355 4.07 
  Age squared / 100 -0.0423 3.78 
  Tenure 0.0164 3.44 
  Number of hours per week 
3869  
2R  0.2265  
 
Average Tuition and Fees by College Quality (quality measured by mean SAT scores)
Table C.4 
Institutional Type N Tuition 
Low-quality, public institution 108 $1,519 
Low-quality, private institution 65 $5,716 
Middle-quality, public institution 80 $1,895 
Middle-quality, private institution 80 $8,130 
High-quality, private institution 106 $10,964 
Total 492  
High-quality, public institution 53 $2,128 
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 ratings. From Table C.4, the difference in tuition and fees can be easily calculated. For 
 private 
institution is $9,445 per year. The benefit different lculat king the 
coefficient in Table C.3 and evaluating it at the mean of earnings distribution. For 
e rential between low-quality public institutions and high-quality 
private institutions evaluated at the mean of the earnings distribution is $3,248 per year. 
W s for the length of college edu nd the l for career 
t ear: The benefit differe ll excee  cost 
differential. The cost-benefit analyses can be carried ou g other ries of 
c  hold. 
LS estimates for the effect of college quality measured 
by Carnegie Classification. The results show that graduates from other types of colleges 
enjoy consistent earnings advantages relative to gradua  Libera  II 
institutions, arguably the least selective institutions. However, the effects vary by college 
type greatly. For example, it appears that Research I and Doctoral II institutions confer 
t enefits to their graduates among all types of institutions. Research 
II, Doctoral II, and Comprehensive I and II institutions also provide si nt benefits 
to their graduates. Surprisingly, the Liberal Arts I institutions, arguably the most selective 
t ories, have virtually no effects on graduates’ earnings. This 
result contradicts Grubb’s (1992) findings. Using a nationally representative sample of 
high school graduate in 1972 (with 1986 earnings data), he finds that the economic effect 
o beral Arts I institution is among the highest of all Carnegie  
example, the differential between low-quality public institution and high-quality
ial can be ca ed by ta
xample, the benefit diffe
ith reasonable estimate cation a ength 
ime, the comparison is quite cl ntial we ds the
t amon catego
olleges, and similar results
Table C.5 presents the O
tes from l Arts
he largest economic b
gnifica
ype among all Carnegie categ
f graduating from a Li
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Table C.5 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation (quality measured by Carnegie category) 
Coe t-ratio Variable fficient
  Constant 8.7972 53.69 
Institutional Characteristics   
tution 
tion 
n 
stitution 
e I institution 0.0614 2.77 
rehensive II institution 
ution 
ally Black colleges and institutions -
ristics   
-
ative American 0 1.45
  Asian 3.53
-0.0081 0.27 
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0067 4.26 
0.0158 2.10 
  Business major 0.2807 11.66 
  Engi
  Research I insti 0.1043 3.96 
  Research II institu 0.0846 2.87 
  Doctoral I institutio 0.1481 4.79 
  Doctoral II in 0.0873 2.69 
  Comprehensiv
  Comp 0.0923 2.03 
  Liberal Arts I instit 0.0068 0.16 
  Historic 0.1148 2.38 
Demographic Characte
  Female 0.0927 6.16 
  N .0948  
0.1234  
  Black 
  Hispanic 0.0042 0.11 
Family Background   
  First-generation college graduate -0.0223 1.58 
Academic Background   
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 
neering major 0.4266 14.20 
  Health major 0.4267 13.95 
  Public affairs major 0.1268 3.13 
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Table C.5 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
  Biological science major 3.27 0.1510
  Math science major 0.3782 10.69 
6.19 
.1268 1.28 
4.31 
3.27 
5.04 
  
3.67 
quared / 100 . 71 3.38 
0.0179 3.89 
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0137 0.69 
  Social science major 0.2013
  History major -0
  Humanity major 0.1354
  Psychology major 0.1267
  Other major 0.1414
Labor Market  
  Age 0.0315
  Age s -0 03
  Tenure 
  Number of hours per week 0.0131 11.36 
N 4131  
2R  0.2232  
 
categories. The contradictory finding in the current analysis may be due to the relatively 
short period of time since one’s graduation. If most of graduates from Liberal Arts I 
institutions obtain post-graduate degrees, then the comparison between baccalaureate 
holders between Liberal Arts I and Liberal Arts II institutions likely underestimates the 
effect of Liberal Arts I institutions. 
Similarly, I ask the question of whether the cost differentials are worth the 
earnings differentials among institutions of Carnegie categories. Table C.6 shows that 
there exists a generally pattern of positive association between average costs and benefits.  
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Table C.6 
Average Tuition by College Quality (quality measured by Carnegie category)
Institutional Type uitionN T  
Research I institution 61 $4,957 
Research II institution 24 $3,973 
24 $6,878 
n 3 $6,176 
21 $3,936 
30 $5,711 
ts I institution 4 10,685 
ution 100 $5,092 
530
Doctoral I institution 
Doctoral II institutio 5
Comprehensive I institution 2
Comprehensive II institution 
Liberal Ar 4 $
Liberal Arts II instit
Total  
 
F , average Research I institutions charge higher tuition and han Research 
I nd the estimated effect of the former is arger than 
t  same results hold for Doctoral I and II institutions. 
More interestingly, Table C.6 shows that the average tuition and fees of Comprehensive 
II institutions is higher than that of Comprehensive I in s, and ow, 
s ated effect of Comprehensive II ons is an that of 
C I institutions. As an exception, the earnings differential between 
g I institutions and Liberal A stitution s not appear 
t to cover the differential in tuitio es.     
9 present the estimates for the effect of ality 
m  and fees (in $1,000) by types of in .7 
resents a pooled model with a dummy variable indicating types of institutional control.  
or example  fees t
I institutions (see Table C.6), a  also l
hat of the latter (see Table C.5). The
stitution  someh
urprisingly, the estim instituti larger th
omprehensive 
raduates from Liberal Arts rts II in s doe
o be sufficiently large n and fe     
Finally, Tables C.7 to C.  college qu
easured by tuition stitutional control. Table C
p
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Table C.7 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation (quality measured by tuition and fees) 
Coe t-ratio Variable fficient
  Constant 8.7297 53.65 
Institutional Characteristics 
n (in $1,000) 
ally Black colleges and institutions -
ristics   
-
ative American 0 1.53
  Asian 4.44
-0.0067 0.23 
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0060 3.88 
  Merged S
  Business major 0.2746 11.33 
  Biological science major 0.1372 2.89 
  Humanity major 0.1156 3.63 
  
  Tuitio 0.0179 4.15 
  Private institution -0.0951 2.95 
  Historic 0.1130 2.29 
Demographic Characte
  Female 0.0977 6.53 
  N .1075  
0.1384  
  Black 
  Hispanic 0.0079 0.20 
Family Background   
  First-generation college graduate -0.0123 0.90 
Academic Background   
AT/ACT quartile 0.0126 1.76 
  Engineering major 0.4371 14.76 
  Health major 0.4578 15.64 
  Public affairs major 0.1226 3.05 
  Math science major 0.3708 10.78 
  Social science major 0.1943 5.90 
  History major -0.1061 1.11 
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Table C.7 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
  Psychology major 0.1288 3.26 
  Other major 0.1553 5.61 
rket   
-0.0455 4.15 
0.0130 11.81 
Labor Ma  
  Age 0.0379 4.42 
  Age squared / 100 
  Tenure 0.0176 3.87 
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0145 0.75 
  Number of hours per week 
N 4187  
2R  0.2286  
 
R  that tuition and fees are positively relate uates’ e s. Other 
things being equal, graduating from private institutions is associated with significant 
earnings disadvantages. This finding reflects the fact that at 
q ns usually charge higher tuition and fees than public institutions. 
7, however, do not reveal potential diffe atterns of the 
effect of college quality (as measured by tuition and fees) between private and public 
institutions. It is clear from Tables 4.3 and C.4, that the  and fee ged at private 
institutions are generally more dispersed than at public institutions. On ld 
reasonably expect that the effect of college quality as m
be larger at private institutions than at public institution st this h esis, separate 
r ted for private and public institutions  results own in 
Tables C.8 and C.9. For private institutions (see Table C.8), a $1,000 increase in tuition 
esults show d to grad arning
equivalent levels of college 
uality, private institutio
The results in Table C. rent p
 tuition s char
e wou
easured by tuition and fees should 
s. To te ypoth
egressions are fit , and the  are sh
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Table C.8 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation (quality measured by tuition and fees), Private 
Institutions
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
  Constant 38.3213 5.76 
Institutional Characteristics   
in $1,000) 
leges and institutions 
   
male -0 4.49
  Native American - 2.34
0.1626 2.69 
  Black 0.0236 0.49 
  First-generation college graduate 0.0294 1.16 
  Engineering major 0.4334 7.01 
5 
ajor 0.1694 2.32 
  Math science major 0.3327 5.11 
  Social science major 0.1122 1.69 
  History major 0.0011 0.02 
  Humanity major 0.0477 0.79 
  Tuition ( 0.0236 4.96 
  Historically Black col -0.2634 3.44 
Demographic Characteristics
  Fe .1117  
0.3445  
  Asian 
  Hispanic -0.0179 0.30 
Family Background   
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0055 2.86 
Academic Background   
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0070 0.55 
  Business major 0.2739 6.27 
  Health major 0.4953 9.57 
  Public affairs major 0.1068 1.5
  Biological science m
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Table C.8 – Continued 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
  Psychology major 0.0599 0.92 
  Other major 0.1831 3.57 
rket   
-0.0579 4.47 
-
0.0120 6.38 
Labor Ma  
  Age 0.0517 4.65 
  Age squared / 100 
  Tenure 0.0299 4.77 
  Tenure squared /100 0.0651 2.65 
  Number of hours per week 
N 1387  
2R  0.2755  
 
and fees is associated with about a 2.4% increase in graduates’ earnings, which in dollar 
t aluated at the mean of the log earnings. For public institutions (see 
Table C.9), the effect is lower: A $1,000 increase in tuition and fees is associated with 
about a 1.8% increase in graduates’ earnings, which in dollar terms is about $570 
e g earnings. For both private and public institutions, 
however, the benefit is large enough to cover the tuition and fees differentials. The 
insignificance of the estimated effect of tuition and fees at public institutions suggests 
t a good measure for public institution
 
erms is about $733 ev
valuated at the mean of the lo
hat tuition and fees might not be s. 
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Table C.9 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equation (quality measured by tuition and fees), Public 
Institutions 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
  Constant 38.6435 2.57 
Institutional Characteristics   
in $1,000) 
leges and institutions 
   
male -0 4.98
  Native American 3.03 
  Asian 0.1257 3.52 
  Black -0.0282 0.77 
0.0202 0.40 
Family Background   
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0074 2.93 
  First-generation college graduate -0.0295 1.81 
Academic Background   
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0143 1.64 
  Business major 0.2634 9.01 
  Engineering major 0.4367 12.89 
  Health major 0.4426 12.56 
  Public affairs major 0.1350 2.69 
  Biological science major 0.1237 2.03 
  Math science major 0.3765 9.38 
  Social science major 0.2185 5.83 
  History major -0.1954 1.29 
  Humanity major 0.1494 4.17 
  Tuition ( 0.0184 1.66 
  Historically Black col 0.0173 0.28 
Demographic Characteristics
  Fe .0931  
0.1902
  Hispanic 
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Table C.9 – Continued 
Variable io Coefficient t-rat
  Psychology major 0.1445 2.94 
  Other major 0.1409 4.29 
Labor
  Tenure 0.0110 1.71 
 Market    
  Age 0.0448 3.08 
  Age squared / 100 -0.0598 3.05 
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0026 0.08 
  Number of hours per week 0.0135 9.99 
N 2800  
2R  0.2228  
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APPENDIX D 
COLLEGE QUALITY AND EARNINGS GROWTH 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to examine the rate of wage growth attributable to 
college quality that is experienced by baccalaureate recipients four years after graduation. 
Most work on economic returns has focused on the modest returns to college quality at 
discrete points in time (usually one to five years after graduation), and very little is 
known owth 
s 
n of 
nowledge of the relationship between college quality and earnings trajectories is 
vital to the understanding of decisions students and their families make about investing in 
higher 4; 
e 
knowledge about these effects over time. What may look like a small return at one period 
 about how institutional factors such as college quality influence the wage gr
of college graduates in the early stages of their careers. This analysis extends previou
research in this area by focusing not only on comparative earnings of graduates from 
different types of colleges but, more importantly, providing a detailed examinatio
divergence in the earnings of graduates from colleges of different quality across a four-
year window shortly after graduation.  
K
education. To the degree that a human capital framework (e.g., Becker, 196
Schultz, 1961) can guide my inquiries in this area, we would expect individuals to b
willing to bear a greater economic burden to attend colleges that are believed to 
subsequently confer greater labor market rewards. Although the corpus of work 
examining returns to college quality supports this general belief, most studies have been 
limited to making statements about these returns at discrete points in time, with little 
 
  
 
 
252
may grow exponentially shortly thereafter. While I cannot, through the analysis in this
paper, make statements about growth over a long period, I can non
 
etheless speak to 
significant changes at two very important tim
their families often make great financial sacrifices to atten  
e knowledge about the 
returns to college at different point in graduates’ lives.  
This analysis addresses earnings at two points in time and allows for direct 
comparisons of these by academic major, type of institution, and levels of academic 
performance. This examination of earnings trajectories related to students’ choices of 
institution and major advances the understanding of the economic returns to the 
baccalaureate degree by providing a more complete picture of these returns and placing 
 perspective.  
ds 
 
 in the models. In other 
words, is there a significant change in the salary determina
combination of effects of independent variables n how m
e periods in the early career. Students and 
d higher prestige institutions—
sacrifices often predicated on the belief that such an “investment” will pay off in the post-
graduation labor market. This highlights the importance of accurat
them in a more accurate and longer-term
 
Metho
The main goal is to determine if there exist substantively and statistically 
significant differences in the economic return to various factors, especially college 
quality, across two points in time, net of other factors included
tion structure (i.e., the 
 o uch one earns at any given 
point in time) across the two points in time? If so, to what degree does college quality 
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play a role among the factors that initiated the structural change? In effect, I estima
separate models of earnings determination at two points in time.  
 97979797 iii XY
te 
εβ +=                                         
 94949494 iii XY
(D.1) 
εβ +=                                  (D.2)
where 97iY  and 94iY  represent log annual salary in 1997 (roughly four years after 
graduation) and in 1994 (roughly one year after graduation) respectively, and 97iX  and 
94iX  represent vectors of exoge
        
nous variables capturing graduates’ demographic 
ily background, academic experiences, labor ma
e
characteristics, fam rket experiences, and 
colleg  characteristics at these two points in time respectively. After the two models are 
estimated separately, I have the estimated 97β , the estimated , and their estimated 
97
94β
variance terms. Assuming the error terms are not correlated between the two models, it is 
possible to construct the difference between these two estimates (β - 94β ) and the 
estimated variance term ( )9497 ββ VarAsyEstVarAsyEst + ). Based on these estimates, 
we can test whether each independent variable has a different effect on earnings betwe
1994 and 1997.      
Although the above method is appealing, it makes a strong assumption on the 
error terms because the error terms in Model 1 and Model 2 are likely to be correla
The easiest way to understand this is to rew
ˆ(..)ˆ(..
en 
ted. 
rite the models as 
 97979797 iiii XY µθβ ++=                                           (D.3) 
 94949494 iiii XY µθβ ++=                                            (D.4) 
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Equations D.3 and D.4 assume that the error terms in equation D.1 and D.2 are composed 
of two components: an individual specifi variant term, c time-in iθ , and time-variant 
terms, 97iµ  and 94iµ . Clearly, the existence of time-invariant component creates the 
correlation between the error terms in Equations D.1 and D.2. Ignoring this correlation 
results in two immediate consequences to the analyses. First, the OLS estimation of 
Equations D.1 and D.2 is inefficient. Second, the variance of 97β - 94β  is incorrect 
97  and because the covariance between β 94β  is left out. The appropriate estimating 
strategy would be GLS to incorporate the error strucutre into the analysis.83 Effectively, I 
estimate the following system of equations 
⎣⎦⎣⎦⎣⎦⎣ 94949494 iii
) 
The sample of students used in the study consists of two overlapping subsets. The 
first subset is based on the BB:93/94 sample (the first BB follow-up one to two years 
after graduation) students who (1) received bachelor’s degrees during the period between 
July 1992 and June 1993; (2) were working full-time, as of April 1994, earning between 
$1,000 and $500,000 per year; (3) were not enrolled in school full-time and had valid 
GPA data; and (4) had institutional-level data available. This results in a sample of 4,961 
graduates from 512 colleges. The second subset of students is based on the BB:93/97 
sample (the second BB follow-up four to five years after graduation). Using the exact 
criteria as described for the first subset, the second subset is limited to 3,965 students 
                                                
 ⎥⎤⎢⎡+⎥⎤⎢⎡⎥⎤⎢⎡=⎥⎤⎢⎡ 97979797 0
0 iii
X
X
Y
Y
ε
ε
β
β
                            (D.5
⎦
 
83 For a detailed discussion of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), see Greene (1999). 
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from 500 institutions. The union of these tw ples, 2,990 tes fro  4
c  used for the current analysis
 
ts 
 D .2 ti y s th
error term t correlated, the differences in th
e iabl  are compu e r of rc
a e the Seemingly Unrelated Regression to estimate 
Equation D.  are pr
e ariance structure rejects the tio th er n at
I  in interpreting the 8 he fi ai
by GLS can be observed from compar su he tab
stimated effect of college n 4 s n tw
years after graduation) confirms Thom (2000a) earlier findings. Net of all other 
v  c al s ou i
s  relative to graduates from low-quality public in tions, 
g blic colleges enjoy h ar d  T
earnings adv out 7% for gradua stitu
r from low-quality publi e a -q
                                              
o sam gradua m 88 
olleges, is .  
Resul
As a starting point, Equations .1 and D  are es mated b OLS. A suming e 
s between these two equations are no e 
stimated effect of independent var es errors ted. Th esults  this exe ise 
re reported in Table D.1. I then us
5. The results of this exercise esented in Table D.2. Because the 
stimated v  assump n that e error t ms are ot correl ed, 
 focus on Table D.2  estimated effects. 4 Nonet less, ef ciency g ns 
ing the re lts in t se two les.   
The e quality i the 199  earning equatio  (one to o 
as’ 
ariables in the model, the effects of ollege qu ity are mall alth gh stat stically 
ignificant. For example, stitu
raduates from high-quality pu  a roug ly 9% e nings a vantage. his 
antage is ab tes from high-quality public in tions 
elative to those c colleg s. Gradu ting from middle uality  
   
84 The likelihood ration statistic 555ˆlogˆlog
1
2 =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Σ−= ∑
=
M
i
iLR T σλ  with one degree of freedom, 
where  is the estimated variance structure. 
 
Σˆ
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Table D.1 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equations and 199in 1994 in 7 
 1997 4 n199  Differe ces 
Variable Coeff. T Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 8.6294 4 40.75  8.1618 6.99  0.4676 1.71
Institutional Characteristics       
e institution -
y, public institution 
, private institution 0.1214 4.48 0.0665 2.71 1.50
quality, public institution 
e institution 
ally black colleges and 
-
      
male -0 6.05 -0 3.63 -0.0497 2.15
  Native American 1.72 1.11 0.0352 0.27
  Asian 0.1036 2.76  0.0550 1.40  0.0486 0.89
  Black -0.0392 1.12  0.0396 1.15  -0.0788 1.60
  Hispanic 0.0484 1.03  0.0973 2.74  -0.0489 0.83
Family Background         
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0064 3.63  0.0059 3.69  0.0005 0.19
  First generation college graduate -0.0406 2.47  -0.0037 0.24  -0.0368 1.65
Academic Background         
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0047 0.55  0.0214 2.74  -0.0166 1.43
  Business major 0.2819 10.01  0.2048 7.91  0.0771 2.02
  Engineering major 0.4246 12.11  0.4010 10.94  0.0236 0.47
  Health major 0.4441 12.59  0.4395 11.91  0.0046 0.09
  Public affair major 0.1379 2.84  0.1235 2.82  0.0144 0.22
  
  Low-quality, privat 0.0507 1.17  0.0020 0.05  0.0526 0.94
  Middle-qualit 0.1069 4.29  0.0471 2.20  0.0598 1.82
  Middle-quality   0.0549
  High- 0.1972 5.21  0.0889 2.37  0.1083 2.03
  High-quality, privat 0.2017 4.70  0.0712 2.04  0.1306 2.36
  Historic
institutions -0.1168 1.95  -0.1025 1.93  0.0142 0.18
Demographic Characteristics    
  Fe .1050  .0553  
0.1449  0.1097  
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Table D.1 – Continued 
1994  Differences  1997 
Variable ff. T Coeff. t  tCoe Coeff. 
  Biological science major 1.10  1.49 - 0.130.0656 0.0761  0.0105
  Math science major   4
0.2173 5.76  0.0919 2.79  0.1254 2.50
-   6
  9
  6
  2
      
0.0461 3.99  0.0448 4.53  0.0014 0.09
d / 100   4
0.0145 2.78  0.0323 5.46  2.27
quared /100   8
er week   4
    
0.4137 9.90 0.2596 6.90 0.1540 2.7
  Social science major  
  History major 0.2274 1.72 -0.0137 0.22 -0.2137 1.4
  Humanity major 0.1382 3.69 0.0618 1.77 0.0764 1.4
  Psychology major 0.1142 2.60 0.0343 0.75 0.0799 1.2
  Other major 0.1444 4.39 0.0999 3.46 0.0445 1.0
Labor Market    
  Age 
  Age square -0.0548 3.63 -0.0458 3.34 -0.0090 0.4
  Tenure  -0.0179
  Tenure s -0.0059 0.27 -0.0570 1.93 0.0511 1.3
  Number of hours p 0.0116 9.12 0.0154 17.73 -0.0038 2.4
N 2990 2990
2R  0.2375     0.2925
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Table D.2 
SUR estimates for Earnings Equations in 1994 and in 1997 
19     97 1994 Differences 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 8.6744 39.93  8.2379 47.90  0.4366 1.94
Institutional Characteristics      
rivate institution 
ublic institution 
vate institution 
 public institution 
rivate institution 0.2043 5.35 0.0723 2.08 0.1320
rically black colleges and 
phic Characteristics     
- -
sian 0 2.34 0 1.36 0.0474 1.02
-0 1.05 0 1.04 -0.0754 1.85
0.0445 1.15  0.0929 2.63  -0.0483 1.15
Family Background         
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0066 3.74  0.0060 3.75  0.0006 0.30
  First generation college graduate -0.0408 2.45  -0.0042 0.28  -0.0366 2.03
Academic Background         
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0039 0.46  0.0206 2.67  -0.0167 1.82
  Business major 0.2845 10.12  0.2070 8.05  0.0775 2.54
  Engineering major 0.4284 10.70  0.4011 11.00  0.0273 0.63
  Health major 0.4430 11.00  0.4374 11.92  0.0057 0.13
  Public affair major 0.1377 2.89  0.1205 2.77  0.0172 0.33
   
  Low-quality, p 0.0528 1.35  -0.0010 0.03  0.0537 1.26
  Middle-quality, p 0.1059 4.53  0.0468 2.20  0.0591 2.34
  Middle-quality, pri 0.1227 4.58  0.0661 2.71  0.0566 1.95
  High-quality, 0.1976 4.82  0.0911 2.44  0.1066 2.40
  High-quality, p   3.19
  Histo
institutions -0.1159 2.00  -0.1033 1.96  -0.0126 0.20
Demogra     
  Female 0.1099 6.63  -0.0613 4.05  0.0486 2.69
  Native American 0.1461 1.36  0.1112 1.13  0.0349 0.30
  A .1005  .0531  
  Black .0397  .0357  
  Hispanic 
 
 
  
 
 
259
Table D.2 – Continued 
 1997  1994  Differences 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Biological science major 0.0676 1.21  0.0775 1.53  -0.0099 0.16
  Math science m 3.50
5
2.92
  Humanity major 0.1377 3.62  0.0628 1.81  0.0749 1.81
1.50
  Age 0.0478 4.17  0.0450 4.58  0.0029 0.24
0.64
45
7
  Number of hours per week 0.0101 12.10  0.0136 16.83  -0.0035 3.21
ajor 0.4149 10.12  0.2594 6.93  0.1556
  Social science major 0.2186 6.10  0.0925 2.83  0.1262 3.2
  History major -0.2322 3.37  -0.0144 0.23  -0.2178
  Psychology major 0.1131 2.28  0.0325 0.72  0.0806
  Other major 0.1467 4.66  0.1012 3.52  0.0455 1.33
Labor Market          
  Age squared / 100 -0.0563 3.81  -0.0459 3.38  -0.0104
  Tenure 0.0096 1.92  0.0340 6.14  -0.0243 3.
  Tenure squared /100 0.0059 0.25  -0.0681 2.46  0.0740 2.1
N 2990   2990   
F statistic 11.61   22.97   
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colleges provides even smaller earnings advantages. It appears that graduating from hig
quality colleges does not yield huge earnings advantages immediately after college 
graduation. 
Although the economic returns to college quality are small immediately after 
graduation, differences do emerge several years later. The results from Table D.2 show 
that graduates from high-quality public and private colleges enjoy more than 20% 
earnings advantage relative to t
h-
hose graduates from public low-quality colleges (log 
coeffic lleges 
ality 
 
cant 
ollege quality occurred among graduates from high-quality 
public  
e 
ients of 0.1976 and 0.2043 respectively). Graduating from middle-quality co
also shows considerable earnings advantages in 1997 earnings. For example, the relative 
earnings advantages of graduates from middle-quality colleges over those from low-
quality public colleges is about 11-12% in 1997, while this advantage is only 5-6% in 
1994. Interestingly, the estimated effect of low-quality colleges relative to low-qu
public colleges is negative in 1994 and positive in 1997, although both are insignificant.  
Testing the hypothesis that there are no differences in returns to sector and
selectivity between 1994 and 1997, the last column of Table D.2 suggests that signifi
wage growth attributable to c
and private institutions. For example, the estimated effect of high-quality private
institutions is 0.0723 in 1994 and 0.2043 in 1997, representing a 0.1320 increase in th
estimated effect in 1997. Put in another way,  the wage gap between graduates from high-
quality private college and those from low-quality public institutions has almost tripled in 
1997 than in 1994 (a 20% gap versus a 7% gap). Significance test suggests that this 
increase in the wage gap is statistically significant with a t value of 3.19. Similarly, the 
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wage gap between graduates from high-quality and low-quality public institutions ha
increased from about 9% to 20%, suggesting that the wage gap has more than doubl
between 1994 and 1997. The estimated effects of middle-quality institution
increased more than 5 percentage points in 1997 compared with 1994. So while Thoma
(2003) showed that, on averag
s 
ed 
s have also 
s 
e, graduates from all types of colleges grow significantly 
betwee
led in 
er of 
4 and 11% in 1997. The 
signific
g 
n these two time periods, those graduates from highly selective private institutions 
increased their earnings most. 
Thus distinct pictures emerge when examining returns to college quality at 
different post-graduation time periods. Other, non-college differences are also revea
Table D.2. The results point to the changing nature of returns associated with a numb
individual level characteristics. These individual level changes include widening wage 
gap between male and female graduates and increasing earnings penalty for first-
generation graduates. College graduates in the field of business, math science, and social 
science have enjoyed increasing return relatively to education major. In contrast, 
graduates from history majors are lagged further behind. A brief discussion of these 
findings is provided below. 
Demographic variables have strong effects on earnings in both 1994 and 1997. 
Race and gender have significant impacts on earnings during at least one of the time 
periods under consideration. Consistent with earlier findings, women are experiencing a 
consistent and significant earnings penalty, with about 6% in 199
ance test for the difference between these two estimated effects suggests that the 
gender gap in earnings is increasing over the time period considered.  Other things bein
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equal, there does not seem to have large earnings gap among racial groups, with the 
except that Hispanics and Asians enjoy a slight earnings premium on average. The 
incomes of Blacks, net of all other variables in the model, are statistically 
indistinguishable from those of whites. None of these effects are found to have shifte
across the two time periods.  
Family background is also shown to have a significant impact on earnings in b
1994 and 1997. As suggested by the bulk of research examining the relationship betwee
earnings and family background, family background variables have strong effects on 
income. More interestingly, two family background variables in the models reveal 
different patterns in their effect on income over time. F
d 
oth 
n 
amily income has strong and 
signific
 
s. A 
 
he 
 
ificant 
ant impact on income in both 1994 and 1997, while the last column of Table D.2 
detects no significant change of the effect between these two points in time. It seems that
family income, like racial variables, has quite consistent effects on earning over year
second family background variable in the model, capturing family educational capital in
terms of first generation college graduate status, warrants more attention. While being a 
first generation college graduate had little effect on earnings in 1994, these same 
graduates were shown to be experiencing a significant earning disadvantage by 1997. T
last column also detected a significant change in its effect on earnings. Whether first 
generation college graduates will close the salary gap with others or they will fall further
behind is another interesting research question for future study.  
Educational experiences have important impacts on earnings at both time periods. 
Graduates from fields in business, math/science, and social sciences enjoy sign
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increas
wth 
 
ajors 
er graduates from most other fields 
while the earnings trajectory emerging over time is relatively flat. Thus we see distinct 
earnings trajectories beginning to emerge among graduates across different academic 
majors. Focusing on either point in time would have disguised this important dynamics of 
the effect of college major in earnings determination.  
Consistent with the large literature in labor economics, earnings are found to be a 
concave function of both age and tenure in most cases. From human capital perspective, 
this could largely be explained by the accumulation and depreciation of general and 
specific human capital. The number of hours worked per week has a significant impact 
on earnings in both time periods but this has much less of an impact in 1997 than it does 
in 1994. This is somewhat intuitive as the number of hours worked per week has a larger 
impact in determining earnings at the beginning of one’s career than at later points in 
time after the graduate has been able to actually demonstrate the value of more important 
characteristics such as productivity. In essence, the valuation of a worker’s contribution 
can be based more on the employer’s perception of quality rather than quantity of hours 
worked alone. It is therefore not surprising that this effect starts to wane in the later time 
period. Similarly, tenure in the position is valued more in 1994 than in 1997.  
es in their net advantage over peers graduating from education related majors. 
These majors start out with large earnings premium and continue to enjoy high gro
momentum. In contrast, history majors start with similar earnings with education majors
but are lagged behind after 4-5 years. Also interesting are those majors displaying a 
constant earnings advantage. These include graduates from health and engineering m
who start out with largest earnings advantages ov
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The findings serve to demonst ource of differences in findings 
informing earnings returns to college qu esults suggest that some of the 
controversy about the effect of college quality may be an artifact of the post-graduation 
s on which different studies have focused.  It is entirely possible that college 
y career whereas its 
strong effects eventually emerge over the years. 
rate the partial s
ality. The r
time period
quality does not have an important effect on earnings in the earl
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APPENDIX E 
TABLES
 
T
O ings Equations (full mo Ge
 
able E.1 
LS Estimates for Earn del) by nder 
 Female  le Ma
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t
  Constant 8.8028 4 24.82 8.2197 4.32
Institutional Characteristics      
private institution 
, public institution 0.0519 2.28 0.1317 3.67
le-quality, private institution 
 institution 
ality, private institution 
l. and inst. -
      
ative American 0 1.03 0 1.48
  Asian 3.49 1.49
k 0.0339 1.11 -0.0848 1.35
0.0218 0.44 0.0651 1.00
     
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0059 2.56 0.0052 2.41
  First generation college graduate -0.0160 0.83 -0.0294 1.35
Academic Background      
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0093 0.96 0.0041 0.34
  Business major 0.2016 7.06 0.4181 7.97
  Engineering major 0.5203 12.88 0.5352 9.91
  Health major 0.4204 12.68 0.4896 6.85
  Low-quality, 0.0363 0.89 0.0715 1.07
  Middle-quality
  Midd 0.0734 2.92 0.1510 3.70
  High-quality, public 0.1678 4.65 0.1779 3.19
  High-qu 0.1612 3.65 0.2039 3.15
  Historically black col -0.1489 3.14 0.0417 0.36
Demographic Characteristics
  N .0954 .1260 
0.2055 0.0678 
  Blac
  Hispanic 
Family Background 
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Table E.1 – Continued 
 Male  Female 
Variable t Coeff. tCoeff.
  Public affair major 1.6 0. 4.060.0767 4 3056 
  Biological science major 0 2
0.2592 5.47 8.59
0 5.2
-0 0.8
0 3.5
0 2.8
0 5.1
    
0.0286 2.90 3.17
red / 100 - 2.9
0.0198 3.08 1.60
0 0.4
7.5
2128 1837 
0.1511 2.29 .2101 .86
  Math science major 0.5467 
  Social science major 0.1181 3.10 .3385 9
  History major 0.0173 0.30 .1351 8
  Humanity major 0.0861 2.26 .2247 2
  Psychology major 0.0803 1.88 .2423 3
  Other major 0.0831 2.52 .2979 0
Labor Market   
  Age 0.0603 
  Age squa -0.0352 2.90 0.0765 3
  Tenure 0.0116 
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0176 0.57 .0133 4
  Number of hours per week 0.0137 8.71 0.0126 5
N   
2R  0.2089   0.2013 
N
1 ds to Table 4.5 in Chapter Four. 
2 ed for heteroscedasticity. 
3 cluded.  
ote:  
. Table E.1 correspon
. Standard errors are correct
. Absolute value t statistics in
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Table E.2 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equations (full m eodel) by Rac  
hite  ite  Non-w Wh
Variable Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 8.6450 1 48.36  8.7344 3.96
Institutional Characteristics 
quality, private institution -
lic institution 
quality, private institution 
nstitution 
tion 
istorically black coll. and inst. -0.1 2.17  0 1.08
Demographic Characteristics     
.0882 1.75  -0.0974 5.83
    
mily income (in $10,000) 0.0155 1.83  0.0052 3.28
  First generation college graduate 0.0173 0.31  -0.0306 2.02
Academic Background      
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0452 1.56  0.0043 0.53
  Business major 0.1561 1.31  0.2967 11.88
  Engineering major 0.1464 0.83  0.4732 15.80
  Health major 0.3895 2.67  0.4470 14.56
  Public affair major -0.0996 0.72  0.2004 4.84
  Biological science major 0.1953 1.34  0.1458 2.85
  Math science major 0.3658 2.84  0.3824 9.56
  Social science major 0.1428 1.10  0.2098 5.97
  History major 0.0367 0.21  -0.1635 1.56
  Humanity major 0.0733 0.59  0.1323 3.90
     
  Low- 0.0813 0.97  0.1242 2.91
  Middle-quality, pub 0.0527 0.84  0.1028 4.66
  Middle- 0.0441 0.64  0.1198 4.86
  High-quality, public i 0.2639 2.18  0.1999 5.62
  High-quality, private institu 0.3585 2.63  0.1610 3.86
  H 196 .1503 
 
  Female -0
Family Background  
  Fa
 
 
  
 
 
268
Table E.2 – Continued 
White  Non-white  
Variable Coeff. tCoeff. t  
  Psychology major 211 0  8 3.150.1 .87 0.12 3 
  Other major 0.1578 1
     
3 1  
3 1  
1 1  
1 0  
1 3  
4  
.23  0.1568 5.38
Labor Market  
  Age 0.0 10 .57 0.0366 3.46
  Age squared / 100 -0.0 96 .74 -0.0437 3.16
  Tenure 0.0 74 .40 0.0171 3.29
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0 63 .31 -0.0099 0.44
  Number of hours per week 0.0 70 .57 0.0125 10.04
N 45  3376 
2R  0.2478   0.2304 
N
1 orresponds to Table 4.7 in Chapte
2 rrected for heteroscedast
3 tics included.  
 
ote:  
. Table E.2 c r Four. 
. Standard errors are co
. Absolute value t statis
icity. 
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Table E.3 
O S Estimates for Earnings Equations (f  FamL ull model) by ily Income 
 Bottom 1/3 Middle 1/3 /3  Top 1
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 8.7323 2 3 14.06 8.5020 5.91  8.9962 7.33
Institutional Characteristics       
e institution -
y, public institution 
, private institution 0.0316 0.86 0.1583 4.30 0.0833 1.77
quality, public institution 
e institution 
ally black coll. and inst. - - -
ristics      
- - -
ative American 0 2.14 0 0.63 0 1.11
  Asian 2.42 1.49 3.27
  Black 0.0870 2.14 -0.1106 2.16  0.0267 0.31
  Hispanic 0.0174 0.25 0.0652 1.14  0.0475 0.55
Family Background        
  First generation college graduate -0.0806 3.22 0.0055 0.22  -0.0055 0.21
Academic Background        
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0140 0.92 -0.0020 0.15  0.0146 1.24
  Business major 0.2510 5.45 0.2900 7.16  0.2450 6.15
  Engineering major 0.4855 8.85 0.3863 7.62  0.4252 7.95
  Health major 0.4323 7.48 0.4267 8.33  0.4304 9.22
  Public affair major 0.1366 1.93 0.1651 2.55  0.2342 3.61
  Biological science major 0.2221 2.39 0.0135 0.20  0.1876 2.69
  Math science major 0.3626 6.34 0.3764 5.27  0.4114 6.64
 
  Low-quality, privat 0.1271 2.46 0.0925 1.59  0.1960 2.28
  Middle-qualit 0.0375 1.19 0.1188 3.70  0.0887 2.08
  Middle-quality  
  High- 0.1214 2.33 0.2431 3.44  0.1451 2.78
  High-quality, privat 0.1163 1.57 0.3544 5.71  0.1240 1.95
  Historic 0.1767 2.84 0.0273 0.33  0.0631 0.55
Demographic Characte   
  Female 0.0823 2.82 0.0756 2.95  0.1146 4.48
  N .1134 .1143  .1438
0.1319 0.1091  0.1915
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Table E.3 - Continued 
 Botto Middle 1/3 1/3 m 1/3  Top 
Variable Coeff C ff. eff. t. t oe t  Co
  Social science major 0.206 0 2.1 334 77 3.60 0.134 8  0.2 4.5
  History major 0.2273 2.80 -0.5621 .04  0.0543 0.49
0.196 4 1. 798 4
0.17 9 0. 448 3
0.19 6 3. 996 1
   
0.04 5 3. 284 9
-0.064 2 2.6 365 1
.0257 2.30 0.0103 .67  0.0284 2.79
quared /100 -0.20 7 0. 651 2
er week .0105 5.36 0.0170 .56  0.0115 6.21
130 3  314
3
  Humanity major 8 3.46 0.082 37  0.0 1.5
  Psychology major 30 2.16 0.043 65  0.1 2.5
  Other major 64 3.54 0.153 19  0.0 2.3
Labor Market      
  Age 73 2.42 0.037 24  0.0 0.9
  Age squared / 100 8 2.47 -0.038 5  -0.0 1.0
  Tenure 0 1
  Tenure s 97 2.56 -0.001 07  -0.0 1.3
  Number of hours p 0 7
N 9  132  1
2R  0.21 6  17470  0.318  0.2
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Table E.3 - Continued 
 Top 10%  Top 5% 
Variable Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 9.2332 8.35  5.8759 2.21
Institutional Characteristics     
private institution -
, public institution -0.0361 0.57 -0.0887 0.93
le-quality, private institution - -
 institution 
ality, private institution - -
l. and inst. 
     
male -0.0 1.71 -0.1 2.16
  Native American   
n 0.2136 2.39  0.0239 0.24
1.92  -0.2076 1.74
-0.2058 1.79  -0.0513 0.37
     
  First generation college graduate -0.0601 0.97  -0.0754 0.72
Academic Background      
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile -0.0141 0.64  -0.0182 0.60
  Business major 0.2717 3.17  0.2575 1.79
  Engineering major 0.4300 3.57  0.5301 2.95
  Health major 0.3074 3.29  0.1382 0.95
  Public affair major 0.1334 1.13  0.3844 1.10
  Biological science major 0.1050 0.82  0.1504 0.75
  Math science major 0.2751 1.93  0.2351 1.04
  Social science major 0.2200 2.09  0.1161 0.73
  History major 0.1424 0.85  0.2072 0.75
 
  Low-quality, 0.0301 0.20  0.0675 0.22
  Middle-quality  
  Midd 0.1025 1.44  0.1062 0.98
  High-quality, public -0.0254 0.30  -0.0457 0.35
  High-qu 0.0386 0.36  0.0961 0.67
  Historically black col 0.6276 2.59  0.5543 3.04
Demographic Characteristics  
  Fe 757  477 
   
  Asia
  Black -0.4198
  Hispanic 
Family Background 
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 Continued 
p 5% 
Table E.3 -
 Top 10%  To
Variable Coeff.  t Coeff. t
  Humanity major 1600 5 1.570. 1.62  0.2 62 
  Psychology major 21 1.
0.0870 0.87  0.0552 .26
 
.0 20 1.
.0 2 1.
.0 10 0.
.4 90 0.
.0 01 3.
421    
0.2379 2.28  0. 22 28
  Other major 0
Labor Market      
  Age 0 116 0.19  0. 93 31
  Age squared / 100 -0 015 0.02  -0. 772 23
  Tenure 0 677 2.60  0. 24 96
  Tenure squared /100 -0 375 2.18  -0. 20 38
  Number of hours per week 0 148 4.91  0. 67 53
N 207 
2R  0.2  3338  0. 059  
N
1  to Table 4.8 in Chapte
2  errors are corrected for heteroscedas
3  value t statistics included.  
 
 
ote:  
. Table E.3 corresponds r Four. 
. Standard
. Absolute
ticity. 
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Table E.4 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equations  Mother’s Educati(full model) by on 
 Less than BA  A d degBA  dvance .
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 8.7354 4 12.93 9.1781 7.99  8.0827 6.05
Institutional Characteristics       
e institution 
y, public institution 
, private institution 0.1128 3.71 0.1308 2.57 0.03
quality, public institution 
e institution 
ally black coll. and inst. - -
ristics     
- - -
ative American 0 1.14 0.0 1.37 0.2 1.95
  Asian 2.50 0.50 2.21
0.16 0.2251 1.90  -0.1033 0.95
5 0.19 0.1502 1.00  -0.0775 0.24
       
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0123 4.99 0.0043 1.23  0.0026 0.58
Academic Background        
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0056 0.54 0.0116 0.69  0.0119 0.48
  Business major 0.2651 8.32 0.1358 2.07  0.2766 3.37
  Engineering major 0.4173 10.80 0.3412 4.03  0.5999 4.77
  Health major 0.4844 12.51 0.2450 2.98  0.4974 5.14
  Public affair major 0.1387 2.62 0.1490 1.53  0.2379 1.65
  Biological science major 0.1926 2.91 -0.0182 0.20  0.2409 1.67
  Math science major 0.3694 7.85 0.2983 2.86  0.3910 3.70
 
  Low-quality, privat 0.0642 1.36 0.1032 0.71  0.0358 0.26
  Middle-qualit 0.0821 2.99 0.1747 3.85  0.0876 1.46
  Middle-quality  -0.0021
  High- 0.2013 4.15 0.2195 3.35  0.0779 0.76
  High-quality, privat 0.1481 2.64 0.2844 3.74  0.0228 0.21
  Historic 0.1489 2.08 0.2511 1.53  0.0225 0.16
Demographic Characte    
  Female 0.1111 5.18 0.0659 1.86  0.1276 2.56
  N .0946 657  063
0.1328 0.0283  0.3564
  Black -0.0062
  Hispanic 0.009
Family Background 
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 Continued 
Advanced deg.
Table E.4 -
 Less than BA BA  
Variable t Coeff. t Coeff.  Coeff. t
  Social science major 4.78 1.70 2.40.1861 0.1558  0.2821 9
  History major 
0.1841 4.63 0.0035 0.05 0.1770 1.65
    
0.0148 0.60 -0.2314 1.34 1.41
of hours per week 
 
-0.3259 2.06 0.0412 0.33  0.0461 0.25
  Humanity major   
  Psychology major 0.1221 2.32 -0.0534 0.46  0.0803 0.69
  Other major 0.1332 3.57 0.0198 0.27  0.1859 2.25
Labor Market     
  Age 0.0368 3.55 0.0056 0.21  0.0907 1.13
  Age squared / 100 -0.0464 3.46 -0.0027 0.08  -0.1270 1.08
  Tenure 0.0123 2.13 0.0371 2.22  0.0737 2.80
  Tenure squared /100   -0.2487
  Number 0.0127 8.27 0.0148 5.49  0.0063 1.65
N 2283  657  371
2R  0.2445  0.2328   0.2615
N
1 4 corresponds to Table 4.9 in Chapt
2  are corrected for heterosceda
3 lue t statistics included.  
 
ote:  
. Table E. er Four. 
. Standard errors
. Absolute va
sticity. 
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Table E.5 
O S Estimates for Earnings Equations y Fathe ucatiL  (full model) b r’s Ed on
 Less than BA  A d degBA  dvance .
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 8.6600 3 1 19.19 8.4746 8.13  9.1240 9.54
Institutional Characteristics      
e institution -
y, public institution 
, private institution 0.1407 4.39 0.0622 1.48 0.0564 0.99
quality, public institution 
e institution 
ally black coll. and inst. -
ristics    
- - -
ative American 0 1.24 0.3 1.76 0.1 0.99
  Asian 2.62 - 0.17 3.62
0.66 -0.0931 1.25  -0.1814 1.83
0.13 0.1176 1.17  0.0557 0.49
       
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0103 2.81 0.0065 1.83  0.0021 1.15
Academic Background        
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile -0.0075 0.68 0.0182 1.23  0.0084 0.51
  Business major 0.2845 8.44 0.2868 5.91  0.1259 2.06
  Engineering major 0.4397 10.36 0.4245 6.42  0.3241 4.50
  Health major 0.4628 11.12 0.4383 7.27  0.2370 3.43
  Public affair major 0.1867 3.39 0.0861 1.00  0.0268 0.28
  Biological science major 0.1628 2.37 0.1620 2.03  0.0001 0.00
  Math science major 0.4038 7.95 0.4634 6.59  0.1218 1.28
  
  Low-quality, privat 0.0973 2.09 0.0646 0.74  0.1373 0.87
  Middle-qualit 0.0947 3.26 0.0764 2.06  0.1025 2.10
  Middle-quality  
  High- 0.2660 5.92 0.0820 1.46  0.1316 1.59
  High-quality, privat 0.2461 5.24 0.1582 2.01  0.1108 1.35
  Historic 0.1436 1.93 0.1681 1.72  0.0687 0.55
Demographic Characte     
  Female 0.0822 3.62 0.1162 3.94  0.1004 2.89
  N .1013 344  231
0.1464 0.0107  0.2864
  Black 0.0249
  Hispanic 0.0071
Family Background 
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Table E.5 – Continued 
dvanced deg. Less than BA BA  A
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Social science major 4.1 0. 3.01 0 1.30.1801 1 1876  .1145 0
  History major - 0 -0
0.1762 3.72 .0564 .76  .0143 0.22
1 -0
0 2 -0
    
0 1 0
- -0 1 -0
0 2 0
0.36 -0.1921 .36  .0679 0.35
of hours per week 5
 
0.2214 1.72 .1004 0.61  .1647 0.92
  Humanity major 0 0 -0
  Psychology major 0.1430 2.63 0.1561 .76  .0756 0.87
  Other major 0.1476 3.64 .1583 .87  .0267 0.43
Labor Market     
  Age 0.0384 3.50 .0491 .87  .0318 1.33
  Age squared / 100 0.0471 3.37 .0608 .73  .0430 1.53
  Tenure 0.0170 2.72 .0351 .37  .0258 1.32
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0094 1 -0
  Number 0.0129 7.89 0.0134 .22  0.0103 3.70
N 2185 802   688
2R  0.2266  0 0.3015   .1903
N
1 5 corresponds to Table 4.10 in Chap
2  are corrected for heterosceda
3 lue t statistics included.  
 
ote:  
. Table E. ter Four. 
. Standard errors
. Absolute va
sticity. 
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Table E.6 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equations y arenta catio (full model) b  P l Edu n 
 Less than BA   degBA  Advanced .
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 8.6044 3 1 28.23  8.7029 8.72  9.1213 2.18
Institutional Characteristics       
e institution -
y, public institution 
, private institution 0.1426 4.23 0.0711 1.79 0.0364 0.79
quality, public institution 
e institution 
ally black coll. and inst. -
ristics     
- - -
ative American 0 0.59 0.3 1.42 0.1 1.70
  Asian 2.38 0.65 3.03
0.33  -0.0725 1.06  -0.0989 1.27
0.59  0.0772 0.83  0.0621 0.59
Family Background         
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0107 2.60  0.0084 2.19  0.0013 0.72
Academic Background         
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile -0.0041 0.34  0.0064 0.45  0.0155 1.06
  Business major 0.2912 8.59  0.2232 4.33  0.1969 3.70
  Engineering major 0.4476 10.39  0.3548 5.21  0.3840 5.87
  Health major 0.4845 11.24  0.3221 5.13  0.3523 5.83
  Public affair major 0.2025 3.64  0.0044 0.05  0.1277 1.42
  Biological science major 0.1934 2.64  0.0506 0.63  0.0621 0.73
  Math science major 0.4137 7.82  0.3742 5.00  0.2328 2.93
  
  Low-quality, privat 0.1006 2.13  0.0974 1.15  0.1364 1.00
  Middle-qualit 0.0920 2.98  0.0743 2.09  0.0843 2.17
  Middle-quality   
  High- 0.2684 5.48  0.1130 2.04  0.1248 1.86
  High-quality, privat 0.1949 3.43  0.2047 2.90  0.0858 1.19
  Historic 0.1697 2.52  0.0628 0.59  0.0123 0.12
Demographic Characte     
  Female 0.0911 3.86  0.1198 3.98  0.1013 3.38
  N .0537  657  711
0.1437  0.0384  0.2378
  Black 0.0128
  Hispanic 0.0307
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Table E.6 – Continued 
dvanced deg. Less than BA  BA  A
Variable Co oeff.eff. t C  t  Coeff. t
  Social science major 0.1792 0.1483 2.28  0.1842 2.44.10  4
  History major -0.2685  1 0.1 34
1790 3.56 0.01 0.19  0.0724 1.23
0.145  1 1.06 66
0.1602  9 1.38 43
     
0.0420  3 1.47 49
-0.0520  8 1.23 67
0.015  5 2.75 01
0001 0.00 -0.23 1.93  -0.1434 0.77
of hours per week 0.012  5 5.60 15
205   48
1.88 0.015 0  -0.04 0.29
  Humanity major 0.  31
  Psychology major 4 2.61 0.094  0.01 0.23
  Other major 3.75 0.079  0.05 0.99
Labor Market     
  Age 3.83 0.038  0.02 1.15
  Age squared / 100 3.73 -0.041  -0.03 1.42
  Tenure 2 2.39 0.036  0.04 2.24
  Tenure squared /100 0.  73
  Number 7 7.45 0.013   0.01 4.66
N 7  891  8
2R  0.2291  4  39 0.284  0.21
N
1 6 corresponds to Table 4.11 in Chapter Fou
2  are corrected for heteroscedasticity
3 lue t statistics included.  
ote:  
. Table E. r. 
. Standard errors
. Absolute va
. 
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Table E.7 
O S Estimates for Earnings Equations (fu /ACTL ll model) by SAT  Quartile 
 Lowest Quartile Second Quartile lowest  
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t
  Constant 8.2403 1 1 23.67  0.6870 0.30
Institutional Characteristics    
e institution -
y, public institution 
, private institution 0.1083 2.42 -0.0409 1.12
quality, public institution 
e institution 
ally black coll. and inst. -
ristics    
- -
ative American -0.3 1.73 0.0 0.59
  Asian 2.43 1.95
0383 0.79  -0.0038 0.08
0.0524 0.66  0.0363 0.40
     
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0116 3.64  0.0010 0.44
  First generation college graduate 0.0071 0.23  -0.0376 1.48
Academic Background      
  Business major 0.2035 3.70  0.2497 5.54
  Engineering major 0.4256 5.04  0.4327 8.02
  Health major 0.2693 4.22  0.4910 8.09
  Public affair major 0.1145 1.41  0.1798 2.69
  Biological science major 0.1499 1.57  0.1225 1.46
  Math science major 0.3621 3.87  0.3630 5.33
  
  Low-quality, privat 0.0441 0.65  0.0165 0.17
  Middle-qualit 0.0705 1.85  0.0314 1.01
  Middle-quality  
  High- 0.3119 2.52  0.1369 2.46
  High-quality, privat 0.2859 2.44  0.0871 1.16
  Historic 0.0455 0.64  0.0504 0.60
Demographic Characte   
  Female 0.0949 2.65  0.1286 4.68
  N 460  573 
0.1366  0.2351 
  Black -0.
  Hispanic -
Family Background 
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Table E.7 - Continued 
 Lowest Quartile Second lowest Quartile 
Variable C t Coeff. oeff. t
  Social science major 0 3 0.2025 .08  .2277 3.68
  History major 0.3308 3.30  0.1234 1.90
0 1.7 0
0 2.4 0
0 3.7 0
  
0 1.7 -0
- 1.2 0
0.0361 3.15  0.0246 2.74
quared /100 - 2.6 -0
er week 0 3.8 0
  Humanity major .1205 4  .1403 2.42
  Psychology major .1992 4  .0330 0.39
  Other major .2283 5  .1532 3.39
Labor Market     
  Age .0612 7  .0791 2.52
  Age squared / 100 0.0594 5  .1165 2.53
  Tenure 
  Tenure s 0.1693 7  .0438 1.01
  Number of hours p .0101 7  .0156 8.54
N 888   911  
2R  0.1991   0.2926  
N
1. o Table 4.12 in Chapter Four. 
2 ed for heteroscedasticity. 
3   
 
ote:  
Table E.7 corresponds t
. Standard errors are correct
. Absolute value t statistics included.
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Table E.7 - Continued 
 Second highest quartile  Highest quartile 
Variable Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 8.8121 1 10.94  9.2974 2.76
Institutional Characteristics     
private institution -
, public institution 0.1934 3.28 0.0381 0.67
le-quality, private institution 
 institution 
ality, private institution 
l. and inst. 
     
male -0.1 2.97 -0.1 3.24
  Native American 0.74 3.36
0.0310 0.34  0.1599 2.19
  Black -0.0664 0.38  0.0305 0.34
  Hispanic -0.1057 0.85  0.1933 1.23
Family Background      
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0026 1.22  0.0026 0.72
  First generation college graduate -0.0485 1.54  -0.0562 1.46
Academic Background      
  Business major 0.2472 4.25  0.3861 6.26
  Engineering major 0.3974 5.95  0.4468 6.81
  Health major 0.4113 6.12  0.4549 4.89
  Public affair major 0.1414 1.50  -0.0797 0.74
  Biological science major 0.1095 1.17  0.1397 1.56
  Math science major 0.3145 3.72  0.4037 5.12
  Social science major 0.2108 3.04  0.1082 1.17
  History major -0.6693 3.07  -0.0930 0.54
 
  Low-quality, 0.2338 2.30  0.1188 0.98
  Middle-quality  
  Midd 0.2449 3.85  0.0260 0.40
  High-quality, public 0.3153 3.90  0.0472 0.68
  High-qu 0.3342 4.04  0.0600 0.79
  Historically black col -0.2014 1.09  0.1364 1.13
Demographic Characteristics  
  Fe 083  125
0.0425  0.3256
  Asian 
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 Continued 
Highest quartile 
Table E.7 -
 Second highest quartile  
Variable Coeff. Coeff. tt  
  Humanity major 0 2.320.0283 0.35  .1609
  Psychology major 0
0959 1.55 1.42
  
0.0310  0
 -0
0.0288  0
 -0
0.0136  0
823  669  
0.2200 2.14  .0742 0.75
  Other major 0.  0.1254
Labor Market     
  Age 0.66 .0126 0.30
  Age squared / 100 -0.0414 0.63 .0116 0.20
  Tenure 1.91 .0250 1.64
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0346 0.34 .0090 0.10
  Number of hours per week 5.32 .0112 3.92
N  
2R  0.3012   0.2434  
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Table E.8 
OLS Estimates for Earnings Equations (full model) by Field of Study 
 Business Engineering  Health 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 9.2498 23.95  9.6822 17.62  9.4072 26.17
Institutional Characteristics         
  Low-quality, private institution -0.0406 0.57  0.1169 0.70  0.2527 2.78
  Middle-quality, public institution 0.0666 1.40  0.0159 0.35  0.0092 0.16
  Middle-quality, private institution 0.0996 1.94  0.1337 2.33  0.0748 1.29
  High-quality, public institution 0.1720 1.46  0.0668 1.17  0.2197 2.35
  High-quality, private institution 0.2576 2.15  0.1686 1.96  0.1572 1.82
  Historically black coll. and inst. -0.2237 2.05  0.0777 0.42  0.8467 3.61
Demographic Characteristics         
  Female -0.1289 4.02  0.0760 1.90  0.0031 0.05
  Native American 0.1445 1.37  0.1834 4.02  0.1971 2.17
  Asian 0.1101 2.08  -0.0159 0.24  0.1659 1.12
  Black 0.0065 0.08  -0.2144 1.12  -0.0285 0.24
  Hispanic -0.0016 0.02  -0.0883 0.62  0.1584 1.42
Family Background         
  Family income (in $10,000) 0.0042 1.37  0.0068 1.15  0.0035 0.65
  First generation college graduate 0.0031 0.10  -0.0337 0.81  0.0110 0.27
Academic Background         
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0524 2.95  -0.0038 0.19  0.0674 2.77
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0117 0.57  0.0258 0.94  0.0240 1.46
  Age squared / 100 -0.0132 0.52  -0.0226 0.63  -0.0281 1.42
  Tenure 0.0247 2.69  -0.0209 1.26  0.0066 0.46
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0235 0.66  0.1717 1.62  0.0480 0.74
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Table E.8 – Continued 
 Business Engineering  Health 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Number of hours per week 0.0152 7.25  0.0082 2.24  0.0081 2.42
N 664   288   268  
2R  0.2387   0.1445   0.2500  
Note:  
1. Table E.8 corresponds to Table 4.13 in Chapter Four. 
2. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
3. Absolute value t statistics included.  
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Table E.8 – Continued 
 Social Sciences Humanity  Education 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Constant 10.4168 13.73  7.5887 13.49  8.1257 12.79
Institutional Characteristics         
  Low-quality, private institution -0.2849 2.11  0.2026 1.52  0.0990 0.93
  Middle-quality, public institution 0.1010 1.58  -0.0254 0.46  0.0692 1.50
  Middle-quality, private institution 0.0888 1.24  -0.0421 0.57  0.0034 0.06
  High-quality, public institution 0.2851 3.18  0.1154 1.39  0.0756 1.10
  High-quality, private institution 0.0951 0.77  0.0312 0.32  0.2266 2.14
  Historically black coll. and inst. 0.0647 0.52  -0.4724 3.30  0.0321 0.35
Demographic Characteristics         
  Female -0.1547 3.41  -0.0502 1.03  0.0630 1.15
  Native American 0.3077 2.49  -0.0761 0.37  -0.0620 0.53
  Asian 0.1434 1.71  0.1620 1.61  0.5873 1.24
  Black -0.0546 0.57  0.1327 2.07  0.1686 2.76
  Hispanic 0.1467 1.23  0.1145 1.06  0.0001 0.00
Family Background         
  Family income (in $10,000) -0.0028 1.09  0.0067 1.25  0.0065 0.86
  First generation college graduate -0.0848 1.78  0.0070 0.16  -0.1098 2.55
Academic Background         
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile -0.0409 1.65  0.0203 0.95  0.0097 0.42
Labor Market          
  Age -0.0588 1.55  0.1124 4.46  0.0673 1.90
  Age squared / 100 0.0806 1.77  -0.1319 4.62  -0.0847 1.81
  Tenure -0.0086 0.42  0.0449 1.33  0.0096 0.67
  Tenure squared /100 0.0024 0.02  -0.3742 0.87  0.0265 0.41
  Number of hours per week 0.0233 5.74  0.0089 1.88  0.0138 4.39
N 413  344   573
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Table E.8 – Continued 
 Social Sciences Humanity  Education 
Variable Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
2R  0.2503  0.1680   0.1634
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Table E.9 
Quantile Estimates for the Earnings Equation (full model)  
 (1) OLS  (2) 0.05 
Variable Coefficient t  Coefficient t
 Constant 8.7298 51.72  8.3354 19.76
Institutional Characteristics      
 Low-quality, private institution 0.0530 1.42  0.0089 0.11
 Middle-quality, public institution 0.0920 4.41  0.0532 0.94
 Middle-quality, private institution 0.1066 4.61  0.0383 0.54
 High-quality, public institution 0.1800 5.46  0.0666 0.83
 High-quality, private institution 0.1754 4.47  0.1011 1.33
 Historically black coll. and inst. -0.1167 2.31  0.0314 0.26
Demographic Characteristics      
 Female -0.0936 6.04  -0.0365 0.84
 Native American 0.1040 1.47  0.3305 1.58
 Asian 0.1268 3.46  0.1344 1.75
 Black -0.0109 0.35  -0.1022 1.13
 Hispanic 0.0438 1.07  -0.0999 1.42
Family Background      
 Family income (in $10,000) 0.0055 3.55  0.0067 1.40
 First generation college graduate -0.0233 1.61  -0.0528 1.48
Academic Background      
Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0081 1.06  0.0278 1.52
 Business major 0.2752 11.08  0.2801 3.82
 Engineering major 0.4321 14.15  0.5302 6.55
 Health major 0.4429 14.28  0.4076 4.50
 Public affair major 0.1473 3.67  0.2141 2.46
 Biological science major 0.1493 3.15  0.0330 0.33
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Table E.9 – Continued 
 (1) OLS  (2) 0.05 
Variable Coefficient t  Coefficient t
 Math science major 0.3818 10.39  0.2968 3.53
 Social science major 0.1944 5.88  0.1120 1.52
 History major -0.1340 1.38  -1.4704 16.24
 Humanity major 0.1231 3.80  0.0626 0.84
 Psychology major 0.1290 3.31  0.0546 0.62
 Other major 0.1471 5.09  0.0523 0.72
Labor Market       
 Age 0.0362 4.15  0.0343 1.61
 Age squared / 100 -0.0433 3.90  -0.0605 2.20
 Tenure 0.0160 3.37  0.0251 1.70
 Tenure squared /100 -0.0058 0.28  -0.0139 0.27
 Number of hours per week 0.0130 10.95  0.0119 3.86
2R / Pseudo 2R  0.2247  0.1398
Note:  
1. Table E.9 corresponds to Table 5.2 in Chapter Five. 
2. Absolute value t statistics included.  
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Table E.9 – Continued 
 (3) 0.10 (4) 0.25 
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t
 Constant 8.5847 30.96  8.5837 34.81
Institutional Characteristics      
 Low-quality, private institution -0.1054 1.91  -0.0287 0.58
 Middle-quality, public institution 0.0750 2.14  0.0727 2.53
 Middle-quality, private institution 0.0429 0.96  0.0701 2.08
 High-quality, public institution 0.1830 3.00  0.1504 3.03
 High-quality, private institution 0.0445 0.75  0.1499 3.44
 Historically black coll. and inst. -0.0431 0.50  -0.2191 2.94
Demographic Characteristics      
 Female -0.0264 0.92  -0.0428 2.08
 Native American 0.1457 1.26  0.1071 1.10
 Asian 0.1068 1.57  0.1079 1.97
 Black -0.0987 1.75  0.0381 0.82
 Hispanic -0.0304 0.51  0.0737 1.51
Family Background      
 Family income (in $10,000) 0.0046 1.55  0.0053 2.03
 First generation college graduate -0.0235 0.91  -0.0130 0.64
Academic Background      
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0225 1.75  0.0093 0.93
Business major 0.3074 6.64  0.2538 7.59
 Engineering major 0.5363 9.94  0.5312 12.30
 Health major 0.4166 7.11  0.4409 10.61
 Public affair major 0.2019 3.60  0.1198 2.13
 Biological science major 0.1779 2.68  0.1338 2.46
 Math science major 0.3273 6.07  0.3090 7.13
 Social science major 0.1143 2.17  0.1873 4.91
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Table E.9 – Continued 
 (3) 0.10 (4) 0.25 
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t
 History major -1.6015 29.55  0.0994 0.99
 Humanity major 0.1267 2.51  0.1614 4.23
 Psychology major 0.2197 3.25  0.1345 2.28
 Other major 0.1191 2.52  0.0959 2.74
Labor Market       
 Age 0.0204 1.40  0.0311 2.42
 Age squared / 100 -0.0279 1.49  -0.0370 2.22
 Tenure 0.0258 2.61  0.0316 4.60
 Tenure squared /100 0.0059 0.16  -0.0488 1.71
 Number of hours per week 0.0122 6.67  0.0129 10.53
Pseudo 2R  0.1276 0.1399 
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Table E.9 – Continued 
 (5) 0.50 (6) 0.75 
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t
 Constant 8.9492 48.61  8.9969 54.22
Institutional Characteristics      
 Low-quality, private institution -0.0121 0.37  0.0726 2.10
 Middle-quality, public institution 0.0696 3.64  0.0727 3.66
 Middle-quality, private institution 0.0624 2.80  0.0848 3.53
 High-quality, public institution 0.1577 4.68  0.1536 4.40
 High-quality, private institution 0.1421 4.71  0.2098 6.65
 Historically black coll. and inst. -0.1571 3.33  -0.1359 2.66
Demographic Characteristics      
 Female -0.0766 5.54  -0.1184 8.17
 Native American 0.1354 1.82  0.1268 2.15
 Asian 0.0565 1.58  0.1278 3.76
 Black 0.0154 0.49  0.0258 0.73
 Hispanic 0.1004 3.04  0.0386 1.15
Family Background      
 Family income (in $10,000) 0.0042 2.87  0.0097 7.26
 First generation college graduate -0.0104 0.76  -0.0045 0.31
Academic Background      
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0059 0.83  0.0100 1.31
Business major 0.2841 12.89  0.2590 11.19
 Engineering major 0.4754 15.94  0.3769 12.19
 Health major 0.4352 14.64  0.4126 14.17
 Public affair major 0.1410 4.11  0.1468 4.03
 Biological science major 0.2353 6.00  0.2266 4.51
 Math science major 0.4223 14.66  0.3822 12.57
 Social science major 0.1673 6.49  0.1836 6.56
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Table E.9 – Continued 
 (5) 0.50 (6) 0.75 
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t
 History major 0.0936 1.74  0.0652 1.23
 Humanity major 0.1413 5.23  0.0692 2.54
 Psychology major 0.1221 3.01  0.1221 2.66
 Other major 0.1572 6.86  0.1624 6.72
Labor Market       
 Age 0.0279 2.84  0.0312 3.73
 Age squared / 100 -0.0333 2.63  -0.0334 3.23
 Tenure 0.0161 3.58  0.0090 1.91
 Tenure squared /100 0.0005 0.03  0.0034 0.14
 Number of hours per week 0.0120 17.13  0.0137 18.64
Pseudo 2R  0.1535 0.1586 
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Table E.9 – Continued 
 (7) 0.90 (8) 0.95 
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t
 Constant 8.8614 26.18  9.2035 24.71
Institutional Characteristics      
 Low-quality, private institution 0.1268 1.78  0.0308 0.38
 Middle-quality, public institution 0.0954 2.20  0.0482 0.90
 Middle-quality, private institution 0.0996 1.91  0.1329 2.11
 High-quality, public institution 0.0958 1.45  0.1407 1.56
 High-quality, private institution 0.2597 3.71  0.2962 3.47
 Historically black coll. and inst. -0.0623 0.52  -0.1009 0.77
Demographic Characteristics      
 Female -0.2082 6.66  -0.2779 7.02
 Native American 0.0444 0.31  0.1056 0.61
 Asian 0.1043 1.65  0.1975 2.56
 Black -0.0033 0.04  -0.0064 0.07
 Hispanic 0.0326 0.44  0.0422 0.49
Family Background      
 Family income (in $10,000) 0.0039 1.43  0.0071 2.37
 First generation college graduate 0.0304 0.97  0.0100 0.27
Academic Background      
 Merged SAT/ACT quartile 0.0343 2.09  0.0147 0.73
 Business major 0.2526 5.46  0.2047 3.51
 Engineering major 0.2616 4.45  0.1230 1.64
 Health major 0.4752 7.80  0.4272 5.97
 Public affair major 0.1391 1.71  0.0951 1.14
 Biological science major 0.1800 1.71  0.0685 0.81
 Math science major 0.3886 6.12  0.3420 3.77
 Social science major 0.2742 4.43  0.2677 3.31
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Table E.9 – Continued 
 (7) 0.90 (8) 0.95 
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t
 History major -0.0178 0.20  -0.0731 0.72
 Humanity major 0.1200 1.87  -0.0137 0.20
 Psychology major 0.0826 0.88  -0.0501 0.53
 Other major 0.2145 4.10  0.2128 3.25
Labor Market       
 Age 0.0469 2.75  0.0538 2.88
 Age squared / 100 -0.0545 2.60  -0.0630 2.72
 Tenure -0.0075 0.83  -0.0266 2.39
 Tenure squared /100 0.0545 1.36  0.1128 2.24
 Number of hours per week 0.0159 8.74  0.0134 4.93
Pseudo 2R  0.1549 0.1589
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Table E.10 
Ordered Logit Estimates for 9 Job Satisfaction Indicators 
Satisfaction with Pay, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.1646 17.58  -0.2040 14.15  0.3686 20.11
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0001 0.18  -0.0001 0.18  0.0002 0.18
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0196 1.09  0.0198 1.37  -0.0395 1.22
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0057 0.63  0.0070 0.63  -0.0127 0.63
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0141 1.25  0.0159 1.39  -0.0300 1.32
  High-quality, public institution  0.0217 1.15  0.0214 1.48  -0.0431 1.30
  High-quality, private institution  0.0592 2.75  0.0399 6.33  -0.0991 3.68
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0102 0.43  0.0113 0.48  -0.0216 0.46
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0211 3.19  -0.0258 3.21  0.0470 3.24
  Native American  -0.0120 0.31  -0.0171 0.27  0.0291 0.28
  Asian  0.0725 2.88  0.0402 9.39  -0.1127 4.15
  Black  0.0505 2.68  0.0376 5.15  -0.0881 3.48
  Hispanic  0.0276 1.49  0.0255 2.10  -0.0530 1.74
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0011 1.51  -0.0013 1.51  0.0024 1.51
  First generation college graduate  -0.0154 2.36  -0.0190 2.36  0.0345 2.37
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0032 0.97  -0.0040 0.97  0.0072 0.97
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Pay, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major -0.0237 2.33  -0.0331 2.08  0.0568 2.20
  Engineering major -0.0315 2.63  -0.0541 1.97  0.0856 2.19
  Health major -0.0355 3.13  -0.0640 2.26  0.0994 2.53
  Public affairs major -0.0284 2.04  -0.0482 1.54  0.0766 1.70
  Biological science major -0.0258 1.63  -0.0429 1.26  0.0687 1.38
  Math science major -0.0315 2.61  -0.0547 1.94  0.0863 2.15
  Social science major -0.0024 0.17  -0.0030 0.17  0.0054 0.17
  History major -0.0451 2.88  -0.0957 1.83  0.1408 2.08
  Humanity major -0.0250 2.09  -0.0400 1.66  0.0650 1.82
  Psychology major 0.0274 1.15  0.0251 1.62  -0.0525 1.33
  Other major -0.0187 1.71  -0.0271 1.48  0.0457 1.57
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0022 0.54  0.0027 0.54  -0.0048 0.54
  Age squared / 100 0.0000 0.02  0.0000 0.02  0.0000 0.02
  Tenure 0.0026 1.21  0.0032 1.20  -0.0058 1.21
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0001 1.07  -0.0001 1.07  0.0003 1.07
  Number of hours per week 0.0010 2.88  0.0013 2.87  -0.0023 2.89
N 3,870   
2χ  647   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Pay, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0000 0.07  0.0000 0.07  -0.0001 0.07
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  -0.0085 0.83  -0.0086 0.84  0.0171 0.84
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0064 0.37  -0.0069 0.35  0.0134 0.36
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0119 0.63  0.0108 0.70  -0.0227 0.66
  High-quality, public institution  -0.0011 0.09  -0.0011 0.09  0.0022 0.09
  High-quality, private institution  0.0222 1.16  0.0183 1.44  -0.0405 1.26
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0400 1.27  0.0271 2.13  -0.0671 1.52
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0046 0.64  -0.0047 0.64  0.0093 0.64
  Native American  -0.0220 0.54  -0.0281 0.43  0.0501 0.47
  Asian  0.0484 2.04  0.0303 3.88  -0.0787 2.52
  Black  0.0499 2.45  0.0319 4.41  -0.0817 3.02
  Hispanic  0.0174 0.91  0.0149 1.10  -0.0323 0.99
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0024 2.90  -0.0024 2.87  0.0048 2.91
  First generation college graduate  -0.0142 1.92  -0.0143 1.92  0.0284 1.93
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0058 1.55  -0.0059 1.54  0.0117 1.55
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Pay, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0676 6.57  -0.0907 5.33  0.1583 5.92
  Engineering major  -0.0807 9.12  -0.1738 5.43  0.2545 6.39
  Health major  -0.0840 10.01  -0.1892 5.96  0.2733 7.01
  Public affairs major  -0.0507 3.77  -0.0847 2.51  0.1353 2.89
  Biological science major  -0.0496 3.34  -0.0829 2.21  0.1324 2.54
  Math science major  -0.0753 8.07  -0.1565 4.82  0.2318 5.67
  Social science major  -0.0341 2.73  -0.0463 2.13  0.0805 2.36
  History major  -0.0297 1.33  -0.0408 1.02  0.0706 1.14
  Humanity major  -0.0429 3.52  -0.0640 2.55  0.1068 2.88
  Psychology major  0.0009 0.04  0.0009 0.04  -0.0018 0.04
  Other major  -0.0429 3.92  -0.0598 3.01  0.1027 3.36
Labor Market           
  Age  -0.0036 0.82  -0.0037 0.81  0.0073 0.82
  Age squared / 100  0.0001 1.23  0.0001 1.23  -0.0001 1.23
  Tenure  -0.0004 0.16  -0.0004 0.16  0.0008 0.16
  Tenure squared /100  -0.0001 0.79  -0.0001 0.79  0.0002 0.79
  Number of hours per week  -0.0012 3.21  -0.0013 3.17  0.0025 3.22
N 3,870   
2χ  175   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Promotion Opportunity, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.1236 11.27  -0.0825 9.50  0.2062 11.45
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0009 1.02  0.0006 1.02  -0.0014 1.02
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0505 1.86  0.0232 3.00  -0.0737 2.10
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0013 0.10  -0.0009 0.10  0.0022 0.10
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0133 0.84  0.0083 0.90  -0.0216 0.86
  High-quality, public institution  0.0420 1.55  0.0206 2.26  -0.0626 1.72
  High-quality, private institution  0.0378 1.47  0.0193 2.02  -0.0570 1.61
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0199 0.56  0.0114 0.66  -0.0314 0.60
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0049 0.51  -0.0033 0.51  0.0081 0.51
  Native American  -0.0028 0.04  -0.0019 0.04  0.0047 0.04
  Asian  0.0195 0.77  0.0113 0.90  -0.0308 0.81
  Black  0.0336 1.45  0.0178 1.90  -0.0514 1.59
  Hispanic  -0.0517 2.98  -0.0495 2.20  0.1012 2.55
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0003 0.25  -0.0002 0.25  0.0004 0.25
  First generation college graduate  -0.0121 1.27  -0.0080 1.27  0.0201 1.28
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0047 0.97  -0.0032 0.97  0.0079 0.97
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Promotion Opportunity, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major -0.0347 2.33  -0.0259 2.14  0.0606 2.28
  Engineering major -0.0102 0.46  -0.0073 0.43  0.0175 0.45
  Health major -0.0137 0.65  -0.0101 0.59  0.0238 0.63
  Public affairs major -0.0202 0.82  -0.0156 0.72  0.0358 0.77
  Biological science major -0.0090 0.32  -0.0064 0.30  0.0154 0.31
  Math science major -0.0243 1.16  -0.0192 1.00  0.0435 1.09
  Social science major -0.0132 0.70  -0.0096 0.65  0.0227 0.68
  History major -0.0084 0.24  -0.0060 0.22  0.0144 0.23
  Humanity major -0.0271 1.44  -0.0217 1.23  0.0488 1.34
  Psychology major -0.0050 0.17  -0.0034 0.17  0.0084 0.17
  Other major -0.0122 0.73  -0.0087 0.69  0.0210 0.71
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0166 2.90  0.0111 2.87  -0.0276 2.91
  Age squared / 100 -0.0002 2.14  -0.0001 2.12  0.0003 2.14
  Tenure 0.0087 2.80  0.0058 2.76  -0.0145 2.80
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0003 1.77  -0.0002 1.76  0.0005 1.77
  Number of hours per week -0.0030 5.55  -0.0020 5.27  0.0049 5.56
N 3,870   
2χ  380   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Promotion Opportunity, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0010 1.17  0.0006 1.17  -0.0016 1.17
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  -0.0126 0.94  -0.0080 0.94  0.0206 0.95
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0181 0.72  0.0101 0.83  -0.0282 0.75
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0400 1.51  0.0189 2.12  -0.0589 1.65
  High-quality, public institution  -0.0010 0.06  -0.0006 0.06  0.0016 0.06
  High-quality, private institution  0.0105 0.45  0.0062 0.48  -0.0167 0.46
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0367 0.96  0.0175 1.35  -0.0542 1.06
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  0.0067 0.70  0.0042 0.70  -0.0110 0.70
  Native American  -0.0168 0.27  -0.0120 0.24  0.0288 0.26
  Asian  0.0043 0.18  0.0027 0.18  -0.0070 0.18
  Black  0.0309 1.33  0.0158 1.69  -0.0467 1.43
  Hispanic  -0.0556 3.18  -0.0513 2.32  0.1070 2.72
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0011 1.00  -0.0007 1.00  0.0017 1.00
  First generation college graduate  -0.0116 1.20  -0.0073 1.20  0.0189 1.20
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0060 1.21  -0.0038 1.21  0.0098 1.21
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Promotion Opportunity, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0666 4.81  -0.0515 3.95  0.1182 4.47
  Engineering major  -0.0578 3.32  -0.0530 2.40  0.1108 2.83
  Health major  -0.0623 3.75  -0.0590 2.68  0.1213 3.17
  Public affairs major  -0.0361 1.55  -0.0293 1.24  0.0654 1.40
  Biological science major  -0.0278 1.06  -0.0214 0.89  0.0491 0.98
  Math science major  -0.0640 3.76  -0.0614 2.64  0.1254 3.14
  Social science major  -0.0350 2.02  -0.0274 1.66  0.0624 1.85
  History major  0.0015 0.04  0.0009 0.04  -0.0024 0.04
  Humanity major  -0.0415 2.32  -0.0342 1.82  0.0758 2.07
  Psychology major  -0.0235 0.88  -0.0175 0.76  0.0410 0.83
  Other major  -0.0292 1.82  -0.0216 1.58  0.0508 1.72
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0119 2.05  0.0075 2.04  -0.0194 2.05
  Age squared / 100  -0.0001 1.33  -0.0001 1.33  0.0002 1.33
  Tenure  0.0067 2.11  0.0042 2.10  -0.0109 2.11
  Tenure squared /100  -0.0003 1.60  -0.0002 1.59  0.0004 1.60
  Number of hours per week  -0.0047 8.76  -0.0030 7.75  0.0076 8.80
N 3,870   
2χ  241   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Educational Benefits, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.0916 8.45  -0.0617 7.77  0.1533 8.50
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0011 1.31  0.0008 1.31  -0.0019 1.31
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0593 2.10  0.0282 3.24  -0.0875 2.38
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0195 1.46  -0.0132 1.45  0.0328 1.46
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0330 1.96  0.0197 2.24  -0.0527 2.06
  High-quality, public institution  0.0245 0.94  0.0144 1.09  -0.0389 0.99
  High-quality, private institution  0.0227 0.92  0.0135 1.05  -0.0363 0.97
  Historically black coll. and inst.  -0.0385 1.37  -0.0324 1.13  0.0709 1.25
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0297 3.01  -0.0198 3.01  0.0495 3.03
  Native American  0.0077 0.11  0.0049 0.11  -0.0126 0.11
  Asian  0.0417 1.44  0.0219 1.93  -0.0636 1.58
  Black  -0.0074 0.35  -0.0052 0.34  0.0125 0.34
  Hispanic  -0.0512 2.77  -0.0459 2.16  0.0971 2.45
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0019 1.80  -0.0013 1.79  0.0031 1.80
  First generation college graduate  -0.0245 2.50  -0.0164 2.49  0.0409 2.50
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  0.0055 1.10  0.0037 1.09  -0.0092 1.10
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Educational Benefits, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major 0.0150 0.89  0.0097 0.92  -0.0248 0.90
  Engineering major 0.0253 0.99  0.0148 1.15  -0.0401 1.04
  Health major 0.0233 0.91  0.0138 1.05  -0.0371 0.96
  Public affairs major 0.0116 0.41  0.0073 0.44  -0.0189 0.42
  Biological science major 0.0102 0.33  0.0064 0.35  -0.0166 0.33
  Math science major -0.0168 0.75  -0.0124 0.69  0.0293 0.73
  Social science major 0.0401 1.73  0.0219 2.18  -0.0619 1.86
  History major 0.0431 1.01  0.0222 1.39  -0.0653 1.11
  Humanity major 0.0370 1.52  0.0203 1.90  -0.0573 1.63
  Psychology major 0.0313 0.95  0.0175 1.17  -0.0488 1.02
  Other major 0.0467 2.27  0.0254 2.87  -0.0721 2.43
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0000 0.00  0.0000 0.00  0.0000 0.00
  Age squared / 100 0.0000 0.39  0.0000 0.39  0.0001 0.39
  Tenure -0.0019 0.60  -0.0013 0.60  0.0032 0.60
  Tenure squared /100 0.0001 0.47  0.0001 0.47  -0.0001 0.47
  Number of hours per week -0.0002 0.43  -0.0002 0.43  0.0004 0.43
N 3,870   
2χ  172   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Educational Benefits, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0012 1.37  0.0008 1.37  -0.0020 1.37
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  -0.0282 2.08  -0.0185 2.10  0.0467 2.10
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0096 0.38  0.0059 0.40  -0.0155 0.39
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0561 2.00  0.0264 2.98  -0.0826 2.24
  High-quality, public institution  0.0231 1.40  0.0138 1.51  -0.0369 1.44
  High-quality, private institution  0.0033 0.14  0.0021 0.14  -0.0053 0.14
  Historically black coll. and inst.  -0.0278 0.93  -0.0213 0.80  0.0491 0.87
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0208 2.11  -0.0135 2.11  0.0343 2.12
  Native American  -0.0026 0.04  -0.0017 0.04  0.0043 0.04
  Asian  0.0270 0.97  0.0150 1.16  -0.0420 1.03
  Black  -0.0090 0.43  -0.0062 0.41  0.0152 0.42
  Hispanic  -0.0545 2.96  -0.0479 2.28  0.1024 2.61
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0023 2.18  -0.0015 2.17  0.0038 2.18
  First generation college graduate  -0.0231 2.33  -0.0150 2.33  0.0382 2.34
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  0.0045 0.90  0.0030 0.90  -0.0075 0.90
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Educational Benefits, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0114 0.71  -0.0077 0.69  0.0191 0.71
  Engineering major  -0.0158 0.73  -0.0112 0.67  0.0271 0.71
  Health major  -0.0197 0.92  -0.0143 0.83  0.0341 0.88
  Public affairs major  -0.0017 0.06  -0.0011 0.06  0.0028 0.06
  Biological science major  -0.0030 0.10  -0.0020 0.10  0.0051 0.10
  Math science major  -0.0484 2.50  -0.0408 2.01  0.0892 2.26
  Social science major  0.0183 0.84  0.0109 0.92  -0.0292 0.87
  History major  0.0483 1.11  0.0233 1.60  -0.0716 1.23
  Humanity major  0.0234 0.99  0.0134 1.13  -0.0368 1.04
  Psychology major  0.0173 0.55  0.0102 0.61  -0.0275 0.57
  Other major  0.0302 1.53  0.0172 1.74  -0.0474 1.59
Labor Market           
  Age  -0.0032 0.51  -0.0021 0.51  0.0053 0.51
  Age squared / 100  0.0000 0.08  0.0000 0.08  0.0000 0.08
  Tenure  -0.0035 1.09  -0.0023 1.09  0.0059 1.09
  Tenure squared /100  0.0001 0.57  0.0001 0.57  -0.0002 0.57
  Number of hours per week  -0.0014 2.70  -0.0009 2.67  0.0023 2.70
N 3,870   
2χ  97   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Fringe Benefits, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.0421 7.51  -0.1026 7.59  0.1447 7.79
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0004 1.01  0.0011 1.01  -0.0015 1.01
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0190 1.34  0.0412 1.51  -0.0603 1.45
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0045 0.64  0.0109 0.64  -0.0153 0.64
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0112 1.30  0.0261 1.36  -0.0373 1.34
  High-quality, public institution  0.0025 0.19  0.0060 0.20  -0.0084 0.20
  High-quality, private institution  0.0275 1.85  0.0569 2.20  -0.0844 2.08
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0345 1.52  0.0674 1.94  -0.1019 1.77
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0152 3.01  -0.0368 3.04  0.0520 3.04
  Native American  -0.0329 1.49  -0.1021 1.19  0.1350 1.25
  Asian  0.0571 2.90  0.0977 4.35  -0.1548 3.71
  Black  -0.0037 0.36  -0.0093 0.35  0.0130 0.35
  Hispanic  -0.0300 3.54  -0.0894 2.96  0.1193 3.11
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0007 1.27  -0.0017 1.28  0.0024 1.28
  First generation college graduate  -0.0022 0.44  -0.0054 0.44  0.0076 0.44
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0016 0.62  -0.0038 0.62  0.0054 0.62
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Fringe Benefits, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major -0.0232 3.11  -0.0604 2.99  0.0836 3.01
  Engineering major -0.0172 1.75  -0.0468 1.59  0.0640 1.62
  Health major -0.0148 1.48  -0.0398 1.36  0.0546 1.39
  Public affairs major -0.0131 1.13  -0.0349 1.04  0.0481 1.06
  Biological science major 0.0016 0.10  0.0038 0.11  -0.0054 0.10
  Math science major -0.0265 2.96  -0.0766 2.55  0.1032 2.64
  Social science major 0.0105 0.94  0.0241 0.99  -0.0346 0.98
  History major -0.0178 1.21  -0.0491 1.07  0.0669 1.10
  Humanity major -0.0043 0.40  -0.0107 0.39  0.0149 0.40
  Psychology major -0.0396 4.40  -0.1275 3.46  0.1671 3.67
  Other major -0.0141 1.75  -0.0369 1.65  0.0511 1.67
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0046 1.46  0.0113 1.46  -0.0159 1.46
  Age squared / 100 0.0000 1.14  -0.0001 1.14  0.0002 1.14
  Tenure -0.0032 1.96  -0.0078 1.96  0.0111 1.96
  Tenure squared /100 0.0001 1.30  0.0002 1.30  -0.0004 1.30
  Number of hours per week 0.0004 1.28  0.0009 1.29  -0.0012 1.29
N 3,870   
2χ  175   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Fringe Benefits, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0005 1.03  0.0011 1.03  -0.0016 1.03
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0004 0.06  0.0010 0.06  -0.0014 0.06
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0049 0.41  -0.0120 0.40  0.0170 0.40
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0173 1.21  0.0366 1.34  -0.0539 1.31
  High-quality, public institution  0.0064 0.75  0.0146 0.76  -0.0210 0.76
  High-quality, private institution  0.0174 1.25  0.0370 1.39  -0.0544 1.35
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0441 1.79  0.0789 2.43  -0.1230 2.16
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0119 2.33  -0.0280 2.36  0.0399 2.35
  Native American  -0.0351 1.61  -0.1066 1.27  0.1417 1.34
  Asian  0.0493 2.61  0.0858 3.67  -0.1352 3.21
  Black  -0.0042 0.39  -0.0101 0.38  0.0143 0.38
  Hispanic  -0.0312 3.64  -0.0900 3.04  0.1212 3.18
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0009 1.68  -0.0022 1.68  0.0032 1.68
  First generation college graduate  -0.0012 0.24  -0.0029 0.24  0.0041 0.24
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0020 0.75  -0.0046 0.75  0.0066 0.75
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Fringe Benefits, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0342 4.61  -0.0883 4.52  0.1225 4.54
  Engineering major  -0.0317 3.76  -0.0907 3.24  0.1223 3.39
  Health major  -0.0302 3.57  -0.0858 3.09  0.1159 3.21
  Public affairs major  -0.0190 1.71  -0.0506 1.53  0.0696 1.58
  Biological science major  -0.0052 0.36  -0.0127 0.35  0.0179 0.35
  Math science major  -0.0379 4.79  -0.1136 4.01  0.1515 4.22
  Social science major  0.0012 0.12  0.0029 0.12  -0.0041 0.12
  History major  -0.0116 0.71  -0.0295 0.66  0.0411 0.67
  Humanity major  -0.0093 0.90  -0.0232 0.86  0.0325 0.87
  Psychology major  -0.0436 4.94  -0.1387 3.91  0.1823 4.15
  Other major  -0.0202 2.56  -0.0527 2.39  0.0729 2.42
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0032 0.99  0.0075 0.99  -0.0107 0.99
  Age squared / 100  0.0000 0.71  -0.0001 0.71  0.0001 0.71
  Tenure  -0.0039 2.31  -0.0091 2.32  0.0130 2.32
  Tenure squared /100  0.0001 1.30  0.0002 1.30  -0.0003 1.30
  Number of hours per week  -0.0002 0.90  -0.0006 0.90  0.0008 0.90
N 3,870   
2χ  113   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Job Challenge, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.0337 6.21  -0.0872 6.28  0.1209 6.38
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0004 1.00  -0.0012 1.00  0.0016 1.01
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0303 2.01  0.0645 2.47  -0.0948 2.32
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0048 0.71  0.0125 0.71  -0.0173 0.71
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0202 2.27  0.0478 2.47  -0.0680 2.42
  High-quality, public institution  -0.0010 0.09  -0.0027 0.09  0.0037 0.09
  High-quality, private institution  0.0263 1.81  0.0576 2.14  -0.0839 2.04
  Historically black coll. and inst.  -0.0226 1.88  -0.0688 1.61  0.0914 1.67
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0209 4.18  -0.0534 4.29  0.0742 4.29
  Native American  -0.0373 1.95  -0.1291 1.49  0.1664 1.57
  Asian  0.0026 0.21  0.0067 0.21  -0.0093 0.21
  Black  0.0423 2.87  0.0844 3.82  -0.1267 3.46
  Hispanic  -0.0153 1.61  -0.0439 1.46  0.0592 1.50
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0016 2.76  -0.0041 2.76  0.0057 2.77
  First generation college graduate  -0.0210 4.24  -0.0538 4.34  0.0748 4.34
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0016 0.67  -0.0042 0.67  0.0059 0.67
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Job Challenge, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major 0.0307 3.22  0.0716 3.54  -0.1022 3.49
  Engineering major 0.0215 1.50  0.0485 1.72  -0.0700 1.65
  Health major -0.0052 0.46  -0.0140 0.45  0.0192 0.45
  Public affairs major -0.0027 0.21  -0.0071 0.20  0.0099 0.20
  Biological science major 0.0227 1.21  0.0504 1.42  -0.0732 1.35
  Math science major 0.0261 1.73  0.0571 2.05  -0.0832 1.94
  Social science major 0.0444 3.09  0.0886 4.03  -0.1330 3.71
  History major 0.0033 0.16  0.0084 0.17  -0.0117 0.17
  Humanity major 0.0416 2.73  0.0835 3.55  -0.1251 3.27
  Psychology major 0.0329 1.65  0.0683 2.07  -0.1012 1.92
  Other major 0.0263 2.37  0.0593 2.71  -0.0856 2.62
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0050 1.63  0.0129 1.63  -0.0178 1.63
  Age squared / 100 -0.0001 1.63  -0.0002 1.63  0.0002 1.63
  Tenure 0.0038 2.39  0.0099 2.39  -0.0137 2.40
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0002 2.03  -0.0004 2.03  0.0006 2.03
  Number of hours per week -0.0018 6.44  -0.0047 6.52  0.0066 6.63
N 3,870   
2χ  230   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Job Challenge, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0004 0.95  -0.0011 0.95  0.0015 0.95
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0019 0.27  0.0047 0.27  -0.0065 0.27
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0065 0.57  -0.0173 0.55  0.0238 0.55
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0292 1.94  0.0614 2.36  -0.0906 2.22
  High-quality, public institution  0.0164 1.86  0.0386 2.00  -0.0550 1.98
  High-quality, private institution  0.0184 1.34  0.0414 1.51  -0.0598 1.46
  Historically black coll. and inst.  -0.0190 1.48  -0.0550 1.30  0.0740 1.34
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0177 3.54  -0.0442 3.62  0.0619 3.60
  Native American  -0.0390 2.06  -0.1332 1.56  0.1721 1.65
  Asian  -0.0013 0.10  -0.0032 0.10  0.0044 0.10
  Black  0.0420 2.83  0.0822 3.74  -0.1241 3.39
  Hispanic  -0.0161 1.69  -0.0454 1.52  0.0615 1.57
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0018 3.12  -0.0047 3.13  0.0065 3.15
  First generation college graduate  -0.0207 4.14  -0.0518 4.22  0.0724 4.22
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0020 0.78  -0.0049 0.78  0.0069 0.78
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Job Challenge, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  0.0205 2.26  0.0484 2.41  -0.0689 2.39
  Engineering major  0.0052 0.42  0.0126 0.44  -0.0178 0.43
  Health major  -0.0191 2.00  -0.0546 1.79  0.0736 1.83
  Public affairs major  -0.0073 0.58  -0.0195 0.55  0.0268 0.56
  Biological science major  0.0167 0.93  0.0376 1.04  -0.0542 1.00
  Math science major  0.0111 0.84  0.0261 0.90  -0.0371 0.88
  Social science major  0.0357 2.62  0.0732 3.24  -0.1089 3.05
  History major  0.0078 0.37  0.0188 0.39  -0.0266 0.39
  Humanity major  0.0366 2.47  0.0741 3.11  -0.1107 2.90
  Psychology major  0.0274 1.42  0.0576 1.72  -0.0850 1.62
  Other major  0.0209 1.94  0.0473 2.16  -0.0682 2.10
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0037 1.20  0.0094 1.20  -0.0131 1.21
  Age squared / 100  0.0000 1.24  -0.0001 1.24  0.0002 1.24
  Tenure  0.0033 2.07  0.0085 2.07  -0.0118 2.08
  Tenure squared /100  -0.0002 2.01  -0.0004 2.01  0.0006 2.01
  Number of hours per week  -0.0023 8.10  -0.0059 8.25  0.0082 8.49
N 3,870   
2χ  188   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Working Condition, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.0169 3.12  -0.0420 3.13  0.0589 3.15
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0001 0.20  -0.0002 0.20  0.0003 0.20
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0356 2.27  0.0706 2.88  -0.1061 2.66
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0010 0.15  -0.0026 0.15  0.0036 0.15
  Middle-quality, private institution  -0.0018 0.23  -0.0046 0.23  0.0064 0.23
  High-quality, public institution  0.0104 0.76  0.0241 0.81  -0.0345 0.80
  High-quality, private institution  0.0316 2.09  0.0645 2.56  -0.0961 2.40
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0131 0.69  0.0297 0.76  -0.0427 0.74
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0028 0.58  -0.0070 0.58  0.0099 0.58
  Native American  -0.0036 0.11  -0.0092 0.11  0.0129 0.11
  Asian  0.0283 1.76  0.0583 2.14  -0.0866 2.00
  Black  0.0362 2.50  0.0721 3.16  -0.1083 2.91
  Hispanic  -0.0003 0.03  -0.0008 0.03  0.0011 0.03
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0010 1.87  -0.0026 1.87  0.0037 1.87
  First generation college graduate  0.0046 0.92  0.0113 0.92  -0.0159 0.92
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0071 2.78  -0.0176 2.79  0.0246 2.80
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Working Condition, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major -0.0176 2.35  -0.0460 2.26  0.0636 2.26
  Engineering major -0.0051 0.46  -0.0130 0.44  0.0180 0.45
  Health major 0.0095 0.75  0.0222 0.79  -0.0316 0.78
  Public affairs major 0.0075 0.53  0.0178 0.56  -0.0253 0.55
  Biological science major -0.0059 0.41  -0.0152 0.39  0.0210 0.40
  Math science major -0.0149 1.47  -0.0408 1.34  0.0557 1.37
  Social science major 0.0031 0.30  0.0076 0.30  -0.0107 0.30
  History major -0.0312 2.52  -0.0978 2.04  0.1290 2.13
  Humanity major -0.0141 1.51  -0.0384 1.39  0.0525 1.41
  Psychology major 0.0083 0.50  0.0196 0.53  -0.0279 0.53
  Other major -0.0166 2.12  -0.0449 1.97  0.0614 1.99
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0095 2.99  0.0236 3.00  -0.0330 3.01
  Age squared / 100 -0.0001 3.14  -0.0003 3.15  0.0004 3.16
  Tenure 0.0064 3.83  0.0158 3.84  -0.0222 3.87
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0002 2.98  -0.0006 2.99  0.0009 3.00
  Number of hours per week 0.0001 0.46  0.0003 0.46  -0.0004 0.46
N 3,870   
2χ  146   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Working Condition, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0001 0.19  -0.0002 0.19  0.0003 0.19
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  -0.0026 0.38  -0.0064 0.38  0.0090 0.38
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0073 0.56  0.0173 0.58  -0.0246 0.58
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0346 2.22  0.0688 2.81  -0.1033 2.60
  High-quality, public institution  -0.0035 0.46  -0.0088 0.45  0.0124 0.45
  High-quality, private institution  0.0273 1.87  0.0570 2.24  -0.0842 2.11
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0154 0.80  0.0344 0.89  -0.0498 0.86
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0012 0.24  -0.0029 0.24  0.0041 0.24
  Native American  -0.0047 0.15  -0.0121 0.14  0.0169 0.14
  Asian  0.0256 1.62  0.0534 1.95  -0.0790 1.83
  Black  0.0358 2.47  0.0712 3.13  -0.1070 2.89
  Hispanic  -0.0009 0.08  -0.0023 0.08  0.0033 0.08
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0012 2.04  -0.0029 2.04  0.0040 2.05
  First generation college graduate  0.0049 0.99  0.0121 0.99  -0.0170 0.99
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0073 2.85  -0.0179 2.86  0.0252 2.87
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Working Condition, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0220 2.93  -0.0579 2.91  0.0799 2.90
  Engineering major  -0.0118 1.15  -0.0314 1.09  0.0431 1.10
  Health major  0.0013 0.12  0.0032 0.12  -0.0046 0.12
  Public affairs major  0.0050 0.36  0.0119 0.37  -0.0168 0.37
  Biological science major  -0.0081 0.58  -0.0213 0.55  0.0294 0.56
  Math science major  -0.0204 2.16  -0.0577 1.94  0.0781 1.98
  Social science major  -0.0002 0.02  -0.0004 0.02  0.0006 0.02
  History major  -0.0300 2.34  -0.0926 1.93  0.1226 2.02
  Humanity major  -0.0160 1.72  -0.0437 1.59  0.0596 1.62
  Psychology major  0.0057 0.36  0.0136 0.37  -0.0194 0.37
  Other major  -0.0187 2.40  -0.0511 2.26  0.0698 2.28
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0089 2.83  0.0221 2.84  -0.0311 2.85
  Age squared / 100  -0.0001 2.99  -0.0003 2.99  0.0004 3.00
  Tenure  0.0061 3.66  0.0150 3.67  -0.0211 3.69
  Tenure squared /100  -0.0002 2.96  -0.0006 2.97  0.0009 2.98
  Number of hours per week  -0.0001 0.38  -0.0002 0.38  0.0003 0.38
N 3,870   
2χ  136   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Job Security, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.0113 2.36  -0.0310 2.37  0.0423 2.37
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0003 0.74  -0.0008 0.74  0.0011 0.75
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0156 1.25  0.0390 1.37  -0.0546 1.34
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0020 0.33  -0.0055 0.33  0.0075 0.33
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0269 3.08  0.0664 3.47  -0.0933 3.37
  High-quality, public institution  0.0168 1.25  0.0418 1.38  -0.0586 1.34
  High-quality, private institution  0.0285 2.03  0.0667 2.39  -0.0952 2.28
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0119 0.72  0.0304 0.78  -0.0423 0.76
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0141 3.08  -0.0383 3.14  0.0524 3.14
  Native American  -0.0101 0.36  -0.0293 0.34  0.0394 0.34
  Asian  0.0034 0.29  0.0092 0.30  -0.0127 0.30
  Black  0.0477 3.34  0.1014 4.44  -0.1491 4.04
  Hispanic  -0.0105 1.14  -0.0306 1.08  0.0411 1.10
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0007 1.47  -0.0020 1.47  0.0028 1.47
  First generation college graduate  -0.0029 0.64  -0.0079 0.64  0.0107 0.64
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0043 1.86  -0.0118 1.86  0.0161 1.86
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Job Security, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major 0.0052 0.67  0.0140 0.68  -0.0192 0.68
  Engineering major 0.0191 1.47  0.0471 1.62  -0.0663 1.58
  Health major -0.0025 0.24  -0.0071 0.24  0.0096 0.24
  Public affairs major -0.0016 0.13  -0.0044 0.13  0.0061 0.13
  Biological science major 0.0274 1.53  0.0639 1.79  -0.0914 1.71
  Math science major -0.0006 0.05  -0.0016 0.05  0.0021 0.05
  Social science major 0.0135 1.26  0.0343 1.34  -0.0478 1.32
  History major -0.0198 1.46  -0.0612 1.30  0.0810 1.34
  Humanity major 0.0002 0.02  0.0006 0.02  -0.0008 0.02
  Psychology major -0.0054 0.42  -0.0153 0.41  0.0208 0.41
  Other major 0.0084 0.94  0.0221 0.97  -0.0305 0.96
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0114 4.04  0.0311 4.07  -0.0425 4.10
  Age squared / 100 -0.0001 3.59  -0.0004 3.61  0.0005 3.63
  Tenure -0.0039 2.64  -0.0106 2.64  0.0144 2.65
  Tenure squared /100 0.0001 0.97  0.0002 0.97  -0.0003 0.97
  Number of hours per week -0.0007 2.67  -0.0018 2.68  0.0025 2.69
N 3,870   
2χ  200   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Job Security, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0003 0.71  -0.0008 0.71  0.0011 0.71
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  -0.0030 0.49  -0.0082 0.49  0.0112 0.49
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0146 1.12  0.0367 1.22  -0.0513 1.19
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0152 1.23  0.0381 1.34  -0.0534 1.31
  High-quality, public institution  0.0254 2.95  0.0628 3.29  -0.0882 3.20
  High-quality, private institution  0.0255 1.87  0.0605 2.17  -0.0859 2.08
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0133 0.80  0.0336 0.86  -0.0470 0.84
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0130 2.87  -0.0353 2.91  0.0483 2.92
  Native American  -0.0109 0.39  -0.0317 0.37  0.0426 0.37
  Asian  0.0020 0.17  0.0053 0.17  -0.0073 0.17
  Black  0.0476 3.34  0.1009 4.42  -0.1484 4.01
  Hispanic  -0.0110 1.21  -0.0321 1.14  0.0432 1.15
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0008 1.61  -0.0023 1.61  0.0031 1.61
  First generation college graduate  -0.0028 0.62  -0.0076 0.62  0.0104 0.62
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0044 1.92  -0.0121 1.92  0.0165 1.92
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Job Security, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  0.0019 0.25  0.0051 0.25  -0.0069 0.25
  Engineering major  0.0129 1.08  0.0329 1.15  -0.0458 1.13
  Health major  -0.0075 0.77  -0.0213 0.74  0.0288 0.75
  Public affairs major  -0.0033 0.27  -0.0090 0.27  0.0123 0.27
  Biological science major  0.0248 1.42  0.0586 1.64  -0.0834 1.57
  Math science major  -0.0048 0.46  -0.0133 0.45  0.0181 0.45
  Social science major  0.0110 1.05  0.0282 1.11  -0.0392 1.09
  History major  -0.0185 1.34  -0.0567 1.20  0.0753 1.23
  Humanity major  -0.0013 0.13  -0.0035 0.13  0.0048 0.13
  Psychology major  -0.0070 0.55  -0.0198 0.53  0.0267 0.53
  Other major  0.0065 0.73  0.0171 0.75  -0.0236 0.75
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0109 3.89  0.0298 3.92  -0.0408 3.95
  Age squared / 100  -0.0001 3.45  -0.0003 3.47  0.0005 3.49
  Tenure  -0.0040 2.75  -0.0110 2.76  0.0150 2.77
  Tenure squared /100  0.0001 0.98  0.0002 0.98  -0.0003 0.98
  Number of hours per week  -0.0008 3.39  -0.0022 3.41  0.0030 3.42
N 3,870   
2χ  194   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Supervisor, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  -0.0175 2.63  -0.0301 2.63  0.0476 2.64
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  0.0000 0.04  0.0000 0.04  -0.0001 0.04
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  -0.0166 1.31  -0.0310 1.21  0.0476 1.24
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0041 0.49  -0.0072 0.49  0.0113 0.49
  Middle-quality, private institution  -0.0046 0.48  -0.0080 0.47  0.0126 0.47
  High-quality, public institution  0.0047 0.30  0.0080 0.31  -0.0127 0.30
  High-quality, private institution  0.0104 0.67  0.0171 0.70  -0.0276 0.69
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0440 1.64  0.0606 2.10  -0.1047 1.88
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0006 0.10  -0.0010 0.10  0.0016 0.10
  Native American  -0.0124 0.33  -0.0229 0.31  0.0354 0.32
  Asian  0.0161 0.90  0.0255 0.98  -0.0416 0.95
  Black  0.0260 1.68  0.0396 1.91  -0.0656 1.81
  Hispanic  -0.0139 1.09  -0.0258 1.02  0.0397 1.04
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  0.0000 0.05  -0.0001 0.05  0.0001 0.05
  First generation college graduate  -0.0047 0.76  -0.0081 0.76  0.0128 0.76
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0015 0.48  -0.0026 0.48  0.0042 0.48
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Supervisor, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major 0.0192 1.69  0.0316 1.75  -0.0508 1.75
  Engineering major -0.0066 0.45  -0.0117 0.44  0.0183 0.44
  Health major 0.0643 2.97  0.0817 4.13  -0.1459 3.58
  Public affairs major 0.0042 0.23  0.0071 0.24  -0.0113 0.24
  Biological science major 0.0103 0.49  0.0168 0.52  -0.0271 0.51
  Math science major 0.0110 0.66  0.0180 0.70  -0.0291 0.69
  Social science major 0.0106 0.75  0.0174 0.78  -0.0280 0.77
  History major 0.0247 0.88  0.0374 1.00  -0.0621 0.95
  Humanity major 0.0327 1.92  0.0484 2.23  -0.0812 2.12
  Psychology major 0.0390 1.62  0.0551 1.99  -0.0941 1.82
  Other major 0.0139 1.10  0.0227 1.15  -0.0366 1.14
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0001 0.04  0.0002 0.04  -0.0004 0.04
  Age squared / 100 0.0000 0.20  0.0000 0.20  0.0000 0.20
  Tenure 0.0023 1.10  0.0039 1.10  -0.0062 1.10
  Tenure squared /100 -0.0001 0.86  -0.0002 0.86  0.0002 0.86
  Number of hours per week 0.0006 1.92  0.0011 1.92  -0.0018 1.93
N 3,870   
2χ  69   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Supervisor, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables    
  Educational debt (in $1,000) 0.0000 0.04  0.0000 0.04  -0.0001 0.04
Institutional Characteristics         
  Low-quality, private institution -0.0061 0.71  -0.0104 0.72  0.0165 0.71
  Middle-quality, public institution 0.0015 0.10  0.0026 0.10  -0.0042 0.10
  Middle-quality, private institution -0.0175 1.39  -0.0329 1.28  0.0505 1.32
  High-quality, public institution -0.0066 0.70  -0.0117 0.69  0.0183 0.69
  High-quality, private institution 0.0065 0.43  0.0108 0.44  -0.0172 0.43
  Historically black coll. and inst. 0.0474 1.73  0.0641 2.26  -0.1115 2.00
Demographic Characteristics         
  Female 0.0011 0.17  0.0018 0.17  -0.0029 0.17
  Native American -0.0135 0.37  -0.0251 0.34  0.0386 0.35
  Asian 0.0135 0.77  0.0217 0.83  -0.0353 0.81
  Black 0.0258 1.66  0.0393 1.89  -0.0651 1.80
  Hispanic -0.0143 1.12  -0.0265 1.05  0.0409 1.07
Family Background         
  Family income (in $10,000) -0.0001 0.20  -0.0002 0.20  0.0004 0.20
  First generation college graduate -0.0042 0.68  -0.0072 0.68  0.0115 0.68
Academic Background         
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile -0.0017 0.55  -0.0030 0.55  0.0048 0.55
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Supervisor, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  0.0141 1.28  0.0234 1.31  -0.0375 1.32
  Engineering major  -0.0133 0.98  -0.0244 0.92  0.0377 0.94
  Health major  0.0528 2.64  0.0706 3.43  -0.1234 3.08
  Public affairs major  0.0017 0.09  0.0028 0.09  -0.0045 0.09
  Biological science major  0.0073 0.36  0.0122 0.37  -0.0195 0.37
  Math science major  0.0041 0.26  0.0069 0.27  -0.0110 0.27
  Social science major  0.0071 0.52  0.0118 0.53  -0.0189 0.53
  History major  0.0287 1.00  0.0425 1.17  -0.0713 1.09
  Humanity major  0.0303 1.81  0.0452 2.08  -0.0755 1.97
  Psychology major  0.0359 1.52  0.0514 1.83  -0.0873 1.70
  Other major  0.0113 0.91  0.0186 0.94  -0.0299 0.93
Labor Market           
  Age  -0.0005 0.13  -0.0008 0.13  0.0013 0.13
  Age squared / 100  0.0000 0.36  0.0000 0.36  0.0000 0.36
  Tenure  0.0020 0.95  0.0034 0.95  -0.0053 0.95
  Tenure squared /100  -0.0001 0.84  -0.0001 0.84  0.0002 0.84
  Number of hours per week  0.0004 1.28  0.0007 1.28  -0.0011 1.28
N 3,870   
2χ  62   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Co-worker, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Log earnings  0.0003 0.26  0.0035 0.26  -0.0038 0.26
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0001 0.69  -0.0008 0.69  0.0008 0.69
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  0.0041 1.19  0.0417 1.27  -0.0458 1.27
  Middle-quality, public institution  -0.0003 0.17  -0.0030 0.17  0.0033 0.17
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0022 1.08  0.0235 1.11  -0.0258 1.11
  High-quality, public institution  0.0075 1.80  0.0734 2.04  -0.0809 2.02
  High-quality, private institution  0.0052 1.43  0.0523 1.55  -0.0575 1.54
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0002 0.05  0.0019 0.05  -0.0021 0.05
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0008 0.68  -0.0085 0.68  0.0093 0.68
  Native American  0.0043 0.45  0.0434 0.48  -0.0477 0.47
  Asian  0.0085 1.96  0.0820 2.27  -0.0905 2.24
  Black  0.0047 1.51  0.0474 1.63  -0.0520 1.62
  Hispanic  -0.0033 1.41  -0.0366 1.37  0.0399 1.38
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0001 0.81  -0.0012 0.81  0.0013 0.81
  First generation college graduate  -0.0010 0.88  -0.0112 0.89  0.0122 0.89
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0011 1.73  -0.0116 1.77  0.0127 1.77
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Co-worker, Direct Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major -0.0038 2.14  -0.0421 2.17  0.0460 2.18
  Engineering major -0.0042 1.94  -0.0478 1.90  0.0521 1.90
  Health major -0.0014 0.54  -0.0148 0.53  0.0162 0.53
  Public affairs major -0.0038 1.50  -0.0427 1.45  0.0464 1.45
  Biological science major 0.0031 0.76  0.0319 0.80  -0.0350 0.80
  Math science major 0.0026 0.84  0.0274 0.87  -0.0300 0.87
  Social science major 0.0028 1.02  0.0286 1.06  -0.0314 1.06
  History major 0.0019 0.41  0.0204 0.43  -0.0223 0.43
  Humanity major -0.0008 0.34  -0.0088 0.33  0.0096 0.33
  Psychology major -0.0047 1.80  -0.0546 1.73  0.0594 1.74
  Other major -0.0010 0.48  -0.0106 0.48  0.0116 0.48
Labor Market          
  Age 0.0013 1.79  0.0143 1.84  -0.0156 1.84
  Age squared / 100 0.0000 1.60  -0.0002 1.63  0.0002 1.63
  Tenure 0.0000 0.06  -0.0003 0.06  0.0003 0.06
  Tenure squared /100 0.0000 0.96  -0.0002 0.97  0.0003 0.97
  Number of hours per week -0.0001 1.04  -0.0007 1.05  0.0008 1.05
N 3,870   
2χ  75   
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Co-worker, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
Financial Variables     
  Educational debt (in $1,000)  -0.0001 0.70  -0.0008 0.70  0.0008 0.70
Institutional Characteristics          
  Low-quality, private institution  -0.0002 0.15  -0.0027 0.15  0.0029 0.15
  Middle-quality, public institution  0.0076 1.82  0.0741 2.06  -0.0817 2.04
  Middle-quality, private institution  0.0041 1.20  0.0419 1.28  -0.0460 1.27
  High-quality, public institution  0.0023 1.09  0.0239 1.13  -0.0262 1.13
  High-quality, private institution  0.0053 1.45  0.0531 1.58  -0.0584 1.57
  Historically black coll. and inst.  0.0001 0.03  0.0014 0.03  -0.0015 0.03
Demographic Characteristics          
  Female  -0.0008 0.71  -0.0088 0.71  0.0097 0.71
  Native American  0.0043 0.45  0.0437 0.48  -0.0480 0.48
  Asian  0.0086 1.98  0.0825 2.28  -0.0911 2.26
  Black  0.0047 1.51  0.0475 1.64  -0.0521 1.63
  Hispanic  -0.0032 1.40  -0.0365 1.37  0.0397 1.37
Family Background          
  Family income (in $10,000)  -0.0001 0.80  -0.0011 0.80  0.0012 0.80
  First generation college graduate  -0.0010 0.88  -0.0113 0.89  0.0123 0.89
Academic Background          
  Merged SAT/ACT quartile  -0.0011 1.73  -0.0116 1.77  0.0126 1.77
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Table E.10 – Continued 
Satisfaction with Co-worker, Total Effects 
 Marginal Effect 
 Dissatisfied  Somehow 
satisfied 
 Satisfied 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t
  Business major  -0.0038 2.12  -0.0412 2.16  0.0450 2.16
  Engineering major  -0.0041 1.91  -0.0466 1.87  0.0507 1.88
  Health major  -0.0012 0.49  -0.0133 0.48  0.0145 0.48
  Public affairs major  -0.0037 1.48  -0.0422 1.43  0.0460 1.44
  Biological science major  0.0032 0.78  0.0326 0.81  -0.0357 0.81
  Math science major  0.0028 0.89  0.0288 0.93  -0.0316 0.92
  Social science major  0.0028 1.05  0.0294 1.09  -0.0322 1.09
  History major  0.0019 0.41  0.0200 0.42  -0.0220 0.42
  Humanity major  -0.0008 0.32  -0.0084 0.32  0.0092 0.32
  Psychology major  -0.0047 1.78  -0.0543 1.71  0.0590 1.72
  Other major  -0.0009 0.46  -0.0101 0.46  0.0110 0.46
Labor Market           
  Age  0.0013 1.81  0.0144 1.86  -0.0158 1.86
  Age squared / 100  0.0000 1.61  -0.0002 1.65  0.0002 1.65
  Tenure  0.0000 0.04  -0.0002 0.04  0.0002 0.04
  Tenure squared /100  0.0000 0.97  -0.0002 0.98  0.0003 0.98
  Number of hours per week  -0.0001 1.01  -0.0007 1.02  0.0007 1.02
N 3,870   
2χ  75   
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